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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the study 
Globalization has led to a rapid growth in the number of MNEs that have been 
investing abroad in recent years. FDI has become enormously significant as the 
magnitude of international business has grown gradually during the last two dec-
ades. This development has occurred for several reasons, including the evolution 
and development of free-market economies around the world, the growth of inter-
national financial markets, the proliferation of regional integration between na-
tions, and the numerous communication and technological developments that 
make managing far flung businesses easier. However, foreign direct investment 
possesses characteristics that make it highly sought after on the one hand and con-
troversial on the other (Barlett & Ghoshal 1989; Dunning 1992).   
The word FDI usually brings to attention the significant contribution of foreign 
investment to domestic development. FDI has been defined differently by differ-
ent scholars. Dunning (1993:5) defines FDI as investments “out of the home 
country of the investing company, but inside the investing company”. He also 
emphasizes that FDI consists of a “package of assets and intermediate products, 
such as capital, technology, management skills, access to markets, and entrepre-
neurship”. The International Monetary Fund (IMF 1993:359) defines FDI as an 
investment that reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by the resident 
entity in one economy of an enterprise resident in another economy. Lasting in-
terest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor 
and foreign enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the investor on the 
management of the enterprise. As noted by Albuquerque (2000), FDI does not 
necessarily require capital flows or investment in capacity. Basically, it is an ex-
tension of corporate control over international boundaries other than that of a 
source/home country. Thus, in view of the above definitions, FDI can be referred 
to as an investment involving a long-term relationship and control or significant 
degree of influence by the resident enterprise of one economy (direct investor) in 
another enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the investor. A direct 
investment enterprise can be a subsidiary (a non-resident investor owning more 
than 50%), an associate (an investor owning 50% or less) or a branch (wholly or 
jointly owned unincorporated enterprises) either directly or indirectly owned by 
the foreign investor. The influence by the foreign investor in the enterprise arises 
from firm specific ownership, a monopolistic advantage that allows MNEs to out-
perform indigenous firms in international business and local markets (Jensen 
2006).  
2      Acta Wasaensia 
 
FDI is seen as an engine of growth as it provides the much-needed capital for in-
vestment, increases competition in the host-country industries, and aids local 
firms to become more productive by adopting more efficient technologies or by 
investing in human and/or physical capital. Researchers (e.g. De Gregorio 1992; 
Giroud 2007; Lensink & Morrissey 2000; Olivia & Rivera-Batiz 2002) argue that 
foreign direct investment (FDI) contributes to the economic growth of a country. 
Domestic investment may accelerate economic growth but new technology need-
ed for economic growth is acquired only through FDI (Yao & Wei 2007). Thus, 
the benefits of FDI include serving as a source of capital, employment generation, 
facilitating access to foreign markets, and generating both technological and effi-
ciency spillover to local firms. It is expected that, by providing access to foreign 
markets, transferring technology and generally building capacity in the host-
country firms, FDI will inevitably improve the integration of the host country into 
the global economy and foster growth and development. However, the role of FDI 
in promoting such beneficial goals has not been without controversy. A number 
of scholars claimed that the activities of MNCs can displace local firms that can-
not cope with competition from foreign firms, thereby reducing the growth of the 
local firms (Jones, 1996). Furthermore, Aitken and Harrison (1999) found both 
positive and negative effects of FDI on local firms in their study of Venezuela. 
Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding FDI, it has been argued that its ad-
vantages outweigh the disadvantages. It has also been cited by many scholars that 
private investment has become the most important source of finance for develop-
ing countries, providing many benefits to recipient countries. Such benefits in-
clude increased economic growth and a positive spillover from transferring tech-
nology to domestic firms (Caves 1982; Helleiner 1989; Haddad & Harrison, 
1993). Furthermore, foreign presence accelerates productivity growth (Aitken & 
Harrison, 1999) and multinational's corporations (MNCs) have had direct and 
indirect positive employment effects on manufacturing and services (Haddad & 
Harrison 1993; Chitraker & Weiss 1995). FDI is also more stable and “less vola-
tile (as measured by the coefficient of variation) than commercial bank loans and 
foreign portfolio flows” (World Bank 1999). 
Over the last decade, developing countries have attracted significant amounts of 
private capital flows to augment low levels of domestic savings and government 
revenues. During the period 1982-1999, most FDI flows to developing countries 
were directed towards Asia and Latin America.  According to the WIR (2001) 
FDI inflows to Africa declined from $10.5 billion in 1999 to $9.1 billion in 2000. 
FDI to African countries peaked in 2008 at USD 72 billion (UNCTAD 2010a), 
five times the value of FDI receipts in 2000. The rise in FDI up to 2008 was sup-
ported by a surge in prices for raw materials, particularly oil, which triggered a 
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boom in commodity-related investment. The global financial crisis had a twofold 
negative impact. First, investors suffered and reduced their investment volume. At 
the same time, the crisis lowered demand for Africa’s commodities. This reduced 
capital investment to the mining and commodity sectors where most foreign in-
vestment has historically been concentrated in Africa. Consequently, FDI inflows 
to African countries fell by 20%, to USD 60.1 billion in 2009. In 2009, FDI flows 
to developing countries amounted to $478.35 billion, in which the share of whole 
of Africa was $60.1 billion (12.2%). For the same year, the stock of FDI in the 
developing world was placed at $4.89 trillion, of which the Africa continent share 
was $514.76 billion (10.55%) (UNCTAD 2010).  In 2010, the inflows to Africa 
declined to $55 billion (UNCTAD 2011). 
Angola, Nigeria, Morocco, Egypt, and South Africa are the major recipients of 
FDI in Africa. A group of African countries including Ghana, Botswana, and 
Equatorial Guinea have recently attracted rapidly increasing FDI inflows mainly 
to the natural resource sectors and for the acquisition of privatized companies. 
FDI business environments in African countries have been perceived to be eco-
nomically and politically unstable and FDI inflows, in particular outside the natu-
ral-resource extraction sector, remained relatively sparse (MIGA 2011). This is 
also reconfirmed by the World Investment Prospect survey conducted by 
UNCTAD in 2009, in which multinational investors indicated that they continue 
to have low preference in Sub-Saharan Africa as a future investment location 
(UNCTAD 2009a). Africa still lags behind other regions in the world in terms of 
total FDIs and the required conducive environment for investments to succeed. 
The image of Africa as a location for foreign direct investment has not been fa-
vourable (Owusu & Habiyakare 2011).  
The reason assigned for a lack of FDI in Africa countries are various political, 
economic and administrative constraints, which make conducting business diffi-
cult. Instability takes many forms such as the overthrow of governments, (Gyi-
mah-Brampong & Traynor 1999) or other forms of political, social and economic 
turbulence (Owusu & Habiyakare 2011). According to Asiedu (2004) and Mlam-
bo (2005), in Sub-Sahara Africa the level of risk perceived by foreign investors is 
very high due to the instability of the macroeconomic environment, which is a 
critical determinant of FDI inflows. One of the main indicators of economic un-
certainty is the inflation rate. Several factors contribute to the instability of infla-
tion in African countries including inadequate monetary policy, inconsistent in-
vestment policies, and deficient financial systems (Mlambo 2005). In addition, 
high corporate taxes in many African countries also deter FDI (Henisz 2000; Jen-
kins & Thomas 2002). Also, Cyrysostome et al. (2011) argued that some African 
countries have very restrictive regulations concerning earning remittance of for-
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eign companies which discourage MNE’s in conducting business in the region. 
According to Montial (2006), other economic constraints that deter FDI inflows 
to African include: barriers to information flow and lack of transparency, which 
reduce FDI attractiveness.  
Ghana has long been regarded as one of sub-Saharan Africa’s “star performers” 
(Coulombe & Wodon 2007). It was one of the earliest African economic reform-
ers, with a series of reforms beginning in 1983. These reforms included the aboli-
tion of price controls, the opening of capital markets, reductions in import tariffs, 
and privatization of many state-owned enterprises (Sandefur 2010). Ghana has 
implemented policies designed to accelerate the process of growth and transfor-
mation of the economy under competitive conditions. The Government of Ghana 
has put in place incentives to encourage the inflow of foreign investment 
(Amoako-Gyampah & Acquaah 2008). They include tax holidays in all sectors of 
the economy to ensure that the country becomes the gateway to the West African 
market of 250 million consumers. In addition, under the on-going privatization 
programme, 100% foreign ownership is permitted. According to Amoako-
Gyampah and Acquaah (2008), the new economic policies have changed the 
business environment of manufacturing companies by reducing hurdles while, at 
the same time, increasing competition. Thus, foreign manufacturing subsidiaries 
face a more promising but competitive environment that demands improved 
strength of market-orientation and competitive capabilities.  
As a result of these reforms Ghana exhibited strong and sustained growth, with a 
growth rate of 7.7 per cent in 2010 (UNCTAD 2011). In 2011, the Ghanaian 
economy had the fastest rate of growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a growth rate 
of 13.4 per cent (UNCTAD 2011). FDI rose from about USD 20 million in 1990 
to  around  USD  200  million  at  the  end  of  the  decade.  Since  then  it  has  risen  to  
about USD 2.5 billion in 2010 (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics; UNCTAD 
2011).The country is considered to be one of the best investment locations in 
West Africa (UNCTAD, 2011), and plays a major role in the Economic Commu-
nity of West African States (ECOWAS). In 2010, Ghana was ranked the 7th larg-
est recipient of foreign direct investments (FDIs) and the 4th safest FDI destina-
tion country in Africa (UNCTAD 2011).  
Table 1 shows the trends of economic indicators in Ghana’s economy since 1995. 
With the discovery and exploration of oil in Ghana, there is an increased potential 
for future growth.Ghana, thus, exemplifies the group of African economies that 
are growing fast due to improved economic management and increased natural 
resource exports. In spite of historically low rates of FDI, they are recently be-
coming more interesting to foreign investors. Some authorities project that an 
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African country like Ghana will become the new frontier of global investment and 
development within the next decade. Thus, we need to better understand issues of 
FDI in an African context 
 
Table 1.   Macroeconomic indicators for Ghana  
 
Year 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Population (mil-
lions) 
16.23 
 
19.53 
 
21,02 
 
22.409 
 
22.93 
 
23,38 
 
23.83 24.39 
GDP PPP (US$ 
bn)(C) 
18.9 
 
26.1 
 
41.9 
 
45.2 
 
49.6 
 
54.9 
 
59.3 64.6 
GDP Per capital 
PPP (US$) (C) 
1,168 1,418 2,007 2,113 2,258 2,439 2,556 2,725 
Real GDP Growth 
(% change) 
4.0 3.7 5.8 6.4 6.3 8.4 4.7 7.7 
Current account 
balance (%GDP) 
-1.878 -5.347 -5.143 -6.199 -7.956 -10.795 - 4.7 -7.0 
Inflation (% 
Change) 
70.8 40.5 14.8 10.9 12.7 18.1 19.3  10.7 
Country risk 49 
 
44.94 
 
36.68 
 
40.96 
 
    
Source: World development indicators and euromoney databases 
Ghana's manufacturing industry expanded after independence in 1957 when the 
government launched an industrialization drive. It resulted in the creation of a 
range of industrial enterprises including aluminum processing, oil refining, timber 
processing, cocoa processing, breweries, cement manufacturing, and textile man-
ufacturing. As a result, the manufacturing industry’s share of GDP grew from 
10% in 1960 to 14% in 1970. After 1970, harsh external economic conditions, 
economic mis-management, and shortage of resources made it difficult for manu-
facturers to stay afloat, ultimately leading to a decline through the 70's and 80's. 
Recent liberalization of trade further added to the difficulties by flooding markets 
with cheap imports (mostly from China) with which local companies could not 
compete. As many as 120 manufacturing facilities have closed their doors since 
the liberalization of trade eliminated many jobs. Since the late 1980s, the Gov-
ernment has attempted to support the manufacturing sector through various finan-
cial incentives to attract both local and foreign investors. Among some of the big-
gest manufacturing companies operating in Ghana are Unilever Ghana Ltd (con-
sumer goods); Valco Aluminium (metals) and Ticor Chemicals Ghana Ltd (indus-
trial chemicals) (see Appendix 6).   
1.2 Research problem and research gap 
There is an immense body of literature which has emerged on international entry 
mode research and has mostly taken place in the advanced world (e.g. Wilson, 
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1980; Caves & Mehra 1986; Forsgren 1989; Zejan 1990; Hennart & Park 1993; 
Andersson & Svensson 1994; Cho & Padmanabhan 1995; Hennart, Larimo & 
Chen 1996; Meyer & Estrin, 1997; Barkema & Vermeulen 1998; Padmanabhan & 
Cho 1999; Brouthers & Brouthers 2000; Harzing 2002; Larimo 2003; Chen & 
Zeng 2004). A growing number of studies have explored the entry modes of 
MNCs entering Central and Eastern Europe (e.g Nakos & Brouthers 2002; Diko-
va & Witteloostuijn 2005, 2007)  and Asia (e.g. Pan, Li & Tse 1999; Pan & Tse 
2000). In addition, many studies have focused on the performance implications of 
entry modes examined from the perspective of the parent firm (e.g. Barkema & 
Vermeulen 1998; Brouthers & Brouthers 2000; Elango & Sambharya 2004; Har-
zing 2002; Hennart & Park 1993; Mudambi & Mudambi 2002). In spite of the 
abundant studies on motives, entry mode choices and performance, most of the 
studies have focused on FDIs made in advanced and emerging economies.   
There have only been a handful of studies of this nature made in the context of 
Africa – even at the macro level (see e.g. Bartels, Eicher, Bachtrong & Rezonja 
2009; Asiedu 2002, 2006; Bende-Nabende 2002). Even though in recent years 
many of the underdeveloped countries in Africa have undergone radical changes 
in their institutional environment with the aim of attracting foreign investment, 
very little research has been carried out to examine FDI strategies and the perfor-
mance of foreign MNEs investing in Sub-Saharan Africa. These studies have 
identified a number of factors which attract FDI into the continent but there is 
scant empirical research on motives, entry modes and subsequent performance of 
FDI in the continent. While motives for FDI in general have been extensively 
discussed in the literature, very few empirical studies have been made in Sub-
Sahara Africa on motives (e.g. Boateng & Glaister 2003). Regarding establish-
ment modes, Bhaumik et al. (2005), and for the performance (e.g. Boateng & 
Glaister 2002; Chrysostome & Lupton 2011) are a few of the few studies that 
have been undertaken in Africa. Despite these and other studies, Owusu and 
Habiyakare (2011), Burgess and Steenkamp (2006), Hoskisson et al. (2000), and 
Nwankwo (2000), among others, state that the academic literature on business in 
Africa is limited, and they call for more studies. Hence, there is the need for more 
research to shed light on the extent of the behaviour of FDI and performance of 
subsidiaries in an African context. 
In order to find out what has been done in the region, I have based my research on 
the articles published in journals found in databases available from the library of 
the University of Vaasa. This encompasses almost all the peer-reviewed business 
and management journals in the world. The database is made of twelve major 
international e-journal databases and it includes ABI Inform Global, Emerald, 
Science Direct,  ESBCO, SAGE Journals Online (Sage Premier),  JSTOR Arts & 
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Sciences etc. The keywords used for the search are “entry mode choices”, “mo-
tives”, “establishment modes”, “ownership choice”, “FDI performance”, “Afri-
ca”, Ghana. This search yielded papers mostly addressing macro-economic de-
terminants of FDI to Africa, which is not the main purpose of the present disserta-
tion. Of the few relevant studies I found, one is on motives, one on establishment 
modes, and three on performance. For the lists of these relevant few studies (see 
Table 2). Also, I went through each number of the available international peer-
reviewed journals on business in Africa: Journal of African Business, Africa 
Journal of Business Management, South African Journal of Business Manage-
ment,  and  African  Journal  of  Business  and  Economics  to  identify  other  articles  
which are relevant to this dissertation.  
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1.3 The objectives and justifications of the study 
The main purpose of the study is to increase our understanding of the behaviour 
of manufacturing FDIs in Ghana. To this end, the research question of this study 
is:  
What factors motivate and influence the FDI choices of MNEs with regard 
to motives, establishment mode and ownership mode, and how do they im-
pact on subsidiary performance in the context of Ghana? 
In order to achieve the overall objectives, this dissertation has both theoretical and 
empirical sub-objectives. They are:  
 
1. To integrate two theoretical streams of the literature on international busi-
ness drawn from the eclectic paradigm and transaction cost theory in order 
to address FDI strategies and performance. 
2. To develop and test a model based on this theoretical framework in the 
context of Ghana. 
3. To empirically analyse how ownership-specific location-specific, internal-
ization, and transaction cost specific factors have influenced the FDI mo-
tives, establishment and ownership mode strategies of foreign firms in 
Ghana. 
4. To empirically analyse how ownership factors, location factors, and strat-
egies of MNEs have influenced the performance of foreign subsidiary 
firms in Ghana. 
5. To empirically analyse the interaction effects of ownership and location 
factors,  as  well  as  the  combined  effect  of  establishment  and  ownership  
mode choices and their impacts on the performance of foreign subsidiary 
firms in Ghana.  
As described in the introduction, Ghana’s economy has performed relatively well 
in the last fifteen years. The 2010 Global Competitiveness Report ranked Ghana 
as one of the best performers in Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of economic reforms 
towards providing a favourable investment environment for business develop-
ment.Therefore, Ghana represents an excellent case to study the phenomenon of 
MNCs strategic decisions and subsidiary performance in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
This study focuses on foreign manufacturing firms that have invested in Ghana, 
where the domestic market conditions are different from that of the advanced 
countries which have been the domain of past research.  Research on FDI in Afri-
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can countries is scanty and several researchers call for increased research (Owusu 
& Habiyakare 2011; Burgess & Steenkamp 2006; Hoskisson et al. 2000; Nwank-
wo2000).Thus, this study has the potential to generate a better understanding of 
the internationalization of foreign companies in Africa.  
Specifically this study will provide both theoretical and managerial insights into 
the strategic motivations, establishment and ownership mode choices, as well as 
the performance of FDI in Africa. This dissertation contributes to the literature on 
foreign direct investments in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. By examining 
manufacturing FDI made by MNEs in Ghana. This study should increase 
knowledge  of  the  behaviour  and  strategies  of  FDI  in  African  countries.  In  addi-
tion, this study provides a rich and comprehensive understanding of the im-
portance of each of the ownership-specific, location-specific and internalization 
and transactions cost factors, and how they influence motives, establishment 
mode, ownership mode and the subsidiary’s performance of foreign firms in Gha-
na.  
Furthermore, this study provides an understanding of whether ownership-specific, 
location-specific and internalization and transaction cost factors should, or should 
not, be considered in isolation, with respect to  their strategic impact upon a firm's 
global strategic aims. Managerially, identifying ownership-specific, location-
specific, internalization and transaction cost factors influencing the FDI choices 
can serve as a guide for policy-makers in designing appropriate FDI policies to 
attract investments. In pursuing vigorous policies towards attracting foreign in-
vestment, policy makers need to understand the importance of conditions influ-
encing the flow of FDI from the home country into a foreign country. In addition, 
the results of this study would help managers to identify the key factors that 
should be taken into consideration when making strategic decisions concerning 
motives, establishment modes and ownership modes that are appropriate when 
making FDI decisions in Sub-Sahara Africa. Finally, this study provides a logical 
step towards examining the motives, establishment mode, ownership mode and 
the performance of FDIs that could be replicated in other settings. As FDI contin-
ues to grow, this method could prove to be useful in examining the motives, es-
tablishment mode, ownership and performance of foreign firms in other countries 
in Africa or other regions in the world. 
In order to answer the research questions, this study uses quantitative methodolo-
gy because of its advantages when trying to understand the relationship between 
independent and dependent variables, develop hypotheses, and test them (Cre-
swell, 2003). Quantitative research has its roots in positivism and is concerned 
with carrying out investigations in such a way that statistical results can be 
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reached. Quantitative research aims at reducing or eliminating biases to the extent 
that hypotheses can be accepted or rejected, levels of significance can be estab-
lished for their acceptance or rejection, and the results can be generalized to better 
extent than qualitative research. Thus, quantitative methodology is most suitable 
to answer the research questions of this study by providing statistical analyses of 
available data. Quantitative research builds on previous knowledge and theories 
in order to answer the research questions (Patel & Davidsson 2003). In this study 
the approach is used to identify factors that influence the FDI strategies and per-
formance of manufacturing FDI in Ghana. This study is based on the five sequen-
tial stages proposed by Robson (2002) to conduct scientific research: deducing 
hypotheses; expressing the hypotheses in operational terms; testing these opera-
tional hypotheses; analyzing the results; and confirming or /modifying the theo-
ries in accordance with the findings. The theoretical framework is built on the 
eclectic paradigm and transaction cost theory. Hypotheses are developed from 
aspects of the extant literature that are relevant to FDI behavior in the areas of 
motives, establishment mode, ownership mode, and performance. The data analy-
sis used a binomial logistic method to analyze the data and test hypotheses relat-
ing to motives, establishment and ownership choice, because the dependent varia-
bles are dichotomous or discrete. Ordinary least square was used to analyze the 
data and test hypotheses relating to performance because variables are categorical 
variable. 
1.4 Definitions of the main concepts of the study 
The main concepts in this study have been identified based on their importance in 
understanding the research phenomenon under study. These terms include foreign 
direct investment, motives, establishment mode choice, ownership mode choice, 
acquisition, greenfield investment, wholly owned subsidiary, joint venture and 
performance. The definitions of main terms used in this dissertation are summa-
rized and presented in Table 1 together with the related references, so that the 
reader can follow the conceptualization of these terms in this dissertation.  
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Table 3.    Definitions of the main concepts of the study 
 
Key Terms Definitions References 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
FDI defines as investments “out of the home country of the 
investing  company,  but  inside  the  investing  company”.   He  
also emphasizes that FDI consists of a “package of assets and 
intermediate products, such as capital, technology, manage-
ment skills, access to markets, and entrepreneurship”. 
Dunning (1993:5) 
Motives FDI literature identifies three most common investment moti-
vations: resource- seeking, market-seeking and efficiency-
seeking, and strategic asset seeking. 
Adapted from 
Dunning, (1993). 
Market-seeking 
(MS) 
Market-seeking FDIs are undertaken to sustain or protect 
existing markets or to exploit or promote new markets.  Mar-
ket-seeking firms generally choose those locations that are 
most promising to achieve actual and future growth goals. 
Adapted from 
Dunning (1993)  
Resource-
seeking (RS) 
Resource-seeking firms naturally aim to access specific re-
sources in the host country at lower cost levels then they 
achieve at present in their home countries  
Adapted from 
Galan, González-
Benito,& Zuniga-
Vincente, 2007); 
Dunning (1993)  
Efficiency-
seeking (ES) 
Efficiency-seeking projects are undertaken in order to ration-
alize the structure of established production units in such a 
way that a firm can gain from the common governance of 
interrelated activities in different locations  
Adapted from 
Dunning (1993). 
Establishment 
mode choice 
The trade-off between start-up(greenfield investment) or ac-
quiring existing firms (acquisition) when MNE enters a new 
market 
Adapted from 
Chen, (2008) 
 
Acquisition Purchasing  part  or  all  of  the  equity  of  an  existing  firm.  This 
implies that acquisitions can be partially or wholly owned as 
well. 
Adapted from  
Cho & Pad-
manabhan (1995) 
Greenfield Startup investment from scratch (operations and human re-
sources) in a new host market 
Adapted from  
Larimo (2003);  
Ownership 
mode choice 
The choice between wholly owned subsidiary and joint ven-
ture when MNE enters a new market through equity 
Adapted from  
Anderson & Gat-
ignon (1986);  
Wholly Owned 
Subsidiary 
(WOS) 
This form of market entry provides a company with full con-
trol over its foreign operations. This method of market entry 
requires large capital investment, commitment of time and 
effort , and normally a willingness of some employees or 
management to travel to and live in a foreign country 
Adapted from 
Kogut & Singh 
(1988); Jun et al. 
(2008) 
Joint Venture 
(JV) 
Joint venture is a cooperative operation formed by two or 
more independent entities from different countries to achieve 
common or complementary objectives. Joint venture partners 
may be privately owned companies government agencies, or 
government-owned firms.  
Adapted from 
Kogut & Singh 
1988). Anderson 
& Gatignon 
(1986) 
Performance Performance is a measure of the outcomes of investments, 
specifically captured as the total performance outcomes and 
profitability of the investment over time. 
 
Adapted from  
Fey & Beamish 
(2001) 
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1.5 Structure of the study 
Chapter 1 gives the introduction and outlines the background, research problem 
and research gap, research questions and objectives, justification and contribu-
tions of the study. The structure of the study is presented in Figure 1. 
Chapter 2 a review of eclectic paradigm and transaction cost theory explaining 
the growth of the firm and foreign value-added activities they own or control.  It  
can be said that due to the diversity of the theoretical explanations, there is no 
unanimously accepted FDI theory. However, all these theories share one common 
feature – nearly all of them are related to outward foreign direct investment. This 
chapter ends with argumentation for choosing these two theories and their short-
comings as the framework of this study.  
Chapter 3 presents the four main strategic motives for investment. By identifying 
the strategic objectives underlying FDI projects, it becomes possible to analyze 
directly and explicitly the role of strategies in determining the propensity of the 
firms to undertake FDI projects. The chapter concentrates on the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the motivational strategies, and discusses the crucial own-
ership-specific, location-specific, internalization and transaction cost specific. It 
also presents the hypotheses measuring the FDI choices of foreign firms in Gha-
na. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks. 
Chapter 4 presents the establishment mode, which is made up of acquisition and 
greenfield foreign manufacturing entries in Ghana. The chapter will examine fac-
tors foreign investors consider when entering the Ghanaian market. Theoretically, 
the analysis will investigate how the ownership- specific, location-specific, inter-
nalization specific and transaction cost could influence the decisions of foreign 
firms to a choice between greenfield and acquisitions in the context of the Ghana-
ian market. The chapter will detail out the hypotheses measuring the choice of 
greenfield and acquisition.  
Chapter 5 presents the ownership mode, which is made up of JV and WOS. The 
chapter will look at factors foreign investors consider when choosing an owner-
ship structure in the Ghanaian market. Theoretically, the analysis will investigate 
how the ownership-specific, location-specific, internalization specific and trans-
action cost could influence the decisions of foreign investing firms to establish a 
joint or wholly owned venture in Ghana. The chapter will detail the hypotheses 
measuring the choice between the joint venture and wholly owned subsidiary 
Chapter 6 this chapter examines the impact of ownership specific factors, loca-
tion specific factors, establishment and ownership modes and its impact on the 
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performance of foreign investing firms in Ghana. Theoretically, the analysis will 
investigate how the ownership-specific, location-specific, establishment modes 
and ownership choices will affect the performance of foreign investing firms in 
Ghana. The chapter will detail the hypotheses measuring the impact of these fac-
tors on subsidiary performance in Ghana.  
Chapter 7 provides a bridge between the objectives, theoretical and empirical 
setting related to the FDI of the foreign manufacturing firms in Ghana. In this 
chapter research methodology and the sample and characteristics of the participat-
ing firms are discussed. It also provides an overview of the statistical procedure 
used and operationalization of the dependent, independent and control variables 
related to motives, establishment modes, ownership modes and performance of 
foreign firms in Ghana. 
Chapter 8 provides the results of the study. The first part of this chapter deal with 
the testing of hypotheses and the model related to the motivational aspect of the 
foreign firms in Ghana. The second part of this chapter deals with the hypotheses 
and model related to the establishment modes of the foreign firm in Ghana. The 
third part of this chapter deals with the hypotheses and model related to the own-
ership choices of the foreign firm in Ghana. The fourth part of this chapter deals 
with the hypotheses and model related to the overall performance and profitability 
of the foreign firm in Ghana.  
Chapter 9 discusses the contributions and implications of this study. The first 
subchapter provides a summary of the previous chapters of the present study. The 
second subchapter reviews the theoretical contribution and managerial implica-
tions of this research. Finally, the thesis ends with limitations and suggestions for 
future research. 
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2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter reviews the literature on two foreign direct investment theories and 
explanations  of  the  growth  of  the  multinational  firms.  This  chapter  attempts  to  
discuss the strength and weaknesses of eclectic and transaction cost theories. 
There is a large diversity of theoretical explanations of international production 
and there is no unanimously accepted FDI theory. However, all these theories 
share one common feature: all of them are primarily related to outward foreign 
investment. Rather, the use of particular paradigms and theories often reflect the 
issues addressed and questions asked. For this study, two theories of international 
production have been selected, and these are eclectic paradigm and transaction 
cost as a basis of analysis. The chapter ends with the summary and arguments for 
choosing an eclectic theory and transaction cost as the framework of the study.  
2.1 The eclectic paradigm 
The Eclectic paradigm, also called OLI theory, is one of the main frameworks 
used to explain and examine the foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions of mul-
tinational firms over the past two decades (Zhao & Decker 2004). The eclectic 
theory is an attempt to incorporate several theories of entry mode choice into a 
unified framework (Goodnow 1985). In response to several partial theories con-
cerning the ownership and location of international production, taking into ac-
count only one or a few market imperfections respectively, the eclectic paradigm 
was developed by Dunning (1977). Since then, it has been refined and develop in 
Dunning (1981; 1988; 1993a; 1995, 2001, 2004), as well as in Gray (1996). The 
intention of the OLI paradigm was to “offer a holistic framework by which it was 
possible to identify and evaluate the significant factors influencing both the initial 
act of foreign production by enterprises and the growth of such production” 
(Dunning 1988). The OLI paradigm asserts that a firm's foreign activity depends 
upon the possession or creation of ownership-specific advantages, which it is 
beneficial to internalise in a foreign country offering location-specific advantages. 
Changes in a firm's foreign activity are then determined by changes in its OLI 
configuration and in its long-term management strategy. It is ‘the precise configu-
ration of the ownership, location and internalization (OLI) advantages (and disad-
vantages) facing firms, and their strategic reaction to them, that will determine, at 
any given moment of time, the nature, level, and structure of MNE activity’ (Dun-
ning 1993). 
Dunning's eclectic framework of international production suggests that firms 
make their FDI choices by considering three sets of advantages: ownership-
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specific advantages (which are concerned with the control issue, the costs and 
benefits (risk) of inter-firm relationships and transactions), Location-specific ad-
vantages (which are resources in a particular location) and Internalization ad-
vantages (which are primarily concerned with reducing transaction and co-
ordination costs (Dunning 1993, 1998, 2004; Cantwell & Narula 2001). These 
three sets of advantages influence a firm's FDI behaviour by affecting the man-
agement perception of asset power (ownership-specific advantage), market attrac-
tiveness (location-specific advantages), and cost of integration (internalization 
advantages) (Agarwal & Ramaswami 1992). 
2.1.1 Ownership-specific advantages 
The extent to which firms have the ability to engage in foreign production de-
pends upon the possession of, or the ability to acquire, ownership-specific ad-
vantages in more favourable terms vis-a-vis firms of other nationalities: in partic-
ular, market it serves.The OLI framework distinguishes between asset advantages 
(Oa) and transaction cost minimising advantages (Ot). Asset advantages arise 
from the access to, or privileged possession of, certain income-generating assets. 
In empirical studies, a number of tangible and intangible asset O advantages have 
been identified. The Oa advantages most commonly evaluated is the possession of 
firm-specific technology, patents, management knowledge, manpower, capital 
and product differentiation through brand names or advertising (Tan & Vertinsky 
1996; Dunning 1980; Denekamp, 1995). The Oa advantages are based upon the 
presence of endogenous (or structural) market failures and are similar to the mo-
nopolistic advantages that are reckoned to provide the firm possessing them with 
the ability to beneficially engage in foreign production and generate monopoly 
rent. The Ot advantages represent the ability of firms to capture transactional ben-
efits from the common governance of interrelated assets located in different coun-
tries. These transactional benefits are associated with the advantages of organis-
ing Oa advantages with complementary assets: that is, with the Ot advantages. 
The Ot advantages arise from a firm's ability to ‘co-ordinate multiple and geo-
graphically dispersed valued added activities and to capture the gains of risk di-
versification’ (Dunning 1993a:80). The Ot advantages increase the propensity to 
undertake new FDI project, but they also have implications for a firm's ability to 
protect its Oa advantages from deterioration. They have as well implications for 
the ability of a firm to exploit its Oa advantages efficiently within the organisa-
tion (Gray 1996). Ot advantages derive mainly from firm size, product diversity, 
learning experience and synergistic economies in production, purchasing, market-
ing, research and development, finance and transportation.  
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These Ot advantages are thus related to the benefits of economies of scale and 
scope and to those of specialization in differentiated products (Dunning 1993). Ot 
advantages also derive from the degree of multinational per se of a firm. By oper-
ating in multiple markets, firms increase their operational (production) flexibility, 
their opportunities to take advantage of geographical differences in factor en-
dowments, and their ability to reduce or diversify risks (Dunning 1993). These Ot 
advantages arise as a direct consequence of foreign production but may subse-
quently put a firm in a more favourable position for further international activity. 
Contrary to the transaction cost theory, which assumes that these advantages are 
derived from internalization, the OLI paradigm claims that these advantages both 
precede and follow foreign production (Dunning 1997:485). The relative im-
portance given to the different O advantages in explaining the ownership of inter-
national production has changed substantially throughout the years (Dunning 
1993; Gray 1996). The source O advantage for well-established MNEs has in-
creasingly become their portfolio of globally coordinated ownership and location-
al assets, that is, their Ot advantages of being multinational. 
Furthermore, the motivation given to FDI has changed from primarily being de-
signed to exploit existing O advantages in countries providing a firm with L ad-
vantages to being designed to generate new O advantages (Gray 1996). New O 
advantages can be externally generated by acquiring a domestic or foreign com-
pany: that is, by adding resources that may give additional O advantages vis-a-vis 
competitors (Dunning 1993:80). The notion that internalization per se is capable 
of generating O advantages implies that firms do not internalise merely to capital-
ize upon their present O advantages. Recognising that internalization can be the 
means through which new O advantages are created or acquired constitutes a sig-
nificant departure from a static treatment of MNE activity. 
2.1.2 Location-specific advantages 
The second strand of the eclectic paradigm is concerned with the location. Loca-
tion-specific advantages refer to a number of factors that favour a particular loca-
tion  vis-a-vis  the  alternatives  in  such  a  way  that  they  affect  the  propensity  of  a  
firm to engage in foreign production and determine the location of that activity.  
Location-specific advantages are related to various characteristics in economic, 
cultural, legal, political and/or institutional environments across locations and 
affect the costs and/or revenues by producing in different locations (Dunning 
1988). The common denominator among the locational advantages is that they 
influence (I) the expected profitability of foreign production in relation to export 
and (ii) the expected profitability of having production located in different coun-
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tries (Liansheng 1993; Thomsen & Nicolaides 1991; Kimura 1989). Location-
specific advantages may then favour either the home country or a particular for-
eign country as a location for production (Liansheng 1993:48), and a firm holding 
O advantages 'may decide to internalize them, and put them to use in foreign loca-
tions when it finds  that they can be utilized more profitably in these locations' 
(Kimura 1989:299). 
Earlier studies have identified a number of L advantages that have had a signifi-
cant effect on the propensity of firms to engage in foreign production and on the 
location of that activity. The most commonly evaluated locational advantages 
include market size and growth, factor endowments, sources of supply, transpor-
tation costs, trade barriers and physical distance (Caves 1996; Pugel 1982). 
Hence, L advantages include not only factor endowments but also a number of 
locational advantages derived from spatial (or structural) market failures, such as 
restrictions on trade, and from transactional market failures (Dunning 1988). The 
location decision has actually become “less based on the comparative advantages 
of factor endowments, and more on the strategies of competitors of supplying 
regional or global markets, the desire to fully exploits the economies of large-
scale production, the need to reduce market instability and uncertainty, and the 
incentive to reap the gains from integrating related activities over space” (Dun-
ning 1988). The presence of spatial (or structural) market failures has implications 
for transfer costs across borders, such as where there are tariffs and non-tariff 
trade barriers (Dunning 1988) or exchange rate risks (Thomsen & Nicolaides 
1991), and may thereby create advantages for operating in a particular location 
(and disadvantages of operating in others). Similarly, the choice of location may 
also be prompted by a reduction in transportation costs and trade barriers, e.g. 
where there is a form of economic integration arrangements (Dunning, 1988). 
Because high transfer costs create advantages associated with operating produc-
tion units in particular locations, it follows that factors that in general discourage 
trade stimulate foreign production (Caves 1996; Thomsen & Nicolaides 1991). 
Trade and foreign production however, are not always substitutes for each other. 
In fact, foreign production sometimes replaces trade, and sometimes it comple-
ments or changes the pattern of trade, such as where there is direct investment in 
product and process specialization in different countries (Dunning 1998). Despite 
the conceptual differences between L and O advantages, the choice of location is 
not independent of present O advantages or of the ability to acquire or generate 
new O advantages by establishing foreign production in different locations (Dun-
ning 1988). There is a close linkage between O and L advantages (Sleuwaegen 
1988). The investment firm may be stimulated to undertake FDI projects in par-
ticular locations in order to advance or protect its O advantages; and it may also 
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be stimulated to undertake foreign production in particular locations in order to 
generate new O advantages that are derived from operating in that location. The 
choice of location is also determined by the fact that the various location alterna-
tives may have different subsequent effects on a firm's OLI configuration (Gray 
1996). Kumar and Kim (1984) argue that it is the complex interaction between the 
ownership-specific and location-specific factors that sheds light on overseas di-
rect investment. 
The relationships between L and O advantages have implications for O ad-
vantages (Ekstöm 1998:41). Operating production resources in particular loca-
tions or in a particular configuration of locations significantly influences the O 
advantages  associated with the common governance of activities in different lo-
cations (Dunning, 1988) These O advantages refer to the benefits associated with 
operating in multiple geographical and product  markets, such  as production flex-
ibility, geographical diversification and firm-level economies of scale and scope: 
in order words, synergistic economies in distribution, marketing and purchasing 
(Dunning 1993). As the transactional market failures enabling firms to create the-
se O advantages are, to a certain extent, country-specific, they have locational 
implications as well (Dunning 1988). The importance of the configuration of lo-
cation advantages for a firm's O advantages emphasises the importance of its port-
folio of locational advantages (Ekstöm 1998:41). Gray (1996) argued that recog-
nising the importance of a portfolio of locational assets means that changes in that 
portfolio will be undertaken if the portfolio becomes sub-optimal. Firms are then 
reasoned to undertake FDI projects if it will create a new portfolio of locational 
assets that is perceived as being better than the old one (Gray 1996). 
2.1.3 Internalisation advantages 
Internalization advantages arise when the potential rents to be realised from the O 
advantages are higher if they are transferred across borders within a firm's own 
organisation than if they are sold in the external market for O advantages (Dun-
ning, 1993; Dunning, 1988). O and I advantages are thus closely interactive with 
each other (Denekamp 1995; Dunning & Kundu 1995). Besides the fact that firms 
are undertaking foreign production to internalise their O advantages in foreign 
markets, the process of internalizing may also generate new O advantages and 
increase the benefits of internalizing. These new O advantages may either be in-
ternally generated or acquired from other firms (Dunning 1993). The I advantage 
has an intermediate role in the OLI framework (Randoy1994). They are interme-
diate in the sense that the advantages of internalizing foreign markets are deter-
mined by a firm's O advantages (Denekamp 1995). They are influenced by the O 
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advantages possessed prior to FDI as well as by those generated by undertaking 
an FDI project (Liansheng 1993).  Since FDI has been increasing become the 
means by which new O advantages are created (Gray 1996), the benefits of inter-
nalization are increasingly derived from the O advantages that internalization 
might generate. Thus, the interplay between O advantages and I advantages have 
become more dynamic. Firms internalize markets in order to acquire Oa ad-
vantages or to develop or enhance Ot advantages through the co-ordination of 
geographically dispersed activities (Gray 1996). The I advantage is also interme-
diate in the sense that it is influenced by the expected profitability of operating 
production units in a particular location (Dunning 1980). 
Firms utilise foreign production whenever the transaction costs of using the mar-
ket  for  exchange  products  across  the  border  (or  to  sell  or  license  their  O  ad-
vantages) exceed the costs of co-coordinating the production and exchange of 
these products within the same hierarchy (Dunning & Kundu 1995). Thus, the 
need to reduce buyer, supplier and governmental uncertainty, the need to protect 
the quality of production, the need to possess a high level of control and increas-
ingly, the need to capture economies of independent activities speak in favour of 
hierarchies and induce firms to undertake foreign production rather than other 
servicing modes (Dunning 1993). According to the OLI framework, by internaliz-
ing, a firm utilises or circumvents the existence of transactional market failures in 
order to economize on transaction costs and to capitalize more fully on its O ad-
vantages. According to the internalization theory, on the other hand, firms inter-
nalize the market in order to economize on transaction costs, which, in turn, gen-
erate advantages over other firms (Itaki 1991). The difference between the eclec-
tic theory perspective on internalization and the internalization theory is essential-
ly in their focus on the transactional market failures as either exogenous or en-
dogenous (Liansheng 1992). In the eclectic paradigm, firms internalise to circum-
vent or utilise market failures, but they also internalise to capitalize on the O ad-
vantages through the internal creation of market failures based on those ad-
vantages. In the internalization theory, market failures are entirely exogenous. 
2.1.4 Criticism of the eclectic paradigm 
Although the eclectic paradigm ultimately deals with strategic decisions its ‘ra-
tionalist’ orientation tends to make it deterministic in its approach, hence there is 
a criticism that there is a lack of latitude for managerial discretion in the decisions 
it is modelling (Johanson & Vahlne 1990). They have been criticized because 
managerial beliefs and actions occupy a prominent position in strategic thinking 
as they provide a means through which organizations respond and maintain ana-
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lignment with shifting market, technological and socio-political environments 
(Rajagopalan 1996). Numerous findings (e.g. Barr 1992; Lant et al. 1992; Smith 
Child & Rowlinson 1991; Webb & Dawson 1991) show that managerial interpre-
tations of organizational conditions directly influence the need for strategic 
change. Indeed, the basic statements found in support of the eclectic paradigm 
indicate that just such logic is assumed to exist; otherwise, managers would not be 
able to make optimal decisions regarding the right investment alternatives. How-
ever, the role of managers is downplayed and this is most evident when compar-
ing the eclectic paradigm with the Uppsala internationalization model (Johanson 
& Vahlne 1990). Furthermore, it has been suggested that it is misleading to sug-
gest that the triad of variables which make up the eclectic paradigm is independ-
ent of one another. For example, a firm’s response to its exogenous locational 
variables might itself influence its ownership advantages, including its ability and 
willingness to internalize the market. A particular R&D strategy, intended to 
strengthen a firm's competitive position, may require a reappraisal of the siting of 
its existing inventory facilities; while a change in firm's organisational structure 
may directly affect its ability to penetrate the markets of its competitors. Over 
time, the separate identity of variables becomes even more difficult to justify. 
Finally, as Dunning's paradigm consists of building blocks from other theories 
and models as described in the last chapter this is due to the fact that an empirical 
verification of the paradigm has been considered impossible. In effect, this is the 
first criticism which the paradigm has faced, as it imposes several operation-
al/empirical limitations due to the complexity of the variables used in the para-
digm (Melin 1992; Borsos-Torstila 1999).  
2.2 Transaction cost theory 
The transaction cost theory of entry mode choice was originated by Williamson 
(1975).  Among  the  first  to  apply  the  TC  theory  to  analyze  entry  mode  choice  
were Anderson and Gatignon (1986). Most studies in this framework work have 
followed the original framework and include the work of Anderson and Gatignon 
(1988), Anderson and Coughlan (1987), Hennart (1988, 1989), Erramilli and Rao 
(1993).  Transaction cost theory has been widely used in entry mode research to 
explain why large companies utilize different modes in expanding abroad 
(Brouthers & Brouthers 2003; Delios & Beamish 1999; Erramilli & Rao 1993; 
Hennart 1991; Gatignon & Anderson 1988; Anderson & Gatignon 1986). Wil-
liamson (1985) argued that companies adopt a certain organizational market 
structure (non-equity modes) versus hierarchies (equity modes) when expanding 
abroad based on how efficient one structure is compared with the alternative 
structure. The transaction cost theory is one of the dominant theories used to ex-
 Acta Wasaensia      23 
 
  
plain an MNE’s establishment mode choice, and is the core international business 
theory propounded by Buckley and Casson (1976). The transactional cost analysis 
is the most widely applied theoretical perspective in international entry mode re-
search (Canabal & White 2008; Brouthers & Hennart 2007). It essentially argues 
that firms choose an entry mode that minimizes the transaction costs associated 
with their international operations. 
In other words, managers make a choice between equity and non-equity modes of 
entry by comparing the costs of internal coordination and control to those associ-
ated with finding, negotiating with and monitoring an intermediary in an external 
market (Kim & Gray 2008). Williamson (1985) proposed that transaction cost 
occurs when a product is transferred across sequential stages of a production pro-
cess under alternative governance structures. The most critical dimension is asset 
specificity. Transaction cost economies maintain that cost occurs due to the com-
bined ramification of the latter coupled with bounded rationality and opportun-
ism. Williamson (1987) refers to the world of governance, in which firms seek to 
organize transactions so as to economize on bounded rationality while simultane-
ously safeguarding them against the hazards of opportunism. The other factors 
affect the nature of these transactions; namely, uncertainties related to completion 
of the contract and the frequency of these transactions. Hence, incentives for other 
operation modes than FDI through vertical integration become weaker as transac-
tions become progressively more idiosyncratic due to the less transferable nature 
of both human and physical assets, which become more specialized to a single use 
(Williamson 1987). 
This theory focuses on individual economic exchanges (Schaefer 2002). Transac-
tion costs are composed of the costs of finding and negotiating with an appropri-
ate partner, and the costs of monitoring the performance of the partner. In the 
transaction cost theory of foreign direct investment (FDI), the essence is the 
cross-border expansion of business. This expansion is based on the ideas that lo-
cating facilities abroad are more efficient than exporting to the country from the 
parent company and that the company finds it desirable to invest in that foreign 
country (Hennart & Park 1993). Research shows that transaction costs play a very 
important role in the finding of an efficient and successful market entry mode 
(Hennart & Park 1993). Furthermore, they have found that when transaction costs 
are low, firms tend to rely on the market to deliver required target market bene-
fits. As the costs increase, they tend to switch to more hierarchical modes, e.g. 
wholly owned subsidiaries.  A transaction cost asserts that the transaction is the 
basic unit of economic activity, where a transaction may be said to occur when a 
good or service is traded across a technological separable interface (Williamson 
1993). A transaction cost argues that transactions have distinct characteristics 
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that, in combination with the attributes of alternate governance structures, pro-
duce different production and transaction costs. The core dimensions of these 
transactions are the asset specifics, the frequency of economic exchange, and un-
certainty surrounding the exchange of resources between the focal parties (Ander-
sen 1997). 
2.2.1 Asset specificity 
This refers to the degree to which the investments necessary for a transaction are 
specific to that particular transaction (Williamson 1981). It also refers to the phys-
ical and human resources that a company uses to complete a specific task that 
may lose value in another use (Williamson 1985; Williamson & Ouchi 1981). A 
foreign firm that possesses the unique technology and know-how has to take extra 
precautions in order to protect its differentiated assets from falling into the hands 
of competitors. Williamson (1985) argued that a transaction that requires more 
asset-specific investment will be structured through hierarchies so as to reduce the 
transaction costs associated with opportunism. This is because if the transaction 
fails, the investments would be less valuable in some second best use (William-
son, 1986). Williamson (1985) suggests that opportunism is the natural seeking of 
self-interest of the individuals. Furthermore, Williamson and Ouchi (1981) argue 
that if opportunism did not exist, the markets could handle most transactions, and 
the need for hierarchical organizations and complex contracting disappears. 
Moreover, Hennart (1989) argues that it is because of market failure to operate 
efficiently and to discourage opportunistic behaviour that forces companies to 
internalize their transactions in order to avoid the costs of finding, negotiating and 
monitoring the activities of an external party. Previous studies (e.g. Brouthers & 
Brouthers 2003; Delios & Beamish 1999; Erramilli & Rao 1993), tend to show 
that firms prefer equity modes of entry when making high-asset specific invest-
ments. As a result, a firm with higher levels of asset specificity will prefer to or-
ganize production internally instead of market governance. 
2.2.2 Uncertainty 
Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) argued that second transaction characteristic uncer-
tainty can come from different sources, most notably environmental variability 
and behavioural uncertainty. Environmental uncertainty, such as technological 
uncertainty, deals with the difficulty to foresee and anticipate changes in the rele-
vant environment (Rindfleisch & Heide 1997). Williamson (1979) argued that 
when faced with high environmental uncertainty, writing complete contracts is 
difficult, and as unforeseen events emerge, contractual gaps might appear and 
 Acta Wasaensia      25 
 
  
require renegotiating and adaptation. Contract adaptation and re-negotiations are a 
costly process and will increase transaction costs. As to behavioural uncertainty, 
it is based on the threat of opportunism and refers to the difficulty of monitoring 
and evaluating the behaviour and performance of the transaction partner. Whereas 
environmental uncertainty makes it impossible to specify contracts ex ante, be-
havioural uncertainty refers to the difficulty to verify the performance of the 
transaction partner ex post (Steenkamp et al. 2006). Governance structures have a 
varying ability to cope with certain kinds of uncertainty. It is supposed that with 
higher levels of insecurity, firms tend to produce products and services internally. 
2.2.3 Frequency of transactions 
Finally, transaction cost economics asserts that the frequency of transactions in-
fluences both transaction and production costs.  The first is the frequency of trade 
between specific trading partners. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002) argued 
that this is the repeated-game notion of frequency, the one appearing in the litera-
ture on relational contracting.  In this sense, frequency and hierarchical govern-
ance are substitutes; with frequent interaction, the incentive to maintain a reputa-
tion for fair dealing may be sufficient to mitigate opportunism, even in the ab-
sence of contracts or vertical integration. Second, there is the frequency of trade 
among many trading partners: that is, the frequency with which a particular trans-
action occurs in the market, regardless of who is transacting. This is how frequen-
cy appears in Economic Institutions of Capitalism (e.g. Williamson’s 1979:60–
61). Williamson’s point is to distinguish standard (i.e., frequently occurring) and 
nonstandard (i.e., idiosyncratic) transactions. The cost of specialized (i.e., hierar-
chical) governance structures will be easier to recover for large transactions of a 
recurring kind. Hence the frequency of transactions is a relevant dimension. 
Where frequency is low but the needs for nuanced governance are great, the pos-
sibility of aggregating the demands of similar but independent transactions is 
suggested by (Williamson 1979:60). 
In  other  words,  for  given  levels  of  asset  specificity,  the  greater  the  volume  of  
trade, the more likely the benefits of hierarchical governance exceeds the costs. 
Frequency, in this sense, thus increases the probability of hierarchy, rather than 
decreasing it as in the first case above. In a relatively stable environment, the 
choice among market, hybrid, and hierarchy depends primarily on asset specifics. 
With more frequent environmental disturbances, however, hybrid forms of organ-
ization become relatively unattractive, even at intermediate levels of asset speci-
ficity, because of the high cost of coordinating the necessary adaptations among 
multiple, independent partners.  
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2.2.4 Criticism of the transaction cost theory 
Although transaction cost is very useful, it is not without its critics. It is important 
to recognise some possible weaknesses in the theory.  The theory assumes that it 
is possible to neatly separate production and transaction costs, but in practice this 
is often not the case. More generally, it is often very difficult to measure transac-
tion costs, even if they can be defined. Transaction costs assume that there are 
limits to the extent to which decision-makers can be rational (that is, it assumes 
bounded rationality). It still makes little allowance for the other factors that we 
know affect decision-making. For example, the profit maximising, cost minimis-
ing object is not considered to be problematic. In reality, we know that this is not 
the case. There are often conflicts of interest among managers, the interests of 
managers and shareholders may not be perfectly aligned, and so on. Consequent-
ly, power plays an important role in decision-making. Thirdly, reputation and 
trust are not considered. Transactions are treated as though they occur without 
any knowledge of previous transactions involving the parties concerned. Howev-
er, we know that trust does develop between people as they do business with each 
other. We know that a reputation for trustworthiness is an important business as-
set that firms will often be reluctant to jeopardize. Therefore, the assumption that 
we cannot judge ex-ante what will be opportunistic is an oversimplification. 
Finally, transaction cost theory has been criticized for the fact that psychic dis-
tance influence and institutional backgrounds are absent in the discussion of entry 
mode decisions. This is mainly due to the difficulties in understanding that social 
and cultural factors are only a part of the so-called transaction atmosphere and 
that interaction effects between socio-cultural and transaction costs factors can’t 
be determined in this simplified model (Schaefer 2002). It has also been criticized 
for being unable to explain the evolution of entry modes (Lu 2002) because it just 
offers a static view of organizational activities characterized by the absence of 
adequate social bonds. In addition to these facts, recent scholars have begun ex-
tending transaction theory by including cultural context and institutional context 
factors. 
2.3 Summary 
The study of a firm's expansion into foreign markets has received increasing at-
tention at both conceptual and empirical levels. A number of theories and concep-
tual frameworks have been put forward outlining a company's decision to initiate 
the internationalisation process (Andersen 1997; Whitelock 2002). Andersen 
(1997) argued that it would be challenging to attempt to examine the various 
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frameworks regarding the foreign entry mode decision. Some of these theories 
include Hymer’s theories (1976), product life cycle theory (Vernon 1966), incre-
mental stage mode (Johnason & Vahlne 1977, 1990), the network model (Johans-
son & Vahlne 1990), resource-based model (Barney 1991), transaction cost theo-
ry (Williamson’s 1985) and Dunning’s eclectic theory (1980). While dunning 
(1988) regards the eclectic theory as a (general) theory, Cantwell (1989) suggests 
that it is a paradigm while Itaki (1991) describes it as a taxonomy of various de-
terminants of foreign direct investment. However, in the field of international 
business, there is no general agreement on what should be labelled as theory, con-
ceptual framework or paradigm. All this suggests that there is the need to have a 
multi-framework approach (Arranz & Arroyabe 2008) to explain firms’ interna-
tionalization. Hence, the present study based its argument on the eclectic para-
digm and transaction cost theory because they contain elements which best ex-
plain international production.  
The eclectic theory integrates several strands of international business theories on 
cross-border activities. It proposes that three types of variables influence cross-
border business activities: ownership-specific variables, location-specific varia-
bles and internalization variables. Ownership-specific variables can be divided 
into asset specific advantages (Oa) and transaction variables (Ot). Ownership spe-
cific advantages include various tangible and intangible assets owned by the in-
vesting firm, whereas transaction specific advantages include variables related to 
the ability of firms to capture the transactional benefits from the common govern-
ance of multiple and geographically dispersed activities.  Furthermore, the degree 
of possession of various ownership-specific variables influences the degree of 
establishment and ownership strategies of foreign FDIs in Ghana. Location-
specific advantages (L) are essential in determining where firms will engage in 
cross-border value-adding activities. The level of location-specific advantages 
may also be expected to influence the establishment and ownership strategies in 
the context of Ghana. The last strand of the OLI approach comprises the internali-
zation advantages (I) that the company has in transferring assets within their or-
ganizing instead of via the market, because of the market failures. The greater the 
perceived costs of transactional market failure – and the greater the benefits of 
circumventing market failure – the more likely the company will be to exploit its 
ownership-specific advantages within the firms and the greater the degree of 
ownership it will prefer in its FDIs in the case of ownership strategies in the con-
text of Ghana.  
The eclectic paradigm offers a holistic framework by which to identify and evalu-
ate the significance of the factors influencing both the initial act of foreign pro-
duction by enterprises and the growth of such production. The eclectic paradigm 
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remains a useful and robust general framework for explaining and analyzing not 
only the economic rationale of international production, but many organizational 
issues relating to multinational enterprise (MNE) activity.  Cantwell (1991) main-
tains that it is an organizing paradigm for identifying the variables derived from 
different approaches, which are most relevant in explaining a wide range of dif-
ferent environments in which international production has been established. The 
eclectic paradigm is considered by some researchers as the most comprehensive 
explanation of international production. However, combining it with the transac-
tion cost theory in the context of Ghana provides a better framework for under-
standing the role of risk and uncertainty, which are high in a developing country 
like Ghana. Hence, this study incorporates transaction cost theory in Dunning’s 
theory.  
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3 STRATEGIC MOTIVES OF FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 
In this chapter, the basic decisions related to the motivational strategies of the 
foreign firms in Ghana are reviewed. This chapter theoretically investigates how 
the ownership-specific, location-specific, and internalization-specific advantages 
influence the motivational strategies of foreign firms in Ghana. Then each of the 
above-mentioned advantages is reviewed in detail in different subchapters. Based 
on the extent of theoretical and empirical literature on motive strategies, several 
hypotheses are developed regarding the components of the eclectic paradigm, 
transaction cost theory and strategic motivational type of FDIs. The chapter ends 
with a summary of all the reviewed previous studies.  
3.1 Motives for International Production 
There are different types of motives for international production undertaken by a 
multinational corporation, and these include: 1) resource seeking, 2) market seek-
ing 3) efficiency seeking and 4) strategic asset seeking (Dunning, 1993). Below is 
the analysis of the various motives of FDI. 
3.1.1 Market-seeking FDI project 
Market-seeking FDIs are undertaken to sustain or protect existing markets or to 
exploit or promote new markets (Dunning 1993). Market-seeking firms aim at 
increasing their sales – at least in a medium-term view (MacCarthy & At-
thirawong 2003; Cheng & Kwan 2000). Generally, market seekers are firms that 
invest in a particular country or region in order to serve markets in this country 
or region. Thus, market-seeking firms generally choose those locations that are 
considered the best to achieve actual and future market growth goals (Dunning, 
1998). FDI of this kind may also be employed as a defensive strategy: it is argued 
that businesses are more likely to be pushed towards this type of investment out 
of fear of losing a market rather than the promise of discovering a new one.  
Apart from market size and expected market growth, there are other reasons for 
which market-seeking firms may undertake foreign investment. First, when im-
portant customers move abroad or when the need to respond to the unique local 
tastes and desires is pronounced, firms may be motivated to relocate their produc-
tion in order to retain their business (Dunning 1993). Shepherd, Silberston and 
Strange (1985) investigate the motives underlying UK outward FDI, and the need 
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to  stay  close  to  customers  was  the  single  most  important  reason  underlying  the  
decision to undertake FDI. In addition, Shaukat and Hafiz (1996) examine the 
motives underlying UK outward FDI in Central Europe: staying close to custom-
ers was among the most important strategic motivations.  
The second reason is that a firm may need to adapt its product to local tastes and 
specific market requirements, which can only be achieved through a market pres-
ence in the form of FDI. This is because without familiarizing themselves with 
local language, business customs, legal requirements and marketing producers, 
foreign producers might find themselves at a disadvantage vis a vis local firms in 
selling consumer goods like machines, stereo equipment and a wide variety of 
food and drink products, as well as those supplying intermediate products such as 
construction machinery, petrochemicals and forestry products, financial and pro-
fessional services (Dunning 1993). The third reason is that the production and 
transaction costs of serving a local market from an adjacent facility may be lower 
than when supplying that market from a distance. The production of what is rela-
tively costly to transport and can be produced economically in small quantities is 
more likely to be located near the main centres of consumption than are those that 
cost relatively little to transport and yield substantial economies of scale in their 
production (Dunning 1993:58).  
The fourth reason is that a firm may consider it necessary, as part of its global 
strategy, to have a physical presence in the leading markets served by its competi-
tors (Dunning 1993:59). Thus most of the large MNEs in sectors dominated by 
international oligopolists (e.g. oil, rubber tyres, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors 
and advertising) not only operate production units in each of the triad areas, but 
also are increasingly engaging in R & D. Dunning (1993) argued that strategic 
market-seeking investment might  be undertaken for defensive or aggressive rea-
sons. Aggressive investments are those designed to advance the global interests of 
a firm by investing in an expanding market.  Unlike those engaging in other kinds 
of FDI, market seeking tends to treat their foreign affiliates as self-contained pro-
duction units rather than as part of an integrated network of cross-border activi-
ties. In consequence, they tend to be the most responsive to local needs and re-
quirements. The affiliates of market-seeking firms will normally produce similar 
products to those supplied by their parent companies, though usually in a truncat-
ed range. Generally, the output will be sold in the country in which it is produced, 
although there may be some exports to adjacent markets. By undertaking market-
seeking FDI projects, the investing firms are motivated by the opportunity to 
capitalize upon their established O advantages (Randoy 1994; Hedlund & Kver-
neland 1984). These O advantages could be capitalized upon in new locations or 
by increasing the amount of production in already established locations. In addi-
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tion, firms may also be motivated to undertake market-seeking FDI projects by 
the advantages associated with staying close to their customers and thus protect-
ing their O advantage from deteriorating. 
3.1.2 Resource seeking FDI project 
Resource-seeking FDIs are primarily undertaken to exploit the comparative ad-
vantages of individual countries, such as favourable access to raw materials, parts 
and components and low costs of labour (Brouthers, Werner & Wilkinson 1996; 
Dunning 1993a; Cantwell 1991). Resource-seeking firms naturally aim to access 
specific resources in the host country at lower cost levels than they achieve at 
present in their home countries (e.g. Galan, González-Benito, and Zuniga-
Vincente 2007). They want to attain cost advantages in the host country environ-
ment, for instance through lower labour cost or advantages in the cost and availa-
bility of raw materials (Dunning 1998). These FDI projects are primarily under-
taken to minimise production costs and/or to secure sources of supply. The reason 
may be to allocate production resources in countries where factor prices are low 
relative to a firm’s productivity (Randoy 1994) and where it can serve foreign 
markets by exports (Kumar 1994). Resource-seeking FDI is normally export-
oriented and less dependent upon access to the host country (Anderson & Fredrik-
sson 1993). Resource-seeking MNEs focus on supply-oriented variables (Castro 
2007), and assets for the economic growth of the home country (Jenkins & Ed-
wards 2006; Ndikumana & Verick 2008). 
Although resource-seeking FDIs correspond to a small proportion of outward FDI 
worldwide (Dunning 1993a), firms have been motivated by resource-seeking ob-
jectives in several empirical studies (Burgenmeier 1991; Bachtler & Clement 
1990; Kayser & Schwarting 1989; Hedlund & Kverneland 1984). By undertaking 
resource-seeking FDIs, the investing firms are motivated by the advantages de-
rived from capitalizing upon the locational advantages of particular locations 
(Randoy 1994). Consequently, these firms undertake FDI projects in order to ex-
ploit their O advantages in new configurations of locational advantages. Foreign 
firms undertake resource-seeking FDI projects in order to increase potential rents 
to be realised from their O advantages. 
3.1.3 Efficiency- seeking FDI project 
Efficiency-seeking projects are undertaken in order to rationalize the structure of 
established production units in such a way that a firm can gain from the common 
governance of interrelated activities in different locations (Dunning 1993). Beh-
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rman (1991) argues out that firms undertaking efficiency-seeking FDIs are ‘look-
ing for the economic sources of production to serve a multicountry standardized 
market’. The potential benefits derived from undertaking efficiency-seeking FDIs 
are especially those of economies of scale and scope, which are derived from 
product and geographical concentration and from process specialization (Balcet 
1995; Dunning 1993; Kim & Whang 1994). The potential benefits are also de-
rived from being established in the multiple product markets (Dunning 1993). It 
follows from the definition of efficiency-seeking FDIs provided by Dunning that 
these FDIs are undertaken primarily to capture, advance and/or utilise a firm’s Ot 
advantages. 
The efficiency-seeking objective is to reorganize and concentrate a firm’s final 
goods production so that it can capitalize upon differences in relative factor en-
dowments across countries and/or upon scale and scope economies (Robson 
1992). Concentrating production resources in particular locations lead to an in-
creased product and/or geographical concentration of economic activity. These 
efficiency-seeking FDI projects are distinguished from resource-seeking FDI pro-
jects in that the former reach beyond the advantages associated with mere produc-
tion cost savings. The efficiency-seeking FDIs are motivated by the transactional 
benefits of concentrating certain types of production resources in a limited num-
ber of locations and by the advantages of operating geographically dispersed val-
ue-added activities ( that is, by the benefits of a firm-and planet-level economies 
of scale (Abdel-Malek 1995). The principal differences between efficiency-
seeking and resource-seeking FDI projects are that the former goes beyond a 
country-by-country efficiency. While resource-seeking FDIs are designed to in-
ternalise new location advantages, efficiency-seeking FDIs are designed to 
change a firm’s portfolio of locational advantages in order to capture the Ot ad-
vantages of a common governance of interrelated activities in different locations. 
The advantages associated with exploiting the scale economics of product and/or 
geographical concentration on a global or regional scale (Kim & Whang 1994; 
Dunning 1993), as well as those scope economies associated with broadening the 
product line (Agren 1990) may motivate firms to initiate FDIs designed to capture 
these advantages.  These advantages are similar to the firm-level opportunity for 
global economies of scale and scope argued by Kim and Whang (1994). The ben-
efit of exploiting economies of scale and scope may be captured by rationalizing 
and restructuring the configuration of a firm’s established production unit, as well 
as by establishing new production units designed to serve the regional or global 
market. These benefits are reasoned to motivate firms to locate their manufactur-
ing facilities where the marginal cost of production is lowest and to capture the 
advantages of operating interrelated activities within the firm (Kim et al. 1993; 
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Dunning 1993). In efficiency-seeking FDI products, the advantages of exploiting 
economies of scale and scope predominate over the importance of relative factor 
endowments across countries. These investments are normally undertaken in 
countries with broadly similar economic structures and income levels (Dunning 
1993). 
Dunning (1993) stated that an efficiency-seeking FDI is designed to take ad-
vantage differences in the availability of and costs of traditional factor endow-
ments in different countries. This explains much of the division of labour within 
firms producing in both developed and developing countries, with capital, tech-
nology and information-intensive value-added activities being concentrated in the 
former, and labour and natural resources intensive activities in the latter.  Here, 
traditional factor endowments play a less important role in influencing FDI, while 
“created” competencies and capabilities, the availability and quality of supporting 
industries, the characteristics of the local competition, the nature of the consumer 
demand and the macro-and micro-policies of the government play a more im-
portant role.  
3.1.4 Strategic asset-seeking FDI project 
Strategic asset-seeking MNEs comprise those which engage in FDI, usually by 
acquiring the assets of foreign corporations, to promote their long-term strategic 
objectives, especially that of sustaining or advancing their international competi-
tiveness. The investing firms involved include both established MNEs pursuing 
an integrated global or regional strategy and first-time foreign direct investors 
seeking to buy competitive strength in an unfamiliar market (Dunning 1993). Pre-
vious studies have recognized that firms invest in foreign countries not only to 
exploit but also to develop their firm-specific advantages or acquire necessary 
strategic assets in a host country (e.g. Teece 1992; Dunning 1993, 1995; Chang 
1995; Almeida 1996; Shan & Song 1997; Frost 2001). These studies suggest that 
a firm's firm-specific advantages would arise not only from the possession of pro-
prietary assets but also of the capacity to acquire, or the efficient coordination of 
the complementary assets owned by other firms in a host country (Dunning 1995, 
1998, 2000).  
Dunning (1994) argues that a strategic asset-seeking FDI is probably the fastest 
growing of the four motives for overseas investment. Firms increasingly use FDI 
to obtain strategic assets (whether tangible or intangible) that may be critical to 
their long-term strategy but are not available at home. In contrast to the other mo-
tives for FDI, strategic assets-seeking investment does not imply the exploitation 
of an existing ownership advantage of the firm. Instead, FDI may be a vehicle for 
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the firm to build the ownership advantages that will support its long-term expan-
sion at home and abroad. Alternatively, strategic asset-seeking investment may 
not involve strengthening the firm’s position, but rather to weaken the competi-
tive position of its competitors (Dunning 1993). 
3.2 Ownership-specific factors 
Dunning (1991:123) defined ownership advantages as “any kind of income gen-
erating assets, which make it possible for firms to engage in foreign production”. 
He also pointed out that ownership advantages are concerned with the extent to 
which the firm has tangible and intangible assets unavailable to other firms (Dun-
ning 1980; Dunning 1988). Ikechi et al. (2004:72) defined ownership advantages 
as the competitive or monopolistic advantages of the firm that helps the foreign 
firm to overcome the disadvantages of competing with the local firms. Based on 
the above definitions, a number of the ownership-specific variables are expected 
to have an influence on the choice of strategic motives. 
3.2.1 Firm size 
A foreign direct investment venture normally requires a large amount of capital 
and managerial resources as compared to exporting. This is because with export-
ing, there is no need for a company to move to the foreign location and do busi-
ness, as the company only sends its products to the foreign market. With foreign 
direct investment, however, the investor has to move to foreign locations and set 
up the business there whether as a joint venture or wholly owned subsidiary. Gen-
erally, large firms owing their large resource base are often considered to be in a 
better position than smaller firms to make such commitments. It has been argued 
that the size and resources of the firms are likely to influence the perceived risk of 
a project; one might expect that the readiness to engage in FDI projects, which are 
associated with a higher perceived risk, is dependent on the availability of re-
sources (Benito 1995). Theoretically, FDI ventures, unlike exporting, require sub-
stantial financial as well as managerial resources. It has been emphasized that 
large firms are more willing to undertake the risk and costs associated with FDI 
projects in distant and unfamiliar markets, due to their larger resource base 
(Buckley & Casson 1976; Pan 2003). Horsct (1972) argued that the firm size, 
more than any other variables,  explained the propensity of US firms to invest  in 
Canada in the 1960s. The impact of the firm’s size has been investigated in sever-
al studies. 
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Previous studies (e.g. Owen 1982; Pearce 1989; Li & Guisinger 1992) argued that 
large firms are more willing to undertake the risk and costs associated with FDI 
projects in distant and unfamiliar markets due to their large resources. Wolf 
(1997) argued that there is a positive relationship between US firm size and FDI. 
Juhl (1978) examined German manufacturing FDI in developing countries and 
found  that  firm  size  was  a  positive  and  significant  determinant  of  FDI.  Also,  
Mutinelli and Piscitello (1997) argued that large firms often have a large resource 
base and, therefore, better possibilities to undertake FDI. However, a study con-
ducted by Pearce (1989) found that there was no statistically significant relation-
ship between firm size and the degree of multinationality of firms. According to 
Dunning (1993), market-seeking FDIs are undertaken to sustain or protect exist-
ing markets or to exploit or promote new markets. Generally, big firms will have 
the ability to invest in large markets or markets that have good growth prospects, 
as compared to small firms (Wolf 1997; Li & Guisinger 1992). Big MNEs have 
global reach which means that they can very easily exploit market-seeking and 
efficiency-seeking opportunities globally. It is an established fact that production 
units are located where the marginal cost of production is lower. As a result of 
that it could be much easier for a large firm to organise their production structure 
in such a way that it can exploit the benefits of economies of scale production. 
This could then lead to higher efficiency gains, a lower marginal cost of produc-
tion, and a large market share. All the above advantages of firm size are relevant 
when investing in developing countries like Ghana that are considered unstable in 
the short-to medium term. Consideration of the above viewpoints leads to the 
following hypothesis. 
H1 There is a positive relationship between firm size and market seeking and/or 
efficiency seeking FDI. 
3.2.2 Firm's international experience 
Buckley and Casson (1985) argued that experience reduces the cost and uncer-
tainty of serving a market. Firms with prior international activities can benefit 
from the associated learning and experience as well as their networks (Gaba, Pan, 
& Ungson 2002). Padmanabhan and Cho (1999) argue that the firm's past experi-
ences manifest themselves in organizational routines that form the blueprint for 
the firm's future actions and, more importantly, serve as an import source of com-
petitive advantages. Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) stated that a firm without 
foreign market experience is likely to have more problems in managing foreign 
operations. However, it is often thought that firms accumulate the necessary skills 
to facilitate market entry via their previous experience operating in a given for-
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eign market or in other foreign markets (Barkema & Vermeulen 1998; Delios & 
Henisz 2000; Henisz 2003). Buckley and Casson (1976) argued that increased 
knowledge of a foreign country reduces both costs and the uncertainty of operat-
ing in a foreign market. Experience helps to develop multinational expansion ca-
pabilities by reducing the overall liability of foreignness, whether defined in so-
cial, economic, or political dimensions. Because of exposure to international op-
erations, a firm's organisational structure and its information gathering and as-
sessing system are likely to be changed to adapt to this new challenge. This 
change, while caused by operations in certain countries, will have an impact on 
the firm's operation in other countries. Several previous studies have pointed out 
that prior investments in one country have a positive impact on investments in 
other countries (Henisz & Macher 2004). 
Moreover, it is argued that earlier experience with a similar type of environment 
in  a  foreign  country  will  allow  the  firm  to  “learn”  from  its  experience,  and  the  
learning will become very valuable when dealing with similar circumstances.  
Moreover,  most of the firms will  like to use the same strategies,  since they will  
enhance the value of the firm by reducing implementation costs in another foreign 
country, because the existing routines can be used. Chang (1995) argues that the 
more internationally experienced firms face fewer knowledge disadvantages. Al-
so, Tallman (1992) argued for the importance of past decision specific experience 
in the firm's organizational structure decisions by stating that, “the firm may re-
duce the uncertainty in a given situation by attempting to imitate either its own 
previously successful structures or its competitors' in the new market”. 
However, Maclayton, Smith and Hair (1980) found that overseas business experi-
ence measured in a number of years has no relationship with a firm's evaluation 
criteria concerning a foreign market, even though previous studies have shown 
that international experience may help firms to evaluate prevailing risks and op-
portunities in the host country. In case of lower levels of institutional develop-
ment in the host countries, uncertainties may be higher and firms may anticipate 
higher levels of investment risks generally increasing the transaction costs of for-
eign investments (Paul & Wooster 2008). Finally, majority of earlier research 
pointed to the fact that, there is a positive relationship between the level of expe-
rience  and  FDI  decisions.  Thus,  a  firm’s  ability  to  undertake  market-seeking  or  
efficiency-seeking FDI is impacted by its experience as knowledge gained from 
past international experience. Knowledge of international business provides the 
firm both the information and the ability to undertake FDIs in different environ-
ments.  
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As  a  developing  African  country,  Ghana  has  a  different  culture  from developed  
and Western countries. Therefore, experience of similar countries can be assumed 
to  be  useful  for  MNCs  coming  from  developed  and  Western  countries.  The  
above-mentioned viewpoints lead to the following hypothesis. 
H2 There is a positive relationship between international experience and market-
seeking and/or efficiency-seeking FDI. 
3.3 Location-specific factors 
Dunning (1988) stated that location advantages referred to the extent to which the 
firm will profit by locating its ownership advantages in a foreign market. Firms 
interested in servicing foreign markets are expected to use a selective strategy and 
favour an entry into the most attractive market. These are because their chances of 
obtaining higher returns are better in such markets (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 
1992). FDI theories suggest that foreign firms will prefer those countries that pro-
vide the best location-specific advantages. Still, it has been known that both own-
ership-specific and location-specific advantages separately and jointly influence 
the firm in its choice of the target country for its FDI venture. Dunning (1977) 
pointed out that theoretical developments have expanded the role of location-
specific variables by suggesting that it may be tied to ownership-specific ad-
vantages. 
3.3.1 Market Size 
The investment decision requires consideration of factors such as market size. 
Market size and competitive environment are considered to be important determi-
nants of FDI (Dunning, 1980; Porter, 1990). Empirical studies reveal a positive 
relationship between market size and FDI in developed countries (Dunning 1998). 
A large market size also provides a better opportunity for foreign investors to en-
joy economies of scale that makes it conducive to sales not only in the internal 
market, but also for export to other markets. Wheeler and Moody (1992) stated 
that a large market size of a region has a significant and positive effect on attract-
ing FDI. Foreign investors are likely to be attracted by large markets, which allow 
them to internalize profits from sales within the host countries. A large market 
allows the firm to maintain lower marginal costs of production through integra-
tion and economies of scale. These are generally the factors that concern compa-
nies engaging in the market seeking FDI (Dunning 1998; Chakrabarti 2001; 
Habib & Zurawicki 2002; Li & Resnick 2003). Globerman and Shapiro (2003) 
found that the market size was statistically the most important predictor of wheth-
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er  a  country  will  receive  FDI  (as  well  as  the  amount  it  receives).  This  claim  is  
confirmed by Nasser and Gomez (2009). 
According to Ancharaz (2003), a large market provides relatively better opportu-
nities for making profits, and so should also attract more FDI flows.The existence 
of scale economies makes it likely that a firm producing and selling in numerous 
sub-markets will hold a larger share in the average market than the typical com-
peting firm operating in a single market: a seller is unlikely to expand production 
in  a  second  region  while  scale  economies  remain  to  be  exploited  in  the  first  
(Caves 1971). There are also fixed costs associated with FDI, which are easier to 
deal with when spread over a large volume of output. The larger the market, the 
greater the reduction in the marginal costs of producing abroad and the more like-
ly the firm will invest in that location rather than resort to exportation (Buckley& 
Dunning 1976). A number of empirical studies of FDI (e.g. Dunning 1980; Scap-
erlanda et al. 1983; Papanastassiou & Pearce 1990) found that the market size of 
host countries has a significant and positive effect on attracting FDI.   
Also, for the developing countries Root and Ahmed (1975), Schneider and Frey 
(1985) Petrochilas (1989), Wheeler and Moody (1992) found the market size to 
be a significant predictor of FDI.  Furthermore, Obwona (2001) found that the 
market size was a significant determinant of FDI in Uganda. Investigating the 
determinants of FDI on developing and developed countries, Chakrabarti (2001) 
concludes that host country market size, measured by per capita GDP, has a posi-
tive and significant effect on FDI. In addition, Sabi (1988) stated that firms expect 
to experience greater long-term profits through economies of scale and lower 
marginal cost of production in countries with a larger market potential. Market-
seeking FDIs are undertaken to sustain or protect existing markets or to exploit or 
promote new markets while efficiency-seeking FDIs aim to exploit local ad-
vantages to gain economies of scale and increase specialization (Dunning 1993). 
Markets perceived as large will be attractive in both respects as they provide large 
potential demand and potentially larger economies of scale. With a population of 
approximately 25 million people, Ghana is a medium-sized African country and 
the second largest population in West Africa. The country is a key player in the 
Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS) region where there 
is expected to be free movement of goods and services with a population of more 
than 250 million in the next decade. Investors interested in market seeking could 
be attracted to the Ghana market based on the regional market and not only the 
size of the Ghanaian market.  The above-mentioned viewpoints lead to the fol-
lowing hypothesis. 
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H3 There is a positive relationship between perceived market size and market 
seeking and/or efficiency-seeking FDI. 
3.3.2 Host country risk 
The investment risk in a host country reflects the uncertainty over the continua-
tion of present economic and political conditions and government politics, which 
are critical to the survival and profitability of a firm’s operations in that country. 
Changes in government policies may cause problems related to repatriation of 
earnings and, in extreme cases, expropriation of assets (Root 1987). Rugman 
(1979) stated that the restrictive policies of a host country’s government are likely 
to impede inward foreign investments. In environments characterized by high 
investment risks, the main effect suggests that firms are better off not entering, 
and exporting rather than investing if they do choose to enter. Political stability is 
a major influential  factor in the decision to invest  abroad. Host countries with a 
higher degree of political stability attract more inwards FDI (Wei, 2000). Where 
there  are  lower  levels  of  political  risk,  MNEs  will  invest  via  FDI,  but  in  areas  
characterized by high political risk, MNEs may avoid entering the market and 
may turn to other forms of international business instead (Jensen 2003). A study 
by Habib and Zurawicki (2002) measured political stability by Political Risk Ser-
vices Inc.’s Political Risk Index (2000) which assigns a number on a scale from 0 
to 100 to each country with 100 being the most stable. They found political stabil-
ity to have a significant positive effect on FDI. 
Edwards (1990) suggests that variables such as political instability and political 
polarization play a significant role in determining the flow of FDI into developing 
countries. Also, Agarwal (1980) found a negative correlation between political 
instability and FDI. Nigh (1985) uses regression analysis to show that political 
conflict is a strong deterrent of FDI in the developing host countries of Asia and 
Africa. Lizondon (1990) argued that some of the empirical studies, however, 
found mixed results. Lizondon's (1990) argued that a review of the literature on 
the determinants of FDI generally supported the negative relationship between 
political risk and FDI, albeit not in a conclusive manner. Likewise, Wheeler and 
Moody (1992) suggest little significance in the relationship between political fac-
tors and FDI. Dunning (1993) argues that firms may undertake FDIs designed to 
reduce the corporate risks associated with the changes of the national and regional 
governments of the host country. Since efficiency-seeking FDIs are aimed at 
achieving economies of scale or specialization through concentration, risky mar-
kets will be avoided as they will not provide the stability needed and will put the 
firm in danger of losing a critical part of its FDI. In general, investors perceive 
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Africa as a high investment risk environment. However, they will increase in-
vestments in African countries whose risk levels reduce (Owusu & Habiyakare 
2011). Ghana is one of the most stable African countries. This has made the coun-
try attractive for foreign investment in Sub-Saharan Africa since the level of risk 
is lower than in other African countries. Based on the above viewpoints the fol-
lowing hypothesis is proposed. 
H4 There is a negative relationship between perceived high investment risk and 
market-seeking/or efficiency-seeking FDIs. 
3.3.3 Cultural distance 
Hofstede (2001) defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind that 
distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another”. Cul-
ture provides a challenge for the firms in terms of how to deal with the cultural  
distance within individual markets as well as across markets.  Proper understand-
ing of cultural differences informs when adaptation may be necessary and when 
regional or even global approaches could be applied. Culture is inherently con-
servative, but borrowing and interaction between various cultures (for example, 
by introducing new products and practices, new words in languages, etc.) may 
lead to narrowing of the distance between them. Normally, firms prefer to invest 
in countries with similar cultures because there will be no learning curve associat-
ed with such locations. Similarities in language, legal structure, and geographic 
proximity can explain the dominance of the U.K. and Canada as traditional U.S. 
targets (Green & Meyer 1997). Dubin (1979) found that UK-based firms have 
very often made their first FDI in Canada or in the US. Similarly, Bergholm and 
Jagren (1985) argued that Swedish firms have often made their first FDIs in other 
Nordic countries. However, Benito and Grisud (1992) found a very weak tenden-
cy for the first FDIs by Norwegian firms to be made in countries that are cultural-
ly closer than those where later investments are made. Further, they did not find 
any evidence that the greater cultural distance between the home and host country 
could have a negative effect on the FDI decisions of the firms.  
Grosse and Trevino (1996) argue that those countries culturally dissimilar to the 
US  and/  or  farther  away  tended  to  have  less  FDI  in  the  US.  Davidson  (1990)  
found that US firms have usually made their first foreign investments in countries 
like Canada and the UK. Root (1978) argues uncertainty due to cultural distance 
may also cause executives to undervalue foreign investment. Moreover, the po-
tential rents realized from the investment are generally higher in culturally famil-
iar countries than in unfamiliar countries. Clearly, cultural distance increases per-
ceived risk and implies a low level of knowledge of the target market, which re-
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duces the attraction of the market for market-seeking and efficiency-seeking 
FDIs. The foregoing authors clearly imply that an MNE cannot expect to achieve 
economies of scale or specialization in a market that it perceives as culturally-
distant. Ghana’s culture is different from that of the developed Western countries. 
It  is  therefore  expected  to  reduce  FDI  flow  to  the  Ghana.  Consequently,  the  
above-mentioned viewpoints lead to the following hypothesis.  
H5 There is a negative relationship between perceived cultural distance and mar-
ket seeking and/or efficiency seeking FDIs. 
3.4 Internalization specific and transaction cost 
Dunning defined internalization advantages as those that firms can transfer and 
which are in the best interest of firms possessing ownership advantages to transfer 
them across national boundaries within the own organization, rather than selling 
them, or giving the right to use them to foreign firms (Dunning, 1988). According 
to Kusluvan (1998:175) internalization advantages refer to the advantages of con-
trolling and coordinating ownership and location specific advantages within the 
firms. From the above definition, it suggested that firms should choose an entry 
mode that can minimize the transaction costs caused by the transfer of firm-
specific assets and can avoid the risk of the free-riding on the firm’s reputation to 
balance the trade-off between their uncertainty of country risk and the reach of the 
economies of scale in their host market expansion.  
Secondly, on the aspect of transaction cost, internalization advantages arise when 
MNCs are more efficient than markets and contracts in organising interdependen-
cies between agents located in different countries. If a company intends to exploit 
firm-specific assets in a foreign market and this exploitation has to be done in that 
market due to localisation factors (e.g. trade barriers, high transportation costs or 
other country-specific factors), the company often tends to do this by investing 
abroad in their own facilities rather than through, for example, a license. The 
more intangible the firm-specific asset is, the stronger this tendency will be. The 
reason is that intangible assets are difficult to do business with.  A number of in-
ternalization and transaction cost variables may have an impact on a firm’s loca-
tion choice. These variables include contractual risk. 
3.4.1 Contractual risk 
Flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) are typically explained by traditional 
cost determinants, such as factor or trade costs (e.g. Dunning 1993; Caves 1996). 
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An increasing number of researchers view risk factors as an important impedi-
ment to inward FDI.  Contractual risk is made of risk of dissipation of knowledge, 
risk of deterioration of quality of services, and costs of writing and enforcing con-
tracts, lack of patents, and license protection of laws, etc. The effect of contractual 
risk, which falls under internalization specific, suggests that firms will refrain 
from entering a country if the perceived risk of dissipation of knowledge, risk of 
deterioration  of  quality  of  services,  and  costs  of  writing  and  enforcing  contracts  
are high. This is particularly critical for firms that have specialized knowledge, 
protection of which must be an important priority (Hill, Hwang & Kim 1990). 
However, these firms are also interested in maximizing the economic rents on 
their knowledge. Lack of protection would make sharing of specialized 
knowledge risky in the long run particularly since it would limit the flexibility a 
firm has in adapting to future contingencies. Since a flexible arrangement is diffi-
cult to achieve in a contractual setting, a firm that has specialized knowledge will 
be expected to opt for internal organisation. On the other hand, when the contrac-
tual risks are low in a particular country, the foreign investor is willing to invest 
in that country and a firm may be more willing to share its specialized knowledge. 
This is because as risk dissipation falls, the opportunity for mutually beneficial 
contractual arrangement increases at the expense of an internal market (Rugman 
1981). This opportunity will also be higher in countries where the cost of writing 
and enforcing contracts is low. In spite of the availability of resources in the tar-
get market, high-perceived contractual risks raise transaction costs and therefore, 
reduce the attractiveness of MNEs to undertake resource seeking FDI. 
In less developed countries, institutions such as transparent and efficient govern-
ment, property protection regimes and enforceable contracts are often quite weak 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc 2008).  However in Ghana, the existing laws of intellec-
tual property rights, patent protection and so on could make it an ideal place for 
investors seeking to undertake FDIs. Nonetheless, the implementations of such 
laws have not been as stringent as might be found in advanced countries. There-
fore, there are relatively high contractual risks in Ghana compared to advanced 
countries. Contractual risk in Ghana will be considered relatively low compared 
to other Africa countries.  Generally, the cost of making and enforcing contracts 
are considered high. Hence based on the above-mentioned viewpoints, we pro-
pose following hypothesis. 
H6 There is a negative relationship between perceived contractual risk and re-
source-seeking FDI. 
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3.5 Summary 
The main goal of this chapter was to theoretically examine the motives of MNCs 
in their FDI to Ghana. The determinants of FDI motives have been categorized 
into three groups. They are market-seeking, resource-seeking, and efficiency-
seeking factors.  Based on the literature review, it is expected that the ownership 
specific factors like firm’s size and firm’s international experience increase the 
probability to undertake market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDIs in Ghana. 
Secondly, with regards to location specific factors, it is expected that market size 
increases the probability of investing firms undertaking market seeking FDIs. In 
contrast, high country risk and the high cultural distance decrease the probability 
of a foreign investing firm undertaking efficiency seeking and market seeking 
FDIs respectively. Finally, with regards to internalization specific and transaction 
cost specific factors, it is expected that high contractual risk in Ghana will de-
crease the probability of a foreign firm undertaking efficiency-seeking FDIs in 
Ghana. By identifying the motives of FDI projects, it becomes possible to analyze 
directly and explicitly the role of ownership-specific, location-specific, internali-
zation specific and transaction cost specific factors affecting the propensity of 
foreign  firms  to  undertake  FDI  projects.  The  distinctions  among  the  motives  of  
FDIs highlight “differences in key features associated with different FDI projects” 
(Brewer 1993:105; Ekström 1998:90) and they indicate the varying motives that 
investing firms seek by undertaking FDIs. This analysis will not only add to our 
understanding of the transaction cost and eclectic paradigm but also broaden our 
knowledge of FDI in general. Table 4 provides a summary of previous empirical 
studies on motives. 
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4 ESTABLISHMENT MODE OF FOREIGN UNITS 
In this chapter, the decisions related to the establishment mode choice strategies 
of the investing firms in Ghana are reviewed. When MNEs decide to invest equity 
in a foreign country, they face at least two strategically important decisions: first, 
whether to buy an existing foreign entity (launch an acquisition) or second, to 
establish a foreign operation from scratch (invest in greenfield). This chapter the-
oretically reviews how ownership-specific, location-specific, internalization and 
transaction cost influence the establishment mode strategies of the foreign manu-
facturing investing firms in Ghana. Based on the extent of theoretical and empiri-
cal literature on establishment mode strategies, several hypotheses are developed 
regarding the components of the eclectic paradigm and transaction cost.  
4.1 Ownership-specific factors 
4.1.1 Firm size 
Hennart and Park (1993) argued that managerial constraints on greenfield expan-
sion might be especially tight when the investor is a relatively small size organi-
zation. A study by Kogut and Singh (1988) showed that the greater the size of the 
parent organization, the greater the likelihood of a greenfield entry. Caves and 
Mehra (1986) also found that larger firms are more likely to enter through green-
field investment. In contrast, other studies (e.g. Padmanabhan & Cho 1995; 
Barkema & Vermeulen 1998; Harzing 2002; Mudambi & Mudambim 2002) re-
ported that large firms tend to prefer acquisitions rather than greenfield invest-
ment. The rationale behind this argument is that large firms have the managerial 
resources and capabilities and, as a result, may be able to facilitate the integration 
and the control of the acquired or partly acquired company easily as compared to 
small firms.  
However, other studies produce mixed result while others did not find any signif-
icant relationship between firm size and entry mode. For example,  Larimo (2003) 
examined the entry mode of Nordic firms and found a significant relationship 
between the firm size and entry modes of Finnish firms, but could not find any 
significant relationship in the case of Danish, Norwegian or Swedish MNEs. Fur-
thermore, Chang and Rosenzweig (2001) could not find any significant relation-
ship between the size of a parent firm and the entry mode. In view of different 
arguments  put  forward  by  scholars,  for  the  purpose  of  this  study,  I  will  take  a  
stand and support the argument put forward by the following scholars (e.g. Pad-
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manabhan & Cho 1995; Barkema & Vermeulen 1998; Harzing 2002; Mudambi & 
Mudambim 2002) that large parent companies may have the resources and capa-
bilities and thus may be able to easily facilitate the integration and control of an 
acquired or partly acquired firm than the small firm. Therefore, it is more likely 
that large firms will opt for acquisition mode of entry. Based on the above infor-
mation I propose that: 
H7 There is a negative relationship between firm size and greenfield mode of 
establishment. 
4.1.2 Firm’s international experience 
Slangen and Hennart (2007) argued that the level of prior international experience 
is essential in entry mode decision.  Also, Padmanabhan and Cho (1999) stated 
that firms’ past experiences transform into organizational routines and conse-
quently, create a model for future actions and become a source of competitive 
advantage. A foreign firms experience can contribute to the development of new 
knowledge and capabilities (Barkema et al. 1996) and, as a result, can make a 
firm efficiently reduce the uncertainties and threats, and increase awareness of 
opportunities in different foreign markets (Sambharya 1996). Thus, it is very im-
portant for the firm to use such experience in their choice of foreign market entry 
mode (Herrmann & Datta 2002). Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) argued that 
when MNEs acquire foreign firms, they often face integration problems. That is, 
the acquired firms could have its’ own organization culture, which would make it 
more difficult to integrate with the acquired firms. The foreign investor does not 
always overcome this problem until it acquires more international experience, 
before it would be able to bear the risk of an acquisition and to integrate subsidi-
aries of diverse managerial nationality. Previous studies (e.g. Slangen & Hennart 
2008; Herrmann & Datta 2006; Chen & Zeng 2004; Harzing 2002; Mudambi & 
Mudambi 2002) found positive relationship between international experience and 
acquisition mode entry.  
Caves and Mehra (1986) argue that a firm with greater experience can reduce the 
risk of acquiring existing firms. They demonstrate that the experience of investing 
firms in the foreign markets is significantly linked with the choice of acquisitions 
over greenfield. Furthermore, Kogut and Singh (1988) and Hennart and Reddy 
(1997) suggest that highly internationally experienced firms are more likely to 
expand through acquisition. Based on the above information we propose that: 
H8 There is a negative relationship between international experience and green-
field mode of establishment. 
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4.2 Location-specific factors 
4.2.1 Market size 
Demirbag et al. (2008) argued that market potential in the host country is one of 
the most important determinants of an MNE’s entry mode decision. Porter (1980) 
argued that in a growing market, individuals could expect MNEs to use a direct 
entry mode to capture market share and realize growth goals, but to establish an 
early presence in the market may require an acquisition rather than a greenfield 
investment. Furthermore, Buckley and Casson (1998) argued that in a situation 
where there exists a large monopoly of rents, the entrant will favour the acquisi-
tion over greenfield in both manufacturing and distribution. This is based on the 
entrant’s desire to establish long-term control over the domestic rivals’ production 
or distribution. In a situation whereby the foreign investors decide to make a fast 
move and capitalize on first-mover advantages, an acquisition of a local business 
with an existing network may be preferred to a greenfield investment, since the 
foreign firm does not need to look for a new location to set up new plant, but ra-
ther acquire the existing plant and manage it. Laurila and Ropponen (2003) also 
suggested that, in the face of rapid market growth, greenfield investment may be 
too slow to achieve the new entrants planned objective and as a result of that, ac-
quisition will be the preferred choice for the investor to opt for.  
Ghana is a medium-sized African market and the second largest in West Africa. 
Besides, Ghana is a key player in the Economic Community of the West African 
States (ECOWAS) region where there is expected to be a free movement of goods 
and services, with a population of more than 250 million, in the next decade. 
Therefore, foreign investors will be attracted to invest in Ghana based on the re-
gional market and not only on the size of the Ghanaian market. Based on the 
above we propose that: 
H9 There is a negative relationship between perceived market size and greenfield 
mode of establishment. 
4.2.2 Host country risk 
Root (1987) argued that country risk impacts on the FDI decisions of MNEs. Al-
so, Demirbag et al. (2008) argued that foreign firms entering new market aim to 
minimize the environmental risks associated with their operations. Ahmed et al. 
(2002) stated that the level of risk perceived by MNEs plays a crucial role in the 
entry mode decision. In addition, Brouthers and Brouthers (2003) argued that risk 
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propensity variables were significant determinants of both manufacturing and 
service sector international entry mode decisions. In a highly volatile environ-
ment, firms will try to minimize their exposure to risk through an entry mode that 
offers the necessary flexibility in the face of environmental variability (Erramilli 
& D’Souza 1995; Kim & Hwang 1992). Hill, Hwang and Kim (1990) argued that 
firms reducing resource commitment in unsafe environments help to reduce their 
financial exposure in situations where they can be adversely affected or forced to 
cease their activities by unforeseen events. Also, studies by Woodcock et al. 
(1994) and Hennert (1998) reveal that there are high costs associated with acqui-
sitions compared to greeenfield investment due to post-acquisition integration and 
other structural changes in the subsidiary.  
The investment risk of Ghana is much higher than that of developed countries. 
This argument stems from the fact that institutional structures are not well devel-
oped in Ghana as compared to advanced countries. Ghana is a young democrati-
cally governed country and is relatively stable. The environment may still be con-
sidered risky by world standards, primarily because of its neighbours, whose 
economy is unpredictable. Based on the above we propose that: 
H10 There is a positive relationship between perceived host country risk and 
greenfield mode of establishment. 
4.2.3 Cultural distance 
Cultural distance has been argued to affect the choice between MNEs expanding 
abroad through greenfield investment or acquisition (e.g. Brouthers & Brouthers 
2000; Kogut & Singh 1988; Larimo 2003), the so-called ‘establishment mode 
choice’ (Cho & Padmanabhan 1995). The cultural risks and costs related with 
greenfields are normally measured to be limited, because the managers appointed 
to buildthe business – often expatriates – can carefully select and hire employees 
who fit the national culture of the MNE (Hofstede 2001; Vermeulen & Barkema 
2001), and can introduce the MNE’s organizational and management practices 
from the outset (Kogut & Singh 1988; Larimo 2003)  Also scholars (e.g. Kogut & 
Singh 1988; Larimo 2003) have argued that the larger the cultural differences 
between countries, the larger the differences in their firms’ organizational and 
managerial practices. Hence, it is difficult for MNEs to integrate into their corpo-
rate network acquisitions made in culturally distant countries, as the practices of 
MNEs and acquired firms are likely to be incompatible and difficult to transfer in 
such cases (Brock 2005; Go´ mez-Mejia & Palich 1997). 
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Larimo (2003) argued that when there is large cultural distance between two 
countries, there are large differences in their firms’ organizational and manage-
ment practices. As a result of these differences, post-acquisition incorporation 
will become more difficult, because the practices used by MNE and the acquired 
units will become increasingly incompatible (Cho & Padmanabhan 1995). Simi-
larly, Olie (1996) argued that, large differences in organizational and management 
practices are likely to lead to misunderstandings of motives and intentions, all of 
which hamper smooth relations between people from different national cul-
tures.Previous studies (e.g. Drogendijk & Slangen 2006; Herrmann & Datta 2006; 
Chen & Zeng 2004; Larimo 2003; Harzing 2002, Mudambi & Mudambi 2002; 
Chang & Rosenzweig 2001; Vermeulen & Barkema 2001) found positive rela-
tionship between cultural distance and greenfield mode entry. Earlier research has 
therefore argued that managers anticipating the above problems tend to avoid ac-
quisitions in culturally distant countries and prefer greenfield investments instead. 
The reason is that greenfields allow MNEs to choose their own workforce, and to 
establish their own practices from the beginning, thus minimizing these problems. 
Ghanaian business culture is different from Western culture. It is therefore ex-
pected that foreign firms planning to make FDI in Ghana will use the greenfield 
mode  of  investment  in  order  to  avoid  cultural  problems.  In  line  with  prior  re-
search, we propose that: 
H11 There is a positive relationship between perceived cultural distance and 
greenfield mode of establishment. 
4.3 Internalization specific and transaction cost 
4.3.1 Contractual risk 
The  result  of  the  internalization  advantage  suggests  that  firms  will  desist  from  
entering a country if the perceived risk of dissipation of knowledge, risk of dete-
rioration  of  quality  of  services,  and  costs  of  writing  and  enforcing  contracts  are  
high. This is particularly critical for firms that have specialized knowledge, pro-
tection of which must be an important priority (Hill, Hwang & Kim 1990). How-
ever, these firms are also intent on maximizing the economic rents on their 
knowledge. Lack of protection would make the sharing of specialized knowledge 
risky in the long run particularly since it would limit the flexibility a firm has in 
adapting to future contingencies. Since a flexible arrangement is difficult to 
achieve in a contractual setting, a firm that has specialized knowledge will be 
likely to opt for an internal organization. 
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On the other hand, when the contractual risk is low in the host country, a firm 
may be more willing to share its specialized knowledge. This is because as risk 
dissipation falls, the opportunity for mutually beneficial contractual arrangement 
increases at the expense of an internal market (Rugman 1981). This opportunity 
will also be higher in countries where the cost of writing and enforcing contracts 
is  low. For those firms that do not possess any specialized knowledge, the pres-
ence of contractual risk may not be a critical issue. These firms may be willing to 
opt for contractual arrangements even when the contractual risk is high (Rugman 
1982). Thus the assessment of internalization advantages is based on the relative 
costs (or risks) of sharing the asset skills with the host firm versus integrating 
them within the firm. The idea behind contractual risk is that firm knowledge 
which is classified under the transaction cost theory as asset specificity and under 
the eclectic paradigm as ownership advantage is protected in the foreign market. 
In a foreign market where there is a high risk of contractual risk, foreign firms try 
to protect their ownership advantage by opting for greenfield in order to make 
sure that its’ asset specificity is being  protected. 
In developing countries, institutions such as transparent and efficient government, 
property protection regimes and enforceable contracts are often quite weak 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc 2008). Ghana belong to these developing countries and, 
even though the country has laws governing intellectual property rights, one 
might expect that having these laws on intellectual property rights, patent protec-
tion and so on could encourage an acquisition mode of entry of foreign firms with 
both specialized knowledge and non-specialized knowledge. However, institu-
tional bottlenecks and the weak monitoring systems make these laws not effective 
and, as a result, make greenfield mode of entry preferable to acquisition entry 
mode. Based on the above viewpoints the following hypothesis is proposed. 
H12 There is a positive relationship between perceived contractual risk and 
greenfield mode of establishment. 
4.3.2 Proprietary assets 
A  number  of  scholars  (e.g.  Erramilli  &  Rao  1993;  Meyer  &  Estrin  1997;  Luo  
2001) argued that the level of a firm’s technological intensity is considered to be a 
critical determinant of foreign market entry strategy. The nature of the key com-
petencies of the investing firm influences the costs of alternative entry strategies 
(Meyer & Estrin 1997). Hennart (1988) argued that transaction cost theory stress-
es the significance of proprietary assets possessed by companies. These assets 
typically include a firm’s proprietary knowledge, products, processes, brand 
name, product differentiation, marketing skills, etc., which are difficult to transfer 
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in an imperfect market. Hennart (1982) argues that one input that MNEs may 
want to exploit or obtain abroad is firm-embedded technological knowledge, 
which is often tacit and hence costly to exchange through the market. Brouthers 
and Nakos (2004) argued that a company can protect its specific knowledge to 
minimize transaction costs by integrating foreign operations. If a firm possesses a 
specific technology or knows how, it has to take extra precautions to protect itself 
from knowledge diffusion into the hands of competitors (Klein 1989). Technolog-
ically oriented firms strive for implementing their own culture and to protect their 
technologies. They tend to avoid compatibility problems with the business cul-
tures, business methods, and technologies of existing firms (Meyer & Estrin 
1997). In line with this argumentation, previous research has shown that 
knowhow-intensive firms prefer to choose greenfield investments over acquisi-
tions to safeguard their proprietary knowledge (Andersson & Svensson 1994; 
Brouthers & Brouthers 2003; Dikova & van Wittelsoostuijn 2007; Gatignon & 
Anderson 1988; Kim & Hwang 1992). 
The transaction costs associated with exploiting such knowledge through green-
field are generally lower than those associated with exploiting them through ac-
quisitions,  as  greeenfields  enable  MNEs  to  deploy  their  technologies  from  the  
outset and to transfer the accompanying skills to a carefully-selected workforce 
capable of and willing to absorb them (Hennart & Park 1993). On the other hand, 
where an MNE lacks proprietary technological knowledge, it may be motivated to 
obtain it to improve its competitive position (Slangen & Hennart 2007). Since 
such knowledge is time-consuming and costly to develop internally (Wernerfelt 
1984), and difficult to purchase on the market because of its tacit nature and its 
embeddedness in firms, it is most efficiently obtained through acquisition (Hen-
nart et al. 1996; Larimo 2003). In contrast, MNEs with abundant firm-embedded 
technological knowledge are likely to choose greenfield and those lacking such 
knowledge are likely to choose acquisition.  
Entering a country like Ghana with weak institutions exposes the firm to addi-
tional challenges of knowledge protection. To minimise opportunistic behaviour 
and diffusion of specific knowledge, firms need to establish specific control 
mechanisms (Klein, Frazier & Roth 1990; Gatignon & Anderson 1988). Ghana 
has weak institutions; the political and legal frameworks do not support efficient 
and functioning intellectual property rights. Luo (2001) argued that when risk is 
high, property rights’ protection is generally weak, both in enactment and en-
forcement. Without sufficient legal protection, a firm’s property rights and tacit 
knowledge (such as patents, trademarks, brands, know how, and copyrights) can 
be exposed to piracy. Based on the above information we propose that: 
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H13 There is a positive relationship between proprietary asset and greenfield 
mode of establishment. 
4.4 Impact of Motives on Establishment Mode 
4.4.1 Market-seeking and establishment mode 
Market-seeking MNEs are firms that invest in a particular country or region in 
order to serve markets in this country or region. Firms undertake market-seeking 
foreign investment for the following reasons: a) market size and expected market 
growth; (b) following its main suppliers or customers who are located overseas; 
(c) the need to adapt its product to local tastes and specific market requirements, 
which can only be achieved through market presence in the form of FDI; (d) pro-
duction and transaction costs of serving a local market from an adjacent facility 
may be lower than when supplying that market from a distance; and (e) the neces-
sity, as part of its global strategy, to have a physical presence in the leading mar-
kets served by its competitors. Unlike other types of foreign direct investors, mar-
ket-seeking firms tend to treat their foreign affiliates as self-contained business 
units rather than as part of an integrated chain of value-adding activities (Dunning 
1993).  
Porter (1980) argues that in a growing market, one will expect MNEs to use a 
direct entry mode to capture market share and realize growth goals. However, to 
establish an early presence in the market may require an acquisition rather than a 
greenfield investment. Furthermore, Buckley and Casson (1998) argue that when 
a large monopoly of rents exists, the entrant will favour acquisition over green-
field both in manufacturing and distribution. This is based on the entrant’s desire 
to establish long-term control over the domestic rivals’ production or distribution. 
In a situation whereby the foreign investors decide to make a fast move and capi-
talize on first-mover advantages, an acquisition of a local business with an exist-
ing network may be preferred to a greenfield investment. This is because the for-
eign investor does not need to look for a new place to set up a new plant, but ra-
ther acquires the existing plant and manages it.   
H14 There is a negative relationship between market-seeking FDI and greenfield mode 
of establishment. 
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4.4.2 Resource-seeking and establishment mode 
Gorynia et. al. (2006) argued that resource-seeking MNEs are motivated to invest 
abroad to acquire specific resources at a lower cost than could be obtained in the 
home country. Their aim is to explore the comparative advantages of individual 
countries, such as favourable access to raw materials, parts and components, and 
low costs of labour (Brouthers, Werner & Wilkinson 1996; Dunning 1993a; 
Cantwell 1991). Their investment are primarily undertaken to minimise produc-
tion costs and/or to secure sources of supply. The reason may be to allocate pro-
duction resources in countries where factor prices are low relative to a firm’s 
productivity (Randoy 1994) and where it can serve foreign markets by exports 
(Kumar 1994). Investors of this nature are normally export-oriented and less de-
pendent on access to any particular country (Anderson & Fredriksson 1993). Re-
source-seeking investment may also aim at utilizing the human capital of a local 
firm for global operations. In order to access local human capital, a direct takeo-
ver may be more efficient because setting up a new operation and hiring key indi-
viduals does not permit the entrant to tap into local tacit knowledge. Foreign firms 
that enter Ghana in search of resources like cheap labour or raw materials are 
likely to enter through acquisition because most of the existing resource firms are 
owned by the state. Based on the above information we propose that:  
H15 There is a negative relationship between resource-seeking FDIs and greenfield 
mode of establishment. 
4.4.3 Efficiency-seeking and establishment mode 
Dunning (1993) argued that the aim of efficiency-seeking MNEs is to take ad-
vantage of different factor endowments, business incentives, and institutional ar-
rangements, by concentrating production in a limited number of locations to sup-
ply many markets. The motivation of efficiency seeking investors is to streamline 
their production, distribution and marketing activities through synergy-building 
among geographically dispersed operations. These strategies stem from two 
sources: the advantages of differences in the cost of factor endowments between 
countries, and the economies of scale and scope (Dunning 1993).  
According to Dunning (1993), this is the reason for much of the division of labour 
within firms producing in both developed and developing countries, with high 
value-added activities being concentrated in the advanced countries, and labour 
and natural resources intensive activities in the developing countries. Cross-
border markets must be both well-developed and open, in order for efficiency-
seeking foreign production to take place; hence efficiency-seeking FDIs often 
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flourish in regionally integrated markets (Dunning 1993). These firms are likely 
to adopt greenfield mode of entry in Ghana because of the undeveloped regional 
market and the lack of companies to acquire. Based on the above information we 
propose that:  
H16 There is a positive relationship between efficiency-seeking FDI and greenfield 
mode of establishment. 
4.5 Summary 
The  main  goal  of  this  chapter  was  to  examine  the  determinants  of  an  MNE’s  
choice between greenfield and acquisition modes of entry. It theoretically reviews 
how different ownership-specific, location-specific, internalization and transac-
tion cost specific factors influence the establishment mode strategies of the for-
eign manufacturing units in Ghana. The determinants of establishment mode 
strategies have been categorized into different groups. First, ownership specific 
advantages include firm size and international experience. Second, location-
advantages, which consists of market risk, country risk and cultural distance. Fi-
nally, internalization specific and transaction cost theory which is made up of 
contractual risk and proprietary assets. Based on the literature review, it is there-
fore expected that the firm’s size and the firm’s international experience will in-
crease the probability of foreign firms choosing acquisition over greenfield. Simi-
larly, with regards to location-specific factors it is expected that perceived market 
size will increase the probability of foreign firms choosing an acquisition entry 
mode in Ghana. In contrast, it is expected that perceived culture distance and the 
perceived host country risk will increase the probability of foreign firms choosing 
greenfield mode of entry in Ghana.  
Furthermore, with regards to internalization specific and transaction cost specific 
factors, it is expected that perceived contractual risk will increase the probability 
of foreign firm choosing an acquisition mode of entry in Ghana. In contrast, it is 
expected that proprietary assets will increase the probability of foreign firms 
choosing greenfield mode of entry Ghana.  Examining these factors therefore 
helps in understanding the factors that influence the establishment mode strategies 
of foreign manufacturing units in Ghana. This analysis will not only add to our 
understanding of the eclectic paradigm and transaction cost but also broaden our 
knowledge of FDI in general. Table 5 provides a summary of previous empirical 
studies on the establishment mode. 
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5 OWNERSHIP MODE OF FOREIGN UNITS 
This chapter theoretically reviews how ownership-specific, location-specific, in-
ternalization and transaction cost influence the ownership mode strategies of the 
foreign manufacturing investing firms in Ghana. Based on the extent of theoreti-
cal and empirical literature on ownership mode strategies, several hypotheses are 
developed regarding the components of the eclectic paradigm and transaction 
cost. The chapter reviews the decisions related to the ownership mode's strategies 
of the foreign firm in Ghana.  
5.1 Ownership specific factors 
5.1.1 Firm size 
Erramilla and Rao (1993) argue that a large firm has a greater ability to put in 
resources to absorb risks than a smaller firm, so it is normally preferred to estab-
lish a high-controlled mode. The same result has been demonstrated by a study 
conducted by Hennart and Park (1993). The argument in the literature is that inte-
gration entails significantly higher resource commitments such as WOSs and car-
ries a greater risk than shares-control structures. Hence, large firms have a greater 
ability to expend resources and absorb risk than smaller ones and, therefore, are 
more likely to establish WOSs. Also, Benito (1995) suggest that foreign firms 
with strong financial resources may enter foreign markets via WOSs. The ra-
tionale behind this argument is that large firms are more likely to possess the nec-
essary financial resources for full ownership of its foreign operations and are bet-
ter positioned for a more resource-demanding and full ownership structure than 
smaller firm (Padmanabhan & Cho 1996). 
Previous studies (e.g. Buckley& Casson 1976; Kimura 1989) suggest that a firm’s 
ability to marshal resources is a potential determinant of ownership structure 
choice. Similar, the results by Stopford and Wells (1972), Kogut and Singh 
(1985; 1988b) give support to the assumption that the probability of choosing a 
joint venture is greater among small firms than among big firms.A study by Lar-
imo and Tahir (2001) found that large-size Nordic manufacturing firms preferred 
a wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) in Asian markets. Furthermore, the following 
scholars (e.g. Claver & Quer 2005; Lee 2010; Shi et al 2001; Leung et al. 2003; 
Nakos & Brouthers 2002; Evans 2002; Lee et al. 2009) found a positive relation-
ship between firm size and WOS. In contrast, there are other studies that lead to 
the opposite prediction. For example, Larimo (1993) found that large size Finnish 
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manufacturing firms had a higher propensity to enter OECD countries through 
JVs, while Brouthers (2002) found that firm size was a non-significant associated 
with ownership mode choice. Based on the above information we propose that: 
H17 There is a positive relationship between firm size and WOS mode of owner-
ship. 
5.1.2 Firm’s international experience 
Sanchez-Peinado, Pla-Barber and Hebert (2007) argued that international experi-
ence can reduce the costs and risks of foreign market entry, making higher level 
entry mode choice more attractive. Also, Padmanabhan and Cho (1999) argued 
that international experience is considered as one of the critical factors affecting 
the entry choices. Erramilli (1991 pointed out that the benefits of a foreign firm 
having some previous international experience when choosing an entry mode 
suggest that the more experience the firm has, the less it will require from a part-
ner and it will, therefore, be less inclined to use cooperative modes. In addition, 
Johanson and Vahlne (1990) suggest that if a foreign firm is less experienced in a 
foreign market, the firm is expected to have local partners to help compensate for 
its insufficient market knowledge. Previous studies confirm that firms with great-
er international experience tend to prefer equity-based entry modes, while firms 
without international experience tend to choose non-equity modes of entry (e.g. 
Agarwal & Ramaswami 1992; Brouthers & Nakos 2004; Erramilli, 1991; Nakos 
& Brouthers 2002). 
Barkema et al. (1996) argue that, in practice, a firm's foreign experience can con-
tribute to the development of new knowledge and capabilities and, as a result of 
that, can make a firm efficiently reduce the uncertainties and threats and increase 
awareness of opportunities in different foreign markets (Sambharya 1996). Hence 
it is very important for the firm to use such experience in the choice of foreign 
market entry mode (Herrmann & Datta 2002). Furthermore, Johanson and Vahlne 
(1977) argued that a firm with more experience in foreign markets should have 
developed organizational capabilities suited to those markets, and thus they can 
make greater commitments to foreign market investments by using high control 
mode. Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) argue that less-experienced firms lacking 
such routines may prefer joint ventures.  Previous studies (e.g. Anderson & Gat-
ignon 1986; Gatignon & Anderson 1988; Blomstrom & Zejan 1991; Hennart 
1991; Mutinelli & Piscitello 1998; Evans 2002; King & Tucci 2002; Nakos & 
Brouthers 2002; Yung-Heng & Yann-Haur 2009; Lee et al. 2009; Lee 2010; 
Chiao et al. 2010; Dikova & Willeloosuijn 2007) suggest that an increase in the 
organization's international experience tends to lead the organization to use higher 
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ownership control mode. Whiles other studies (e.g. Arslan & Larimo 2010; Clav-
er & Quer 2005; Brouthers 2002; Shi, Ho & Siu 2001) indicated an insignificant 
relationship between experience and choice of ownership. However, most of the 
empirical studies point to a positive relationship between international experience 
and preference for WOSs. Based on the above information we propose that: 
H18 There is a positive relationship between international experience and WOS 
mode of ownership. 
5.2 Location-specific factors 
5.2.1 Market Size 
Morschett et al. (2010) argued that the attractiveness of a foreign market is seen 
as a predominant factor in market selection and in the choice of a market entry 
mode. Researchers (e.g. Taylor et al. 1998; Brouthers 2002; Randoy & Dibrell 
2002) argued that firms are assumed to enter attractive markets via wholly owned 
subsidiaries. This is based on the fact that countries that are characterized by high 
market attractiveness are seen to have better prospects to take up supplementary 
capacity, which provides an opportunity to improve firm efficiency (Morschett et 
al. 2010).  
A lot of studies (e.g. Davidson & McFetridge 1985; Erramilli et al. 1997; Ekeledo 
& Sivakumar 1998) have argued that increasing market size leads to an enhanced 
resource commitment in the country: that is, market size is positively related in-
ternalization. According to Agarwal, (1994) a large host country market implies 
that companies can expect returns that are commensurate with the higher risk as-
sociated with commitment of resources. Previous studies (see e.g Agarwal & 
Ramaswami 1992; Nakos & Brouthers 2002; Eicher & Kang 2002; Chung & 
Enderwick 2001) argued that in a large size market, firms tend to prefer WOSs so 
that they can obtain scale economies, hence reducing cost, and also to establish a 
long-term market presence. Ghana is a medium-sized African market and the se-
cond largest in West Africa but small by international standards. Hence, looking 
at the internationally, small-market size may favour JV than WOSs ownership 
mode decisions in Ghana. Based on the above we propose that: 
H19 There is a positive relationship between perceived market size and WOS 
mode of ownership.  
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5.2.2 Host country risk 
A country risk reflects the uncertainty over the continuation of present economic 
and political conditions and government politics, which are deemed to be critical 
to the survival and profitability of a firm’s operations in that country (Agarwal & 
Ramaswami 1992). Morschett et al. (2010) argued that where there is uncertainty, 
transaction cost reasoning implies a higher level of vertical integration.  Kim and 
Hwag (1992) argued that if an environment in a host country is uncertain and un-
predictable, firms apparently hesitate to commit themselves too much as they may 
lose their strategic flexibility. Brothers (2002) also concluded that firms tend to 
prefer JVs when entering countries characterized by high investment risks. 
Previous studies (e.g. Bell 1996; Benito 1995; Mutinelli & Piscitello 1997; 
Brouthers 2000; Cristina & Esteben 2002; Brouthers & Brouthers 2000; Tahir & 
Larimo 2006) suggest that firms under high levels of risks in host countries are 
likely to choose low control ownership modes. Anderson and Gatignon (1988) 
used a sample data from the Harvard Multinational Enterprise Project embracing 
1267 foreign subsidiaries set up in 87 countries by 180 US firms between 1960 
and 1975, and found that firms are most likely to opt for JV when undertaking an 
investment in high-risk countries. Bijur (1995) argued that the levels of risk in the 
host country place a firm’s assets at a heightened risk and, consequently, firms 
cannot afford to lose them or render them unproductive. Hence, a JV is a more 
flexible option that makes it easier to withdraw from a market in the event of de-
terioration in operating conditions. In short, much of the reasoning above suggests 
a negative association between target country risk and WOS entry mode, this rela-
tionship has received a lot of empirical support (Gatignon & Anderson 1988; Kim 
& Hwang 1992; Osborne 1996; Aulakh & Kotabe 1997; Contractor & Kundu 
1998; Azofra & Mart?nez 1999; Luo 2001; Brouthers 2002; Nakos et al. 2002; 
Brouthers & Brouthers 2003; Pak & Park 2004). 
The investment risk in Ghana is much higher than that of developed countries. 
This argument is based on the fact that institutional structures are not well devel-
oped as compared to advanced countries. Ghana is a young democratically gov-
erned country. However, the environment may be considered risky in comparison 
to developed countries. Thus, foreign firms that set up subsidiaries in Ghana are 
likely to opt for cooperative modes of ownership.  Based on the above infor-
mation we propose that: 
H20 There is a negative relationship between perceived investment risk and 
WOS mode of ownership. 
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5.2.3 Cultural distance 
Hofstede (2001) argued that culture provides a challenge for the firms in terms of 
how to deal with the cultural distance within individual markets as well as across 
markets. Randoy and Dibrell (2002) suggest that cultural distance generates addi-
tional costs related to information collection and communications, making inter-
nalization difficult. In addition, Palenzuela and Bobillo (1999) stated that cultural 
distance induces foreign enterprises to seek local support with the aim of facilitat-
ing product adaptation, risk sharing and mistake avoidance. Furthermore, Madhok 
(1997) argues that cultural distance hinders the transfer of firm-specific routines, 
making collaboration more attractive than hierarchy. Also, Gatignon and Ander-
son (1988) argued that under conditions of high cultural distance, MNEs may 
require greater flexibility, resulting in preferences for modes of entry with lower 
control,  such as licensing or a joint  venture.  Morschett  et  al.  (2010),  claims that 
cultural distance increases the risk of operating in a certain market and of the loss 
of company resources. Hence, cooperative entry mode can serve as a risk-
reduction strategy (Gatignon & Anderson 1988; Erramilli 1991; Tihanyi et al. 
2005).  Kim and Hwang (1992) argued that when confronted with disparate sales 
philosophies, languages, customs and lifestyles, foreign investors will tend to 
choose a lower-control entry mode to avoid conflicts with local actors and to in-
crease the flexibility of business arrangements, particularly if they consider the 
contingency of withdrawal from the area when the business fails. 
Hennart and Larimo (1998) examine the impacts of the distance in cultural scores 
between the home countries (Japan and Finland) and the host country (U.S.A.) on 
ownership preference. They use two national cultural indices developed by Hof-
stede (1980). The two national cultural indices are Power Distance Index (PDI) 
and Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI). The result shows that, as the degree of 
cultural distance increases, a foreign investor is more likely to form a JV to obtain 
the knowledge from its local partners. As a result, the greater the cultural distance 
between the home and host country, related to culture and business practices, the 
greater the likelihood of entry through low-involvement resource commitment 
modes (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Kim & Hwang, 
1992; Anand & Delios 1997; Mutinelli & Piscitello 1998; Makino & Neupert 
2000). In addition, Sun (1999) and Wei et al (2005) found a negative relationship 
between cultural distance and choice of WOS.  
Several studies have shown that joint venture is preferable to a wholly-owned 
subsidiary when cultural distance is large (see e.g. Anderson & Coughlan, 1987; 
Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Kim & Hwang, 1992; Brouthers & Brouthers 2003; 
Padmanabhan & Cho 1999; Evans 2002; Cristina & Esteban 2002; Leung et al. 
 Acta Wasaensia      61 
 
  
2003; Quer, Claver & Rienda 2007). Ghana’s business culture is different from 
that of the developed Western countries. It is therefore expected that foreign firms 
wishing to set up subsidiaries in Ghana will use the JV mode of ownership. All 
these arguments lead to the conclusion that cultural distance will be associated 
with the adoption of an entry mode that implies lower resources commitment. 
Based on the above information we propose that: 
H21 There is a negative relationship between perceived cultural distance and 
WOS mode of ownership. 
5.3 Internalization specific and transaction cost 
5.3.1 Contractual risk 
Dunning (1993), describes some of the internalization advantages as follows: 
minimizing negotiation and transaction costs, ensuring adequate quality control, 
avoiding  the  risk  of  dissipation  of  knowledge,  and  avoidance  of  property  right  
enforcement costs. The internalizing of international operations comes at a cost.  
These costs must be compared with the costs of finding and maintaining an exter-
nal relationship to perform the same functions in the international markets. These 
internalization advantages represent the motivations behind the firm’s decision to 
internalize its foreign markets. The effect of the internalization advantage sug-
gested that firms will refrain from entering a country if the perceived risk of dis-
sipation of knowledge, risk of deterioration of quality of services, and cost of 
writing and enforcing contracts are high. This is particularly critical for firms that 
have specialized knowledge, protection of which must be an important priority 
(Hill, Hwang & Kim, 1990).  
Lack of protection would make the sharing of specialized knowledge risky in the 
long run particularly since it would limit the flexibility a firm has in adapting to 
future contingencies. Since a flexible arrangement is difficult to achieve in a con-
tractual setting, a firm that has specialized knowledge will be expected to opt for 
an internal organization. On the other hands when the contractual risks are low a 
firm may be more willing to share its specialized knowledge. This is because as 
the risk of dissipation falls, the opportunity for mutually beneficial contractual 
arrangements increases at the expense of an internal market (Rugman 1981).In 
developing countries, institutions such as transparent and efficient government, 
property protection regimes and enforceable contracts are often quite weak 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc 2008). Ghana has promulgated laws to protect intellec-
tual property rights. However, the implementations of such laws have not been as 
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stringent as might be found in advanced countries. Therefore, there are relatively 
high contractual risks in Ghana compared to the advanced countries. Based on the 
above information we propose that: 
H22 There is a positive relationship between perceived contractual risk and 
WOS mode of ownership. 
5.3.2 Proprietary assets 
Hennart (1998) argued that transaction cost theory laid emphasis on the signifi-
cance of proprietary assets possessed by companies. These assets in general in-
clude a firm’s proprietary knowledge, products, processes, brand name, product 
differentiation, marketing skills, etc., andare difficult to transfer in an imperfect 
market. The transaction cost theory stresses the efficiency of using high control 
modes in the presence of intangible assets. Buckley and Casson (1976) argued 
that the existence of transaction costs in markets provides a reason to organise 
international transactions inside the boundaries of the firm through wholly owned 
subsidiaries. Hence, internalization will prevent these assets being exploited by 
third parties (protection against opportunistic behaviour by partners or licensees), 
or it will ensure that the operation develops in accordance with the standards de-
manded by the parent company (protection against the local partner’s incapacity 
to execute correctly the routines and procedures required). A number of studies 
have provided empirical evidence about this relationship (e.g. Chen & Hu 2002; 
Gatignon & Anderson 1988; Gomes-Casseres 1990; Brouthers & Nakos 2004). In 
addition, the tacit nature of knowledge makes its valuation and transfers a com-
plex process, since it is impossible to reveal this knowledge to a buyer without 
diminishing its value. At the same time, there is a high risk of opportunistic be-
haviour from both buyers and sellers due to the ease with which non-codified in-
formation can be under or overvalued (Madhok 1998). Agarwal and Ramaswami 
(1992) suggest that the absence of protection mechanisms means that it is risky 
for a firm to share specialised knowledge, especially because this may limit its 
flexibility in adapting to future possible changes. 
Past studies (e.g. Larimo 2000; Brouthers & Brouthers 2003; Cho & Pad-
manabhan 2005; Tahir & Larimo 2006; Yung-Heng & Yann-Haur 2009; Chiao et 
al. 2010; Lee 2009; Slangen & Hennart2008; Demirbag 2007) have shown that 
technologically intensive firms prefer WOS mode of ownership. They tend to 
select equity-based entry modes as a control mechanism to safeguard their propri-
etary knowledge (Brouthers & Brouthers 2003; Gatignon & Anderson 1988; Kim 
& Hwang 1992). Anderson and Gatignon (1986) put forward detailed relation-
ships among fundamental constructs of control, commitment of resources, and 
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risk. They recommend that high control entry modes are more efficient for prod-
ucts that are highly proprietary, unstructured, ill understood, highly customized to 
a user or in introductory and growth stages. Their propositions were in line with 
Teece’s (1986) argument that greater complexity will lead to high control entry 
mode since the complexity is a proxy of the ill-understood, unstructured nature of 
the products. It is agreed among researchers that high knowledge content, espe-
cially  its  tacitness,  exposes  the  investing  multinationals  to  more  risk  and,  as  a  
result of that, a high control entry mode, i.e. wholly owned subsidiary is more 
efficient (Hill, Hwang & Kim 1990; 1996).  
Transaction cost theory assumes that because of bounded rationality (agents can-
not work out a contract  that  covers all  possible situations) and opportunism (the 
contract is difficult to enforce because the agents cheat), markets fail. Market 
failures create transaction costs. The high costs incurred by companies transfer-
ring proprietary assets lead them to internalize markets. Hence, when transferring 
their proprietary assets overseas, multinationals are more likely to select a high 
control mode. This line of reasoning is particularly true for multinationals’ entry 
mode decisions in Ghana, where intellectual property protection is weaker than in 
developed Western countries. Ghana is still developing its legal systems, and 
sometimes the intellectual property protection law is difficult to enforce. Based on 
the above information we propose that: 
H23 There is a positive relationship between proprietary assets and WOS mode 
of ownership. 
5.4 Impact of Motives on Ownership Modes 
5.4.1 Market-seeking and ownership mode 
A country attracts market-seeking investment based on factors such as market 
size, per capita income and market growth. Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) ar-
gued that in a huge potential market, foreign firms tend to prefer WOSs so that 
they can obtain scale economies, hence reducing cost and also to establish a long-
term market presence. Foreign firms invest in countries with large market sizes to 
capitalise on ownership-specific assets. Foreign firms also expect to gain valuable 
skills and large economies of scale by acquiring intangible assets like market 
knowledge and expertise (Kang 2010). Hence, the bigger the size of the host-
country market, the more likely it will attract high levels of FDI. Firms enter a 
high-potential market with a higher resource's commitment that will allow more 
control to effectively penetrate the market. Root (1994) argued that a low and 
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uncertain sales potential of a target market will attract low commitment entry 
mode. However, the results of Sanna-Randaccio (1990) indicated that there is a 
positive relationship between market size and ownership structure.  Based on the 
above information we propose that: 
H24 There is a positive relationship between market-seeking FDIs and a WOS 
mode of ownership. 
5.4.2 Resource seeking and ownership mode 
Resource-seeking firms aim to access specific resources in the host country at 
lower cost levels as compared to what they achieve in their home countries (e.g. 
Galan, González-Benito & Zuniga-Vincente 2007). They strive for achieving cost 
advantages in the host-country environment, for example, through lower labour 
cost or advantages in cost and the availability of raw materials (Dunning, 1998). 
Resource-seeking investors aim to explore the comparative advantages of indi-
vidual countries, such as favourable access to raw materials, parts and compo-
nents, and low costs of labour (Brouthers, Werner & Wilkinson 1996; Dunning 
1993a; Cantwell 1991). Less developed are economies normally are characterised 
by lower cost structures and often offer high investment incentives to attract for-
eign investors. Resource-seeking investments are primarily undertaken to mini-
mise production costs and/or to secure sources of supply. The reason may be to 
allocate production resources in countries where factor prices are low relative to a 
firm’s productivity (Randoy 1994) and where it can serve foreign markets by ex-
ports (Kumar 1994). 
Anderson and Fredriksson (1993) argued that resource-seeking investors are nor-
mally export-oriented and less dependent upon access to any particular country. 
Foreign firms from advanced economies that enter the Ghanaian market in search 
of resources like cheap labour or raw material are likely to be involved in joint 
ventures because of the preference of the government. This is because most of the 
resource-controlling firms in Ghana are owned by the state; the government may 
not be willing to give everything out to foreign investors. Most of the time, the 
government  tries  to  hold  some proportion  of  the  company,  and  this  ends  up  be-
come a joint venture project between the state and the foreign investors. Based on 
the above information we propose that: 
H25 There is a negative relationship between resource-seeking FDIs and WOS 
mode of ownership. 
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5.4.3 Efficiency- seeking and ownership mode 
Sethi  et  al.  (2003)  argues  that  the  efficiency-seeking  motive  has  to  do  with  the  
search for locations that offer low-cost factors of production and scale economies. 
Dunning(1993) argued that the intention of the efficiency-seeking MNE is to take 
advantage of different factor endowments, cultures, institutional arrangements, 
economic systems and policies, and market structures by concentrating produc-
tion in a limited number of locations to supply numerous markets. The main aim 
of efficiency-seeking investors is to rationalize their production, distribution and 
marketing activities through common governance of and synergy-building among 
geographically dispersed operations. Dunning (1993) argued that the rationaliza-
tion essentially stems from two sources: the advantages of differences in the cost 
of factor endowments between countries and the economies of scale and scope. 
This explains much of the division of labour within firms producing in both de-
veloped and developing countries, with capital, technology and information inten-
sive value-added activities being concentrated in the former, and labour and natu-
ral resources intensive activities in the latter (Gorynia et al.  2006). 
Similarly, Dunning (1993) argued that efficiency-seeking firms aim to capitalize 
on the advantages of the common ownership of a network of activities and capa-
bilities in diverse environments. Efficiency-seeking MNEs from developed econ-
omies tend to come from countries where labour costs have become relatively 
high and force those MNEs to enter other developing countries to take advantage 
of cheaper labour (Giroud 2004). In order for efficiency seeking foreign produc-
tion to take place, cross-border markets must be both well-developed and open, 
hence it often flourishes in regionally integrated markets (Dunning 1993). In ac-
cordance with this argument above, the Sub-Sahara Africa cross-border market is 
not  well  developed  as  in  the  case  of  the  developed  world;  therefore,  efficiency-
seeking FDI firms in Ghana are more likely to opt for a joint venture instead of a 
wholly owned subsidiary. Based on the above information we propose that: 
H26 There is a negative relationship between efficiency-seeking FDIs and a 
WOS mode of ownership. 
5.5 Summary 
The main goal of this chapter was to examine the determinants of MNE’s choice 
between WOS and the JV mode of ownership. It theoretically reviews how differ-
ent ownership-specific, location-specific, internalization and transaction cost spe-
cific and strategic advantages influence the ownership mode strategies of the for-
eign manufacturing units in Ghana. The determinants of ownership mode strate-
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gies have been categorized into different groups: First, ownership specific ad-
vantages which include firm size and international experience. Second, location-
specific advantages, which consist of market size, country risk and cultural dis-
tance. Finally, internalization specific and transaction cost theory which is made 
up of contractual risk and proprietary assets.  
Based on the literature review, it is expected that a firm’s size and the firm’s in-
ternational experience will increase the probability of foreign firms choosing 
WOS over the JV mode of ownership in Ghana. It is expected that perceived 
market size will increase the probability of foreign firms choosing WOS modes of 
ownership. While perceived cultural distance and perceived country risk will lead 
to an increase in the probability of foreign firms choosing JV modes of ownership 
in Ghana. Furthermore, with regards to internalization specific and transaction 
cost specific factors, it is expected that, perceived contractual risk will increase 
the probability of a foreign firm choosing WOS modes of ownership. Besides, 
proprietary assets of foreign firms will increase the probability of a foreign firm 
choosing WOS modes of ownership in Ghana. Examining these factors therefore 
helps in understanding the factors that influence the ownership mode strategies of 
foreign manufacturing units in Ghana. This analysis will not only add to our un-
derstanding of the transaction cost and eclectic paradigm but also broaden our 
knowledge of FDI in general. Table 6 provides a summary of previous empirical 
studies on the ownership mode.  
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6 PERFORMANCE OF FOREIGN UNITS 
This chapter theoretically investigates how ownership-specific factors, location-
specific factors, establishment mode and ownership choice influence the perfor-
mance of the foreign firms in the context of Ghana. Each of the above-mentioned 
factors is reviewed in detail in different subchapters. Based on the reviewed lit-
erature on performance, several hypotheses are developed regarding the compo-
nent of the ownership-specific factors, location-specific factors, establishment 
mode, and the ownership type. This chapter goes beyond the examination of only 
entry modes of performance, and also examines variables under ownership-
specific factors and location-specific factors of performance at the subsidiary lev-
el in the context of Ghana.  
6.1 Performance measurement 
The performance evaluation of foreign subsidiaries has been an important topic 
for both researchers and practitioners (Schmidt & Kretschner 2010). There are 
various approaches to how FDI performance is measured. Performance evaluation 
is essential for revealing a true picture of subsidiaries’ activities: it can make 
headquarters aware of successful developments as well as unsuccessful ones. Var-
ious performance measures exist which have been categorized in numerous ways 
by different authors (Neely et al. 1995). Despite the heterogeneity of performance 
measures, an often used and widely accepted distinction is the distinction between 
quantitative and qualitative performance measures (Blau & Scott 1963; Grüning 
2002; Pun& White 2005). Most quantitative measures are considered to be objec-
tively measured, while qualitative measures imply a certain degree of subjectivity. 
Owing to their nature, qualitative criteria are usually more difficult to measure 
than quantitative criteria (Pun & White 2005). 
 
Quantitative measures can be non-financial or based on financial data (Fisher 
1992). Within financial measures, two groups are frequently distinguished 
(Gladen 2003; Ittner & Larcker 1998): on the one hand, traditional, accounting-
based measures such as profit and return on investment and, on the other hand, 
value-based measures such as economic value added (EVA) or cash flow return 
on investment (CFROI). Financial performance measures includes overall profit-
ability (indicated by ratios such as return on investment, return on sales, return on 
assets, and return on equity), earnings per share, stock price (Chowdhury 1992; Li 
1995; Delios & Beamish 2004; Chung & Beamish 2005; Mudambi & Zahra 2007; 
Xu  & Lu 2007). Non-financial performance measures are often grouped into two 
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categories – internally determined measures or externally determined measures 
(e.g. Keegan et al. 1989; Neely et al. 2000). For instance, while productivity is an 
internal non-financial measure, market share is interpreted as an externally as-
sessed measure. Other studies have used different approaches by measuring per-
formance through ex-ante or expected performance versus ex-post or realized 
performance. The first category has used stock market reactions to FDI an-
nouncements as an index of performance (e.g. Morck & Yeung 1992; Markides & 
Ittner 1994; Chen, Hu, Chen & Shieh 1992; Datta & Puia 1995; Merchant 1995). 
The other one is the realized performance which is the function of two broad sets 
of factors: strategy of the parent and the characteristic of the environment in 
which the venture operates. These broad factors are consistent with the strategy 
literature (e.g. Andrews 1971; Porter 1980) which argues that an appropriate firm 
strategy and a favourable external environment are the two key factors impacting 
performance.  
Qualitative criteria used for performance evaluation can again be classified into 
either internal qualitative criteria (such as employee satisfaction) or external qual-
itative criteria (such as customer loyalty) (Gregory 1993). Qualitative criteria are 
subjective because they are based on the person’s judgments or perception. Ex-
amples of subjective measure include achievement of goals, and perceived overall 
performance relative to competitors. Subjective measures have been used by 
many scholars in measuring performance in international business studies (e.g., 
Woodcock et al. 1994; Nitsch et al. 1996; Andersson et al. 2001; Beamish & Lee 
2003; Delios & Beamish 2004). In this study, subjective measures are used, and 
thus the firm’s performance is measured on the basis of the perceptions of subsid-
iary managers. Merchant, Stringer and Theivananthampillai (2010) emphasize 
that subject measures can be better than quantitative measures in many ways. Ac-
cording to them, quantitative measures are not necessarily more objective; in fact 
they can even distort the performance picture. Many quantitative performance 
measures might be skewed over the short term, and one needs deep contextual 
knowledge to understand their implications. It is argued that subjective measures 
based on management perceptions enable managers to say exactly how perfor-
mance is impacting their business and to reflect on the total picture of perfor-
mance. On the other hand, with subjective responses, some managers may inflate 
performance or even deflate performance in order to give a certain biased impres-
sion. It is also possible that managers do not have a clear picture of performance 
(Merchant et al. 2010). 
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6.2 Ownership-specific factors 
6.2.1 Firm size 
Firm size has been considered an important source of strategic advantage since it 
can allow the firm to realize economies of scale and scope and access to resources 
denied to smaller firms. Large firms usually possess vital assets and oligopolistic 
advantages, as their dominant positions have been attributed to their intensive 
investments in advanced technology, product differentiation and extensive adver-
tising (Siripaisalpipat & Hoshino 1999). Previous studies (e.g. Brouthers 2002; 
Brouthers & Werner 2003; Pangarkar & Lim 2003) argued that transaction cost 
predicts that there is a relationship between the size of parent firm and perfor-
mance. This is because large investors can commit a significant amount of re-
sources, which might lead to greater synergies (Pangarka & Lim 2003) in turn 
influencing parent firm affiliate. Moreover, Glaister and Buckley (1999) argued 
that large MNEs with global reach and an integrated network may also facilitate a 
more effective supply chain thereby enhancing the cost effectiveness of opera-
tions and hence leading to better performance. Empirical support to the above 
views was gives e.g. by the results of Pangarkar and Lim (2003). Based  on  the  
above argument we propose that:  
H27 There is a positive relationship between parent firm size and FDI perfor-
mance. 
6.1.2 Firm's international experience 
Davidson (1980) argued that a parent firm's experience in the foreign market is 
critical for international expansion and, consequently, can have significant effects 
on the performance of foreign subsidiaries. Johanson and Vahlne (1977) stated 
that the parent firms’ experience in operating overseas subsidiaries can be trans-
ferable to subsidiaries in different countries, because managers may build organi-
zational routines that allow firms to efficiently expand abroad in many markets 
(Westney, 1998; Madhok, 1997). These arguments are based on the fact that op-
erational experience in foreign markets can be accumulated at the firm level as 
well as the subsidiary level. Hence, the accumulation of experience helps the par-
ent firm to increase know-how of doing business in the foreign market and, con-
sequently, can reduce operational uncertainties (Johanson & Vahlne 1977). Gat-
ignon and Anderson (1988) argue that firms with lack of experience in the inter-
national setting are not capable of managing subjectively, monitoring appropriate-
ly, and assessing inputs in lieu of outputs.  
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Kim et al. (1993) argue that the more multinational the firm is, the better it can 
leverage strategic resources and diversify market risks, and, thus, the better it can 
perform. This is because, as a firm expands its operation overseas, it learns more 
about  how  to  cope  with  different  environments  in  terms  of  economic,  political  
and legal systems, as well as the perceived psychological distance. These learning 
skills can be applied to new foreign investment opportunities. Barkema and Ver-
meulen (1998) argue that when firms make international investments, specific 
knowledge of the host country is gained together with more general knowledge of 
conducting international operations. Hence based on the above-mentioned view-
points, we propose that: 
H28 There is a positive relationship between the international experience and 
FDI performance. 
6.3 Location-specific factors 
6.3.1 Market size 
The  market  size  of  the  host  country  is  an  important  determinant  of  the  MNE’s  
performance. Brouthers (2002) found that there is a relationship between market 
potential and MNE performance. Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) also suggest 
that firms tend to utilize WOSs rather than IJVs in the host countries with large 
market size. There are fixed costs associated with FDI, which are easier to deal 
with when spread over a larger volume of output. The larger the market, the 
greater the reduction in the marginal costs of producing abroad and the more like-
ly the firm is to invest in that location rather than resort to exportation (Buckley & 
Dunning 1976).  In a small market, firms may find that fewer integrated modes 
provide better opportunities either because (1) they do not increase the capacity in 
the market, hence not impacting competitor pricing strategies as severely, (2) can 
provide a better return on investment by minimizing the resource commitment, 
based on lower expected returns, or (3) reduce the switching costs of market exit 
if product/ service sales are low (Kim & Hwang 1992). Ghana is a medium-sized 
African country and the second largest population in West Africa. The country is 
a key player in the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS) 
region where there is expected to be free movement of goods and services with a 
population of more than 250 million in the next decade. Investors looking for bet-
ter performance will be attracted to Ghana market based on the regional market 
and not only the size of the Ghanaian market. Hence, based on the above view-
point we propose that: 
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H29 There is a positive relationship between perceived market size and FDI per-
formance. 
6.3.2 Cultural Distance 
A growing number of studies consider cultural distance in the MNE portfolio of 
operations an important predictor of performance (Luo & Peng 1999; Palich & 
Gomez-Mejia 1999; Mulok & Ainuddin 2010). The greater the cultural distance 
between home and host countries, the greater the differences in management prac-
tice, and the more difficult it becomes to integrate the unit with the parent. Luo 
and Peng (1999) argue that high cultural difference tend to lead to intra-
organizational conflicts and poor carrying out of organizational actions, either 
resulting in inconsistencies in values and institutions between home and foreign 
market operations. Furthermore, previous studies (e.g. Egelhoff 1982; Schneider 
& DeMeyer 1991), argue that high cultural distance limits MNE performance due 
to increased training, monitoring, and control costs, as well as differences in man-
agerial cognition of environmental and organizational issues. Li and Guisinger 
(1992) argue that, at the extreme, cultural differences may lead to differences in 
investment preferences between partners, resulting in the failure of foreign opera-
tions of MNEs. Luo and Peng (1999), found a negative relationship between cul-
tural distance and MNE performance, while some of other studies have found a 
positive effect (e.g. Morosini et al. 1998). Park and Ungson (1997) argue that 
managing portfolios of foreign operations with higher cultural distance often as-
sociates with increased transaction and operating costs, resulting in higher surviv-
al hazard among MNEs. Thus, based on the above information, we propose that: 
H30 There is a negative relationship between perceived cultural distance and 
FDI performance. 
6.3.3 Host country risk 
Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) argue that host country risk reflects uncertainty 
about the continuation of current economic and political conditions and govern-
ment policies that are deemed to be critical to the survival and profitability of firm 
operations in that country Furthermore, Ahmed et al. (2002) emphasized the im-
portance  of  the  political  risk  and  the  uncertain  dimension  of  MNEs’  operations  
and performance. Bijur (1995) argue that levels of risk in the host country place a 
firm’s assets at a heightened risk - firms cannot afford to lose them or render them 
unproductive. By and large, a country that is economically and politically unsta-
ble has a high level of risk associated with FDIs made. An extremely unpredicta-
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ble  environment  will  result  in  firms  that  want  to  minimize  exposure  to  risk  
through entry methods that offer the necessary flexibility in the face of environ-
mental risk (Erramilli & D'Souza 1995; Kim & Hwang 1992). In general the per-
ceived country risk in Ghana is assumed to be clearly higher than e.g. OECD 
countries and in several emerging economies because of the less developed insti-
tutional structures. Based on the above viewpoints, we propose that:  
H31 There is a negative relationship between perceived country risk and FDI 
performance. 
6.4 Establishment mode and performance 
The FDI can be made using either greenfield investment or acquisition mode. 
Several studies (e.g. Woodcock et al. 1994; Li 1995; Nitsch et al. 1996; Hennart 
et al. 1998) argue that the performance of Greenfield investments should be sys-
tematically better than that of acquisitions. Greenfield FDI is a particular form of 
market penetration and generally MNEs consider this choice when their firm-
specific advantages are well-built enough to cover the additional transaction costs 
arising from operations in the foreign market, and when location advantages are 
great. Greenfield investment also provides improved possibilities to build the op-
erations step-by-step following the local market situation.  
Regarding acquisitions-related advantages it may be stated that in cases where the 
foreign company acquires an existing local firm that is well-established in the 
market the investing firm may then try to combine the subsidiary’s advantages 
with its own core abilities, thereby augmenting its overall firm specific asset 
(Dunning 2000). The new combined entity may then be able to use these syner-
gies to better overcome the transaction cost barrier and to improve its position on 
the local market (e.g. Anand & Delios 2002; Dunning 2000). Also, acquisitions 
have been considered less risky than greenfield investments (Caves 1996) because 
making an acquisition means buying a going concern with a proven track record 
(Penning et al. 1994; Hill & Jones 1998), established suppliers and customers, 
and managers familiar with the  industry and local market conditions (Caves, 
1996). All these factors reduce the uncertainty about the subsidiary’s future in-
come (Hill & Jones 1998; Caves 1996).  Furthermore, Larimo (2003) argues that 
greenfield investments need more time for planning, construction and market po-
sitioning than takeovers, and as a result may lose a lot of time before they can 
develop their operations. There is wide empirical evidence that although there are 
several advantages associated with acquisitions they also appear be risky, and a 
great proportion of acquisitions do not reach the goals set for them. Several stud-
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ies also indicate better performance in greenfield investments than in acquisitions, 
especially in cases of high cultural distance and highly uncertain markets. Based 
on the above we propose that: 
H32 There is a positive relationship between the greenfield establishment mode 
and FDI performance. 
6.5 Ownership mode and performance 
The ownership modes are wholly owned subsidiary (full acquisition) and joint 
venture (partial acquisition). Prior studies have shown that a relationship exists 
between ownership mode and firm performance. Anderson and Gatignon (1986) 
argue that a correct decision on entry mode should improve a company’s long-
term  performance.  In  the  same  way,  a  mode  wrongly  chosen  will  lead  to  high  
transaction costs and low transaction benefits, conditions under which a venture’s 
performance will suffer (Chen & Hu 2002). It has been argued that performance 
is relatively independent of ownership mode, since both WOS and JV choice 
could equally obtain the same results. Previous empirical studies report mixed 
results on the relationship between the degree of ownership and performance. 
Chowdhurry (1992) found that WOSs performed better than JVs. Similarly, Tan 
and Yu (1990) found that WOS generated higher profits than JVs. There are also 
other  studies  that  have  drawn  similar  conclusions  (e.g.  Brouthers  et  al.  2000;  
Nitsch, Beamish & Makino 1996; Woodcock, Beamish & Makino 1994). Howev-
er, there also many studies which opposite results have been found indicating thus 
that IJVs have performed better than WOSs (see e.g. Reus & Ritchie 2004; Pan, 
Li & Tse 1999). Finally, there are also quite many studies like Lim and Pangarka 
(2003) and Luo (2003) where there is no relationship between ownership ar-
rangement and performance were found. Because quite many studies focusing on 
FDIs in emerging markets (e.g. Pan, Li & Tse 1999) seem to indicate better per-
formance in IJVs for the possible reason that there is in (several cases) a need for 
a local partner because of cultural differences and market uncertainty and there-
fore:   
H33 There is a negative relationship between WOS ownership mode and FDI 
performance. 
6.5.1 Combined effect 
The foregoing discussion implies that we would expect better performance in 
greenfield investments than in FDIs made in the mode of acquisitions and better 
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in joint ventures than in wholly owned FDIs. However, we expect that there may 
be some differences in the impacts when the establishment and ownership mode 
decisions are analyzed jointly. We expect that joint ventures perform better than 
WOSs if the investment is made in the mode of greenfield whereas if the invest-
ment is made using acquisition modes we expect that WOSs would perform better 
than joint ventures (partial acquisitions). Our expectation is based on the wide 
empirical evidence that has indicated acquisitions to be often very problematic 
because of e.g. management and cultural differences, needed technological trans-
fer, needed integration etc. and these problems are especially high in partial ac-
quisitions (Hennert 1998). Thus we expect: 
H34 There is a positive relationship between joint venture ownership in green-
field mode of investment and FDI performance.   
H35 There is a positive relationship between WOS ownership in acquisition 
mode of investment and FDI performance. 
6.5.2 Interaction effect 
As discussed earlier, researchers have argued that international experience has a 
positive impact on performance. International experience provides a firm with 
knowledge and resources that it can use to improve performance (Johanson & 
Vahlne 1977; Gatignon & Anderson 1988). On the other hand scholars have ar-
gued that high level of risk negatively affect performance by increasing barriers 
and creating high miscellaneous costs as firms try to guard against unexpected 
occurrences like loss of investments (Kobrin 1976; Erramilli & D'Souza 1995; 
Kim & Hwang, 1992). Also, it has been argued that high cultural distance affect 
performance negatively (e.g. Luo & Peng 1999; Palich & Gomez-Mejia 1999). 
Our expectation is based on the empirical evidence that has indicated internation-
al experience positively impacts on performance. Therefore we expect that the 
MNEs with extensive international experience operating in a high risk and high 
cultural distance country will positively moderate the negative impact of cultural 
distance and country risk on subsidiary performance. Based on the foregoing lit-
erature review the following hypotheses have been formulated: 
H36 International experience positively moderates the impact of perceived coun-
try risk on FDI performance 
H37 International experience positively moderates the impact of perceived cul-
tural distance on FDI performance 
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6.6 Summary 
This chapter theoretically reviews how different ownership-specific, location- 
specific, establishment and ownership mode factors influence the performance of 
foreign manufacturing units in Ghana. It also reviews how the interaction between 
ownership specific factors and location specific factors affect the performance of 
foreign subsidiaries. With regards to ownership specific factors which consist of 
firm size and international experience, it is expected that large firm size and ex-
tensive international experience will increase the performance of foreign subsidi-
ary firms in Ghana. With regard to location-specific factors which are made up of 
the market size, culture distance and host country investment risk, it is expected 
that large market of the host country will increase the performance of the foreign 
subsidiary firm in Ghana. In contrast, it is expected that cultural distance and the 
host country risk will decrease the performance of the foreign subsidiary firms in 
Ghana. In the case of establishment mode and ownership mode, it is expected that 
the greenfield entry mode and joint ventures mode of ownership will increase the 
performance of the foreign subsidiary firms in Ghana. In addition, it is expected 
that, the combined effect of greenfield JV will lead to increase in performance of 
foreign subsidiary firms. This analysis will not only add to our understanding of 
the ownership specific factors, location specific factors and entry mode's choices 
and its effect on performance of foreign subsidiary in the context Ghana but also 
broaden our knowledge of FDI performance of subsidiaries in general. Table 7 
summarizese empirical results of previous studies on FDI performance. 
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6.7 Research model of the study 
The eclectic paradigm proposes that three types of firm level advantages influ-
ence cross-border business activities: ownership specific advantages, location-
specific advantages and internalization advantages: Ownership-specific ad-
vantages include various tangible and intangible assets owned by the investing 
firm, whereas transaction-specific advantage include variables related to the abil-
ity of firms to capture the transactional benefits from the common governance of 
multiple and geographically dispersed activities. Location-specific advantages are 
essential in determining where firms will engage in cross-border value adding 
activities.  Dunning (1980) argued that a company will engage in international 
production when each of the three following conditions are present.  A company 
possesses certain specific advantages not possessed by competing companies of 
other nationalities (ownership-specific advantages) and such advantages are most 
suitably exploited by the company itself rather than by selling or leasing them to 
other companies. In other words, the company internalizes the use of its owner-
ship-specific advantages; and it must be more profitable for the company to ex-
ploit its assets overseas, rather than in domestic locations. Hence, location-
specific factors play an important role, in combination with internalization of 
ownership-specific advantages, in determining whether or not and where overseas 
production occurs. The above factors have been found to influence the behaviour 
of the foreign firm's internationalization process.  
Building on the insights from the eclectic paradigm and transaction cost theory, 
the analytical framework of this study suggests that a firm’s internationalization 
process will be influenced by the ownership-specific factors, location-specific 
factors, internalization and transaction cost factors. The research model of this 
study is presented (see Figure 2). In the model, the independent variables for owner-
ship specific factors are: firm size and international experience; independent variables 
for the location specific factors are: market size, cultural distance and country risk; 
and variables for internalization and transaction cost specific factors are: proprietary 
assets and contractual risk. The dependent variables for the motives are: market seek-
ing, efficiency seeking, and resource seeking; the variables for the establishment 
mode are: acquisition and greenfield; and the variables for ownership mode are JV 
and WOS. The final dependent variable is overall performance. The control variables 
are: incentives, product relatedness, target country experience, timing of entry or age 
of the unit, historical ties (UK / other countries), and competition. Finally interaction 
relationships are tested with the following: joint effects of firm size and perceived 
market size; joint effects of international experience and perceived host country 
risk; joint effects of international experience and perceived cultural distance and 
combined effects of establishment mode and ownership mode on FDI perfor-
mance. Thirty seven hypothesized relationships are illustrated in the model. The 
positive hypothesized relationships are indicated with a plus sign and vice versa.  
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Figure 2.    Research model of the Study 
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7 METHODOLOGY AND THE SAMPLE 
In this chapter, the methodology of the study and the characteristics of the partici-
pating firms are reviewed. It provides a discussion of the sample, an overview of 
the statistical procedure used, and descriptive statistics. In addition, the popula-
tion  of  the  firms  and  the  type  of  investment  in  the  sample  has  been  discussed.  
Finally, the operationalization of the independent variables, dependent variables, 
and control variables related to a motive, establishment mode, ownership mode 
and performance aspects are also been presented in this chapter. 
7.1 Research methods 
The study employs quantitative methodology because it is helpful when trying to 
develop knowledge about cause and effect, reduction to specific variables, hy-
potheses development, use of measurement and testing (Creswell 2003). Quanti-
tative research has its roots in the natural sciences and is concerned with carrying 
out investigations based on observable and measurable events in a way that can 
be repeated by other researchers. In other words, quantitative research employs 
the use of deductive reasoning by making use of specific observations, measuring 
and detecting patterns and regularities, and formulating a hypothesis for testing. 
Denzil and Lincoln (2000), describe quantitative research as one that “emphasizes 
the measurement and analysis of causal relationships between variables, not pro-
cesses”. It usually makes use of various mathematical models, statistical tables, 
and graphs, and is not concerned with rich descriptions as it may disrupt the pro-
cess of developing generalized conclusions or theories. Quantitative research 
builds on previous knowledge and theories in order to answer the research ques-
tions (Patel & Davidsson 2003). Its focuses on the reason a situation or behaviour 
occurs and which cause produces which effects. The researcher then formulates a 
hypothesis that is tested empirically. A quantitative approach is particularly suita-
ble for this study because this approach works best to identify factors that influ-
ence FDI in Ghana. This study uses the five sequential stages proposed by Rob-
son (2002) to conduct scientific research namely deducing hypotheses; expressing 
the hypotheses in operational terms; testing these operational hypotheses; analyz-
ing the results;  and confirming or modifying the theories in accordance with the 
findings. 
The survey method is used for this study because it provides an opportunity to test 
the existing knowledge in a rigorous manner, and to assess causal relationships 
(Jick 1979; John & Phil 1997). This method permits a description of the overall 
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picture of a phenomenon, problem, or issue by questioning a cross section of a 
population at specific moments in time (Jesson 2001). Furthermore, survey re-
search enhances the generalizability of the results from a sample to a population 
leading to the ability to infer some characteristics and behaviours of the popula-
tion (Babbie 1990). 
7.2 Data collection 
In this section, the data collection is described based on the sample population, 
the data gathering process and response patterns. 
The sample population 
The population of the study consists of foreign manufacturing units in Ghana op-
erating as wholly owned or joint ventures from a period of 1994 to 2008. The data 
for this study was obtained from the Ghana Investment Promotion Council 
(GIPC). The GIPC acts as a one-stop agency for implementing the regulations 
concerning foreign investment in the country. The agency database provides in-
formation about a country of origin, location of the investment, the sector of op-
eration, the proportion of foreign equity shareholding, total paid-in capital, for-
mation type of the company, date of establishment, and the contact information of 
the companies. The total number of firms based on the database from Ghana In-
vestment Promotion Council (GIPC) was 390.  
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was designed based on the review of the literature. It was de-
signed to capture all the necessary information which is important in answering 
the research questions. This relates to the following issues: background infor-
mation about the foreign company, key issues related to the Ghanaian market and 
the investment motives, entry mode, ownership choice, and the performance of 
the foreign company. The original version of the questionnaire is presented in 
Appendix 8.  
Data gathering process and response pattern 
The population of the study consists of foreign manufacturing units in Ghana es-
tablished from 1994 to 2008. The names of the companies for this study were 
obtained from the Ghana Investment Promotion Council (GIPC). The total num-
ber of firms based on the database from GIPC was 390. This time frame was cho-
sen because the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act was enacted in 1994 to 
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encourage, promote and facilitate investments in all sectors of the economy, ex-
cept the mining and petroleum sector. Before this Act, there was no specific or-
ganisation responsible for keeping records of investment in the country, hence in 
order  to  obtain  reliable  data  with  regard  to  foreign  investors  in  the  country,  the  
year 1994 was chosen as a starting point.  In addition, the year 2008 was chosen 
because the data available on FDI in Ghana from the Ghana Investment Promo-
tion Council database was up to 2008 at the time of the data collection. 
Prior to sending the questionnaires, firms were contacted by phone in order to 
check if the information from GIPC was correct for identifying the right respond-
ents to the questionnaire. The following criteria was applied to define suitable 
respondents: (1) the person should be top management personnel and should have 
been involved both in the original entry mode decision and the operation after the 
entry, and (2) foreign ownership of the company should be more than 10 percent 
of the equity capital. This was considered critical in order to obtain reliable in-
formation. After applying the above criteria, foreign firms whose ownership has 
changed from foreign to local were eliminated from the sample. In addition, for-
eign firms that had ceased to exist and were still in the database of GIPC were 
eliminated,  which  lead  to  final  sample  of  230  units.  The  data  consists  of  FDIs  
made by MNEs from 19 different countries. The questionnaires were personally 
delivered to the CEO's or top executives of these firms. At the end of data collec-
tion period, 75 completed questionnaires were received representing a response 
rate of 32.60%. The remaining questionnaires which were sent to respondents and 
not received respond were due to the following reasons. First, the employees who 
were qualified to give out the necessary information needed were no longer em-
ployees of the subsidiary, or had gone back to their respective home countries. 
Second, some of the companies did not answer the questionnaires because of the 
company policy not to give out any information concerning the company. The 
final sample size is comparable to that of other foreign entry mode studies using 
survey data (e.g. Kim & Hwang 1992: 22%, Harzing 2002: 20%, Slangen 
2005:19. 2% and Dikova 2005: 7.5%). 
Characteristics of the sample 
Out of the 75 samples of foreign firms, 48 (64%) were FDIs made in the form of 
greenfield investment while 27 (36%) FDIs were made in the form of an acquisi-
tion. With regard to the ownership mode, 30 (40%) were FDIs entered through 
wholly owned subsidiaries and 45 (60%) FDIs entered through joint ventures. 
Foreign firms with a foreign equity stake equal to or exceeding 95% were consid-
ered WOS, whereas those with a lower foreign equity stake were labelled JVs. In 
terms of the origin of the foreign firms, 19 (25%) of the responses are from firms 
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originating from the UK, while 56 (75%) are firms from other countries.  Of the 
sample FDIs, 33 (44%) were made in the period 1994-1999 and 42 (56%) be-
tween 2000 and 2008.  In terms of the origin of the foreign firms, 19 (25%) of the 
responses are firms originating from the UK, while 56(75%) are firms from other 
countries. Firms from other countries include 8 firms each from France and Ger-
many (10.6% each); 6 firms from China (8%); 5 firms each from the Netherlands 
and Italy (6%); and the remaining 24 firms from thirteen different countries 
(32%). Entry dates of the foreign firms were classified according to two distinct 
time periods.  Of the sample FDIs, 33 (44%) were made in the period 1994-1999 
and 42 (56%) were made between 2000 and 2008.   
With regard to non-response sample size, out of 155 firms, 67 (43.2%) were FDIs 
entered through WOS while 88 (56.7%) FDIs entered through a joint venture. In 
terms of origin of the foreign firms, 19 (76%) of Chinese firms did not respond; 
followed by 12 (60%) of German firms. The rate for Dutch firms was 11 (68%); 
the rate for French firms was 11 (58%); the rate for Italian firms was 9 (78%), the 
rate  for  British  firms  was  only  10  (34%),  and  the  rate  for  India.  The  rest  were  
from seventeen other countries. Of the sample non-respondents FDIs, 61 (39%) 
were made in the period 1994-1999 and 94 (60.6%) were made between 2000 and 
2008.  Out of 230 investments made from 25 countries. European sources made 
up 149 from 13 countries. The remaining investments were made by countries 
from other parts of the world. See table 8 for investment by various countries. 
 
Table 8 also shows the various countries and their response rate to the question-
naire. Table indicates that the response rate from the European companies invest-
ing in Ghana is higher as compared to Asian countries. (e.g. China, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Indonasia, Taiwan). During the data-collecting phase, I realized that 
Asian companies were not willing to provide information regarding their business 
operations in Ghana. Sometimes, nanagers contacted for completing the survey 
questionnaire gave the excuse that it is against the company’s policy to disclose 
information to outsiders. Another reason why the non-response rate was higher 
among companies from Asia could be attributed to the issue of transparancy. In 
other words,  because of the weak institutional set  up in Ghana, most of the for-
eign companies do not comply fully with the regulations governing their business 
operational activities. Thus, they fear that disclosing information to outsiders 
about their operation activities might end up with the tax authorities. As could be 
observed in Table 8, the European subsidiaries in Ghana are more willing to an-
swer the survesy questionnaire about their business operations in Ghana com-
pared to Asia subsidiaries.  
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Table 8. Investments made by countries 
 
Countries To-
tal 
Respondents Timing of entry 
1990s     2000s 
Non-
respondents 
Timing of entry 
1990s          2000s 
UK 29 19 65.5% 13 6 10 6 4 
China 25 6 24.0% 2 4 19 9 10 
Germany 20 8 40.0% 3 5 12 5 7 
France 19 8 42.1% 4 4 11 8 3 
India 18 4 22.2% 2 2 14 5 9 
Netherlands 16 5 31.2% 2 3 11 3 8 
Italy 14 5 35.7% 1 4 9 2 7 
Spain 13 3 23.1% 1 2 10 4 6 
Belgium 10 3 30.0% 2 1 7 1 6 
Switzerland 8 1 12.5% 0 1 7 5 2 
U.S.A 8 3 37.5% 1 2 5 2 3 
Greece 8 2 25.0% 0 2 6 0 6 
Lebanon 7 2 28.5% 0 2 5 0 5 
Portugal 5 1 20.0% 0 1 4 3 1 
Indonesia 5 0 - 0 0 5 2 3 
Malaysia 4 0 - 0 0 4 3 1 
Taiwan 3 0 - 0 0 3 0 3 
Hong Kong 3 0 - 0 0 3 2 1 
Sweden 3 1 33.3% 1 0 2 1 1 
Canada 3 0 - 0 0 3 3 0 
Denmark 3 1 33.3% 1 0 2 1 1 
South Korea 2 0 - 0 0 2 0 2 
South Africa 2 1 50% 0 1 1 0 1 
Eygpt 1 1 100% 0 1 0 0 0 
Hungary 1 1 100% 0 1 0 0 0 
TOTAL 230 75 32.6% 33 42 155 65 90 
 
7.3 Data analysis 
In line with previous studies, logistic regression analysis is employed to examine 
the empirical data. Logistic regression is employed as a statistical technique be-
cause the dependent variable is binary. The independent measures are qualitative 
or quantitative, and assumptions of multivariate normality do not necessarily have 
to be met (Ekeledo & Sivakumar 2004). The binomial logistic analysis estimates 
the probability of an event occurring and has been utilized frequently in studies 
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on foreign establishment mode strategies (Hennart & Park 1993; Andersson & 
Swensson 1994; Padmanabhan & Cho 1995, 1999; Brouthers & Brouthers 2000; 
Larimo 2003; Dikova & van Witteloostuijn 2007; Slangen & Hennart 2008; 
Dikova et al. 2010) and ownership mode choice of MNEs (e.g. Gatignion & An-
derson 1988; Padmanabhan & Cho 1996; Hennart & Larimo 1998; Kaynak et al. 
2007). 
The binomial logit model can be expressed as P (Yi = 1) = 1/ [1+exp (-? – Xi B)]. 
Where, Yi is the dependent variable, defined by a dummy variable either 1 or 0. 
The value of 1 denotes the probability of an event occurring rather than another as 
shown by the value of 0. Xi is the vector of independent variables for ith observa-
tion, ? is the intercept parameter, B is the vector of the regression parameters 
(Amemiya 1981). The regression coefficients estimate the impact of the inde-
pendent variables on the probability of an event that occurs. A positive sign for 
the coefficient means that the variable increases the probability of the event oc-
curring. A negative sign signifies the opposite. The maximum likelihood esti-
mates of the parameters were obtained employing logist regression. The explana-
tory power of the model is assessed using the model chi-square statistics, which 
test the null hypotheses that all parameter coefficients are zero, except the inter-
cepts term. Large chi-square values and small p values indicate goodness fit. The 
predictive ability of the model can be determined by the correct classification 
rate, which shows the percentage reduction in classification errors with respect to 
random selection. However, to identify an acceptable level of predictive accuracy, 
the obtained classification rate has to be compared to the rate that would have 
been obtained by chance.  In the case of unequal group sizes, the standard to cal-
culate this rate should be proportional chance criterion. The formula for this cri-
terion is: a2 + (1 - a)2 where a is the proportion of cases in group 1 and 1 - a is the 
proportion  of  cases  in  group  2.  For  a  rough  estimate  of  the  acceptable  level  of  
predictive accuracy, Hair et al. (1995) suggest that the classification rate should 
be at least one-fourth greater than the proportional chance criterion. 
In line with previous studies ordinary least-squares (OLS) models, were em-
ployed to examine the empirical data because the dependent variables were con-
tinuous (scale from 1 to 5). Such linear regression models are econometrically 
appropriate, when the performance of affiliate is treated as the dependent variable 
(e.g., Demirbag et al. 2007; Dikova 2009; Slangen & Hennart 2008). The regres-
sion equation takes the form Y = b1x1 + b2x2 + c + e,  where Y is the true depend-
ent, the b's are the regression coefficients for the corresponding x (independent) 
terms, where c is the constant or intercept, and e is the error term reflected in the 
residuals. Sometimes this is expressed more simply as y = b1x1 + b2x2 + c, where 
y is the estimated dependent and c is the constant (which includes the error term).  
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7.4 Operationalization of the variables used in this study 
7.4.3 Dependent variables 
Market-seeking FDIs (MS) are coded as dummy variables equal to one, if the 
investment is market seeking and zero otherwise. MS are classified as the FDI 
undertaken to sustain or protect existing markets or to exploit or promote new 
markets. More precisely the investing firms undertake in a country or region to 
supply goods to markets in these or in adjacent countries.  In most cases, part or 
all of these markets will have been serviced previously by exports from the in-
vestment firms which, either because of tariffs or other cost raising barriers im-
posed by the host countries or because the size of the markets now justifies the 
local production, are no longer best supplied by this route (Dunning 1993).  
 
Resources-seeking FDIs (RS) are coded as dummy variables equal to one, if the 
investment is resource seeking and zero otherwise. RS are classified as the FDI 
projects are undertaken in order to minimise production costs and/or to secure 
sources of supply. The reason may be to allocate production resources in coun-
tries where factor prices are low relative to a firm’s productivity (Randoy 1994) 
and where it can serve foreign markets by exports (Kumar 1994). The motivation 
for the resource seeking FDI is to make the investing enterprise more profitable 
and competitive in the markets it serves (or intends to serve) than it would other-
wise be. Most, or all, of the output of affiliates of resource seekers is exported, 
and mainly, although not exclusively, to develop industrialized countries 
 
Efficiency-seeking FDIs (ES) are coded as dummy variables equal to one, if the 
investment is efficiency seeking and zero otherwise. ES are classified as the FDI 
project is undertaken in order to rationalize the structure of established production 
units in such a way that a firm can gain from the common governance interrelated 
activities in different locations. Such benefits are essentially those of the econo-
mies of scale and scope and of risk diversification (Dunning 1993:59). The inten-
tion of efficiency-seeking investment is to take advantage of different factor en-
dowments, cultures, institutional arrangements, economic system and policies and 
market structure by concentrating production in a limited number of locations to 
supply multiple markets.  
 
Establishment mode: As typical with establishment mode studies (e.g. Harzing 
2002) dependent variable is a binary dummy variable coded ‘0’ when the entry 
into  a  foreign  market  is  based  on  the  acquisition  of  an  existing  company within  
that market, and ‘1’ when the venture is based on entirely new assets (i.e. a green-
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field start-up) the dependent variable is the foreign firm’s establishment mode 
choice (acquisition versus greenfield) into a Ghanaian market were obtained from 
the  questionnaire as to whether the company, in the process of their most recent 
foreign entry event into Ghana, had acquired an existing local company or wheth-
er it had built an operation from scratch.  
 
Ownership mode: Researchers have generally not put forward any specific prop-
ositions concerning the impact of ownership structure (i.e. whether the venture is 
a wholly-owned subsidiary or an equity joint venture), but a substantial number of 
studies (e.g. Barkema & Vermeulen 1998; Caves & Mehra 1986; Hennart & Park 
1993; Larimo 2003) have retained it as a control variable due to the possibility of 
interactions between entry mode choice and establishment mode choice (Anand & 
Delios 1997). For this study, ownership structure was retained as dependent vari-
ables and is measured using a dummy variable (WOS) coded 1 for wholly-owned 
subsidiaries (95% or more of equity controlled by the foreign parent) and 0 for 
equity joint ventures. 
 
Performance: to measure a subsidiary’s performance, the variable is captured by 
using subjective measures:  total performance and profitability of the subsidiary 
based on management evaluation. The reason for using overall performance and 
profitability as a key performance variable for this study is that these measures 
are commonly used measures FDI performance studies (e.g. Brouthers et al. 2003; 
Fey & Beamish 2001; Hult et al. 2008). 
 
 
Table 9. Description of dependent variables of the motives, establishment 
mode, ownership mode and performance 
 
Variables SYMBOLS Data Source 
Resource-seeking RS Survey data 
Marketing- seeking MS Survey data 
Efficiency- seeking ES Survey data 
Greenfield GRF Survey data 
Acquisition ACQ Survey data 
Wholly owned subsidiary WOS Survey data 
Joint venture JV Survey data 
Total performance OP Survey data 
Profitability PR Survey data 
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Independent variables related to motives, establishment mode, ownership 
mode and Performance 
Firm size: Is measured by adopting the method used by Anderson and Gatignon 
(1988). Thus, in this study, firm size is measured by the number of the employees 
of the parent firm, which was assessed through the questionnaire. The expected 
sign for motives is positive for MS and/or ES, for the establishment mode, the 
expected sign is negative for acquisition and for ownership mode the expected 
sign is positive for WOS. For the performance, the expected sign is positive (see 
Tables 13, 14, 15 and 16). 
International experience: There are alternative measures for international expe-
rience that have been used in previous studies such as, share of foreign sales from 
total sales of the firm (Hennart & Part 1991), the number of years from the time 
the firm's manufacturing unit was established (Dubin 1976; Zejan 1988), the 
number of foreign units (majority-owned) owned by the parent (Zejan 1988), the 
number of countries where the firm has a foreign manufacturing unit (Caves & 
Mehra 1986), and the geographical diversity of foreign manufacturing units (Du-
bin 1976). For this study, international experience is measured by the number of 
foreign manufacturing operations at the time of establishment, and was assessed 
by the questionnaire. The expected sign for motives is positive for MS and/or ES, 
and for establishment mode, the expected sign is negative for acquisition, and for 
ownership mode, the expected sign is positive for WOS. For the performance, the 
expected sign is positive (see Tables 13, 14, 15 and 16). 
Market size: Some studies measured market size based on the value of gross na-
tional product (GNP). GNP was used as the measure of market size in the study 
by Zejan (1988). For this study, market size was measured by the perceived mar-
ket size and growth potential. This was assessed by the questionnaire on a Likert-
type response format of 5-point scale. Respondents were asked to rate market size 
and potential growth in Ghana. The expected sign for motives is positive for MS 
and/or ES, for the establishment mode, the expected sign is negative for acquisi-
tion, and for ownership choice, the expected sign is positive for WOS. For the 
performance, the expected sign is positive (see Tables 12, 13, 14 and 15). 
Target-country risk: Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) found that MNEs prefer to 
enter risky countries through greenfields. The likely reason is that greenfields can 
gradually and carefully be built from scratch, which should be an advantage in 
countries where the economic and political environment is uncertain and unpre-
dictable, as losses can be reduced to a minimum in this way (Bell 1996; Sharma, 
1998). For this study, host country investment risk was assessed by the question-
naire and measured on the Likert-type response format of 5-point scale. Respond-
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ents were asked to rate how they perceive investment risk in Ghana at the time of 
establishment. The expected sign for motives is negative for ES and/or RS, for the 
establishment mode, the expected sign is positive for greenfield and for owner-
ship choice, the expected sign is negative for JV. For the performance the ex-
pected sign is negative (see Tables 12, 13, 14 and 15). 
Cultural distance: Is computed by adopting the approach suggested by Kogut 
and Singh (1988), using a composite index based on differences between the for-
eign units and Ghana the target country of the investment along the four cultural 
dimensions (Power distance; uncertainty avoidance; individuality and masculini-
ty) identified by Hofstede (1980). The arguments for applying this approach are 
that, the method had been used in other previous FDI studies (Li & Guisinger 
1991; Larimo 1993) and no other better alternative for the classification seems to 
be available. The deviations were corrected for differences in the variances of 
each dimension and then arithmetically averaged. The cultural distance is calcu-
lated using Kogut & Singh’s (1989) formula: CDj = ? {(I ij - I iu) 2 / Vi} / 4. 
Where Iij is the index for the ith cultural dimension and jth country, Viis the vari-
ance of the index of the ith dimension, u indicates the foreign (in this study, Gha-
na), and CDj is the cultural difference of the jth country from the foreign coun-
tries (in this study, Ghana). The expected sign for motives is negative for ES 
and/or MS, for the establishment mode, the expected sign is positive for green-
field, and for ownership choice, the expected is positive for WOS. For the per-
formance the expected sign is negative (see Tables 12, 13, 14 and 15). 
Contractual risk: The assessment of internalization and transaction specific was 
based  on  the  relative  cost  (or  risks)  of  sharing  the  assets  and  skills  with  a  host  
country firm versus integrating them within the firm. Because such cost is diffi-
cult to estimate (Buckley 1988), researchers have recommended the measurement 
of contractual risks associated with sharing the firm’ assets and skills (Dunning 
1980). The risks involved in using contracts include cost of making and enforcing 
contracts in a foreign country relative to the home country, the risk of dissipation 
of proprietary knowledge, and risk of deterioration in the quality of services if 
operated jointly with a host country partner or licensee. In this study, contractual 
risk was assessed by the questionnaire and measured by applying Likert-type re-
sponse format of 5-point scale. The Respondents were asked to rate how they 
perceive the cost of making and enforcing a contract at the time of investment. 
The expected sign for motives is negative for MS, for the establishment mode, the 
expected sign is positive for greenfield, and for ownership choice, the expected 
sign is positive for WOS. (see Tables 12, 13, 14 and 15). 
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Table 10. Cultural distance between other countries and Ghana 
 
Countries 
Power 
distance 
Uncertainty 
avoidance Individualism Masculinity 
Cultural 
distance 
Belgium 65 94 75 54 2.215 
China 80 40 20 66 0.325 
Denmark 18 23 74 16 4.611 
Egypt 80 68 38 52 0.260 
France 68 86 71 43 1.702 
Germany 35 65 67 66 2.493 
Greece 60 112 35 57 1.767 
Hungary 46 82 55 88 2.586 
India 77 40 48 56 0.508 
Italy 50 75 76 70 2.478 
Lebanon 80 68 38 52 0.260 
Netherland 38 53 80 14 3.305 
Portugal 63 104 27 31 1.326 
Spain 57 86 51 42 1.150 
South Africa 49 49 65 63 1.651 
Sweden 31 29 71 5 3.882 
Switzerland 34 58 68 70 2.655 
U.K 35 35 89 66 3.788 
U.S.A 40 46 91 62 3.448 
West Africa (Ghana) 77 54 20 46 - 
Proprietary assets: Two types of proxies have been used in the literature to cap-
ture the proprietary nature of assets possessed by foreign investors: (1) the ratio of 
research and development expenditures to sales; or (2) line of business using 
standard industrial classification (SIC) into various technology levels. For this 
study, line of business was used, which has been widely used in the literature (e.g. 
Dunning 1979; Lee 1983; Tallman & Shenkar 1990; Schroath, Hu & Chen 1993; 
Hu & Chen 1993). First classify the line of business of foreign investment enter-
prises into two digits. Then group them into high (coded as 1) or low (coded as 0) 
technology industries. Low technology industries include food and kindred prod-
ucts, tobacco products, textile mill products, paper products, rubber and plastic 
products, leather products, concrete products. The high technology industries in-
clude manufacturing of chemicals products, manufacturing of industrial machin-
ery and manufacturing of electrical and electronic products. The expected sign for 
the establishment mode is positive for greenfield and for ownership choice the 
expected sign is positive for WOS and for performance the expected sign is posi-
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tive(see Tables 13, 14 and 15) (see appendix 7) number of observations by indus-
try. 
 
Table 11. Independent variables related to motives, establishment mode, owner-
ship mode and performance 
 
Variables SYMBOL Data Sources 
Firm size PSIZE Survey data 
International experience INTEX Survey data 
Market size MSIZE Survey data 
Host country investment risks CRISK Survey data 
Cultural distance CULTDIS Survey data 
Contractual risk CONTRISK Survey data 
Proprietary assets PROASSETS Survey data 
   
                PREFORMANCE 
Variables SYMBOL Data Sources 
Firm size PSIZE Survey data 
International experience INTEX Survey data 
Market size MSIZE Survey data 
Host country investment risks CRISK Survey data 
Cultural distance CULTDIS Survey data 
Establishment mode Establishment mode (greenfield or ac-
quisition) 
Survey data 
Ownership mode ownership mode (WOS/JV) Survey data 
 
 
Table 12. Expected results for each independent variable related to motives 
 
Variables  SYMBOL Expected Sign 
Firm size PSIZE + 
International experience INTEX + 
Market size MSIZE + 
Host investment risk  CRISK _ 
Cultural distance CULTDIS _ 
Contractual risk CONTRISK _ 
+ means increase in probability of undertaking MS, RS or ES FDIs– means de-
crease in probability of undertaking either MS, RS or ES FDIs   FDI. 
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Table 13. Expected results for each independent variable related to the estab-
lishment mode 
 
Variables  SYMBOL Expected Sign 
Firm size PSIZE - 
International experience INTEX - 
Market size MSIZE - 
Host investment risk   CRISK + 
Cultural distance CULTDIS + 
Contractual risk CONTRISK + 
Proprietary assets  PROASSETS + 
 + means increase in probability of Greenfield mode   - means increase in proba-
bility of Acquisition mode  
 
 
Table 14. Expected results for each independent variable related to the owner-
ship mode 
 
Variables  SYMBOL Expected Sign 
Firm size PSIZE + 
International experience INTEX + 
Market size MSIZE + 
Host investment risk   CRISK - 
Cultural distance  CULTDIS - 
Contractual risk 
CONTRISK + 
Proprietary assets PROASSETS + 
+   means increase in probability of WOS   - means increase in probability of JV 
 
 
Table 15. Expected results for independent variable related to performance 
 
Variables  SYMBOLS Expected Sign 
Firm size PSIZE + 
International experience INTEX + 
Market size  MSIZE + 
Cultural distance  CULTDIS - 
Host country risk  CRISK - 
Establishment mode Establishment mode (greenfield) + 
Ownership mode Ownership mode (JV) + 
+ means increase in performance         - means decrease in performance 
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7.4.2 Control variables 
Control variables related to the establishment mode, ownership mode and 
performance 
Many variables that have been found important in past studies to effect these is-
sue, this study tries to control them. These variables includes product relatedness, 
incentives, target country experience, competition, country of origin of the inves-
tors and age or timing of entry which have been used  in past IB studies and have 
been shown to affect a firm’s choice of foreign market mode (Luo 1999). Hence, 
these variables are included in this study as control variables. The study offers no 
formal hypotheses for these factors, but does control for them in the empirical 
analysis.  
Product relatedness: MNEs expanding into new industries should prefer to make 
acquisitions, as this allows them to obtain the tacit product-specific knowledge 
they need to successfully operate in the new industry (Caves 1996; Hennart & 
Park 1993). Respondents were asked by the questionnaire for a description of the 
subsidiary’s main products and compared it to the parents’ main activities. The 
variable was assigned a value of 0, if the subsidiary’s products are different from 
the parent’s products, and a value of 1, if the subsidiary’s main products are the 
same as the parent’s products. Product relatedness has been shown as an im-
portant firm level determinant of both FDI establishment and ownership mode 
choices in past studies (e.g. Hennart & Park 1993, Hennart, Larimo & Chen 1996, 
Larimo 2003, Chen & Zeng 2004; Dikova 2005), therefore this variable is used as 
firm level control variable in this study.  
Incentives: host-country policies in the form of governmental incentives is a 
measure designed to influence the size, location or industry of a FDI investment 
project by affecting its relative cost or by altering the risks attached to it through 
inducements that are not available to comparable domestic investors (UNCTAD 
1994). For this study, Dummy variable was assigned to a value of 1 for incen-
tives, and 0, no incentives. Incentives has been shown as important host country 
level determinant of both FDI establishment mode and ownership mode choices 
in past studies (e.g. Padmanabhan & Cho, 1995), thus, this variable is used in this 
study as control variable. 
Target-country experience: Previous experience with the host country entered 
has been argued to influence an MNE’s establishment mode choice.  MNEs with 
considerable experience of a country may already possess all the knowledge re-
quired to successfully operate in that country and, hence, may not need to make 
acquisitions to obtain this (tacit) knowledge. In contrast, there are other studies 
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arguing that, MNEs with much host country experience may be better at manag-
ing local acquisitions, and may therefore be more likely to make them (e.g. Hen-
nart  & Park  1993).  In  this  study,  respondents  were  asked  if  the  parent  firm had  
previous experience in Ghana before setting up the affiliate in the country.  Tar-
get-country experience has been shown as important determinant of both FDI 
establishment mode and ownership mode choices in the past studies (e.g. Hennart, 
Larimo & Chen 1996, Barkema& Vermeulen 1998; Arslan & Larimo 2010, 
Arslan 2011). 
Competition: A major difference between greenfield and acquisition entries is 
that the former increases the local supply, which often reduces prices and profits 
and may therefore, provoke a competitive response from incumbents (Hennart & 
Park 1993; Slangen 2005).  Such a response is more likely if an industry is grow-
ing slowly, and if competition is weak, as greenfield entry will lead to a large in-
crease in supply and therefore, to a large reduction in prices and profits in this 
case. If an industry is highly competitive and/or growing rapidly, on the other 
hand, the supply-increasing features of greenfields are less of a problem, as each 
incumbent’s profit is hardly affected in this case. This makes greenfields more 
tolerable for incumbents and, hence, more likely. Respondents were therefore, 
asked the level of competition it was expected to encounter at the time of the de-
cision to invest in Ghana. The variable was measured on a 5-point scale. 
Historical ties (UK)/Other countries or (country of origin): It was captured in 
the questionnaire as dummy variables for MNEs operating in Ghana,  the parent firm 
originating from the UK are coded 1 and other countries are coded 0. Respondents were 
therefore asked to indicate the location of a parent firm. Country of origin has been 
shown as important determinant of both FDI establishment mode and ownership 
mode choices in the past studies (e.g. Wilson 1980, Hennart, Larimo & Chen 
1996 Markino & Tsang 2011), and therefore it is used in this study as control var-
iable. 
Makino and Tsang (2011:546) define historical ties as ‘certain types of relations 
formal or informal, which developed between countries’. They define formal ties 
as those created intentionally and take the form of agreements, treaties and alli-
ances that aim at promoting interest in a given domain, while informal ties evolve 
naturally as a result of geographic proximity, immigration, colonization, or mis-
sionary activities, and take the form of cultural, ethnic, and social relations be-
tween individuals and nations. Rangan (2000) argued that a key function of the 
historical ties between counties is to make foreign firms’ search for and assess-
ment of potential exchange partners easier and less costly, thereby facilitating 
information flow and making ongoing operations more efficient. Furthermore, 
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Jones (1996) suggested that colony – colonizer relationships work not only to 
reduce the investing risks but also to enhance the legitimacy of the investment. He 
notes that: “colonial governments established similar legal and administrative 
structures to those in the home country, thereby greatly reducing the risks of FDI. 
Markino and Tsang, (2011) suggested that prior colony – colonizer relationships 
have long-lasting, positive effect on trade. In addition, they argued that historical 
ties clearly influence the economic relations between countries, and the effects are 
not always positive. They further went on to argue that relations can be disrupted 
or become hostile because of conflict during the colonial period. Most of the prior 
research on the impact of historical ties examined their effect on the total FDI 
inflows between countries but not their effect on the choice of establishment 
mode, ownership mode and performance. This study, however, examines the in-
vestment decision related to the establishment and ownership mode in the context 
of Ghana and how it impacts on subsidiary performance.  
Age or timing of entry: Previous studies (see e.g. Dollar et al., 2003; Carlson et 
al. 2005) suggest that the length of subsidiaries’ operation in the host country pos-
itively impacts the subsidiaries’ performance. Newly created subsidiaries need to 
be adjusted and directed before they can be integrated into the host country’s do-
mestic market. A relatively old age is likely to have a positive effect on a firm’s 
performance. In this study, the age of the firm was measured by assigning the 
value of 0 for firms that entered Ghana from 1990 to 1999 and 1 for those entered 
Ghana from 2000 to 2008.Furthermore, timing of entry has been shown as im-
portant determinant of both FDI establishment and ownership mode choices in 
past studies (e.g. Barkema & Vermeulen 1998; Padmanabhan & Cho 1999; Har-
zing 2002, Larimo 2003), therefore this variable is used as control variable in this 
study. 
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8 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This chapter presents the empirical  findings of the study, test  of hypotheses and 
models related to motives, establishment mode, ownership mode and performance 
of foreign manufacturing firms in Ghana. The first section deals with the testing 
of hypotheses and models related to the motives of foreign firms in Ghana. The 
second section deals with the hypotheses and models related to the establishment 
mode strategies of foreign firms in Ghana. The third section deals with the hy-
potheses and models related to the ownership mode strategies of the foreign firms 
in Ghana. The fourth and final section deals with hypotheses and models related 
to the performance of the foreign firms in Ghana. 
8.1 Empirical results related to strategic motives 
The descriptive statistics of all variables and their correlations related to the mo-
tives is presented in the appendix. The correlations between the independent vari-
ables varied from moderate to low implying no multicollinearity problem (see 
Appendix 1). Table 16 presents the results of the binomial logistic regression in 
the model. The estimated coefficients represent the probability of undertaking 
market, efficiency, and resource-seeking FDI: a positive coefficient means that a 
certain type of investment has been undertaken, and a negative coefficient signi-
fies the opposite. In order to analyze the model’s strength and explanatory power, 
chi-square (x2) and p values are analyzed. Large chi-square values and small p 
values indicate a good fit as well as better explanatory power of the statistical 
models. The model has a satisfactory overall explanatory power with chi-squares 
of 15.942with (p=0.05) for market-seeking FDIs; 11.452 with (p=0.075) for effi-
ciency-seeking FDIs; and 5.641 with (p=0.465) for resource-seeking FDIs. An-
other way of measuring how well a maximum likelihood model fits the data is to 
use the model to classify observations. The ability to classify can be judged 
against the classification rate that would have been obtained by a change. The rate 
is equal to a2+ (1 - a) 2, where a, is the proportion of MS, ES and RS in the sample. 
In the present study, the baseline rate is 54.7%, 52.0% and 58.7% respectively. 
Similarly, the results show that 68%, 68% and 60% of the observations are cor-
rectly classified for MS, ES, and RS respectively.   
A summary of the hypotheses with the independent and control variables and 
their predicted and actual signs is shown in Table 16. Out of the six hypotheses, 
three variables were significant in model 1a whiles one variable was significant in 
model 2a. With regard to the interaction variables, none of the variables tested 
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were significant, hence they did not have any impact on the motives of FDIs in 
the context of Ghana.  
PSIZE is not a significant variable for both MS and ES, suggesting that firm size 
did not increase or decrease the probability of foreign firms undertaking a market-
seeking and/or an efficiency-seeking FDI in Ghana. Thus, hypothesis 1 is not 
supported.  
INTEX is significant at the 0.1 level. The variable had a negative sign suggesting 
that extensive international experience decreases the probability of foreign firms 
to undertake an MS FDI in Ghana. Thus, hypothesis 2 is not supported. This re-
sult is contrary to the findings of previous studies (e.g. Buckley & Casson 1985; 
Padmanabhan & Cho 1999). Similarly, international experience is an insignificant 
variable for ES FDI, suggesting that the international experience variable does not 
increase or decrease the probability of foreign firms undertaking efficiency FDIs 
in Ghana. Thus, hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
MSIZE is significant at the 0.05 level. The variable had a positive sign suggest-
ing that perceived market size increases the probability of foreign firms undertak-
ing an MS in Ghana. Thus, hypothesis 3 is partially supported. It can therefore be 
argued here that firms expect to accrue greater long-term profits through econo-
mies of scale and lower marginal cost of production. The results suggest that in-
vesting firms can be better stimulated to undertake market-seeking FDI in Ghana 
with a good market potential. This result is in line with previous studies, e.g. Sabi 
1988; Papanastassionu & Pearce 1990; Wheeler & Moody 1992. The results indi-
cate that the market size of Ghana has a significant and positive effect on attract-
ing  FDIs.  In  contrast,  perceived  market  size  was  significant  at  0.01  level.  The  
variable had a negative sign suggesting that perceived market size decreases the 
probability of foreign firms to undertaking efficiency-seeking FDIs in Ghana. 
Thus, hypothesis 3 is not supported. This finding is contrary to previous studies, 
(e.g. Tahir 2003) who found that the perceived large market size increased the 
probability of foreign firms undertaking efficiency-seeking FDIs. 
CRISK is not a significant variable for ES FDIs, suggesting that the perceived 
high country risk did not increase or decrease the probability of foreign firms un-
dertaking an efficiency seeking FDI in Ghana. Thus, hypothesis 4 is not support-
ed.  
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CULTDIS is significant at the 0.1 level. The variable had a negative sign sug-
gesting that perceived cultural distance between Ghana and foreign firm’s home 
countries decreased the probability of foreign firms undertaking an MS FDI in 
Ghana. Thus, hypothesis 5 is partially supported. The finding can be explained by 
the fact that in culturally similar countries, the demand structures are usually 
more similar than in culturally more distant countries. Furthermore, marketing, 
management and production strategies are more easily and less expensively trans-
ferable to culturally close countries and thus can encourage the foreign firms to 
undertake MS FDIs in a culturally close target country. This result coincides with 
the findings of previous studies (e.g. Tahir 2003) suggesting that investing firms 
prefer to undertake FDIs in culturally similar countries. Similarly, cultural dis-
tance is not significant for ES, suggesting that perceived cultural distance does 
not increase or decrease the probability of foreign firms undertaking an ES FDI in 
Ghana. Thus, hypothesis 5 is not supported. 
CONTRISK is not significant for RS, suggesting that perceived contractual risk 
did not decrease or increase the probability of foreign firms to undertaking an RS 
FDI in Ghana. Thus, hypothesis is not 6 supported. 
8.2 Empirical results related to establishment mode 
The descriptive statistics of all variables and their correlations related to the estab-
lishment mode is presented in the appendix. The correlations between the inde-
pendent variables varied from moderate to low. The only worrisome correlation is 
between that of international experience and target country experience (r=0.97), 
which is higher than the correlation cut-off point 0.60, implying multicollinearity 
problems (see Appendix 2).The variance inflation factors (VIF) analysis indicated 
values of 27 and 25 for the two variables, which are considerably higher than Hair 
et al.’s (1998) multicollinearity threshold value of 10. Related to other variables 
the respective values were clearly below 10 (see Appendix 5). Thus different runs 
were performed including and excluding international and target country experi-
ence. The results of these models were the same as model 1, hence I did not report 
on them. 
The results of the binomial logistic regression in the basic model are presented in 
Table 17. The explanatory power of all the statistical models are good, as their 
chi-square values are highly significant at p<0.000 level. Moreover, the chi-
square values increase from 50.837 in model 1 to 53.597in model 3 showing in-
creased explanatory power with the addition of independent variables. The pre-
dictive ability of the statistical models can be assessed by the correction classifi-
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cation rate. In the present study, the baseline rate for the establishment mode is 
64.4% respectively. Similarly, the results show that 88% of the observations are 
correctly classified for the establishment mode. Furthermore, the predictive capa-
bility of the statistical models is further strengthened by the fact that Nagelkerke 
R2values are good as well as they gradually increase from 0.675 to 0.700 from 
model 1 to model 3. In Table 17 model 1, the regression coefficients illustrate 
that:  
PSIZE is significant at the 0.01 level. The variable had a negative sign, suggest-
ing that the larger the firm size the higher the probability that the foreign firm will 
choose an acquisition mode of entry over agreenfield in Ghana. Thus, hypothesis 
7 is supported. The finding can be explained here as meaning large firms have the 
managerial resources and capabilities that can facilitate the integration and the 
control of the fully acquired or partial acquired foreign firm as compared to a 
smaller size firm. The result suggests that with the large firm size, the managerial 
resources and capabilities are not a problem as compared to small firms entering a 
foreign market; thus, they prefer acquiring an existing firm than setting up a new 
plant since acquiring existing firms facilitates access to existing networks. This 
result is in line with the previous studies (e.g. Padmanabhan & Cho 1995; 
Barkema &Vermeulen 1998; Shaver 1998; Harzing 2002; Mudambi & Mudambi 
2002; Larimo 2003) who found out that large firm size compels firm to go for 
acquisition rather than greenfield when investing in a foreign market.This finding 
also confirms the findings of Larimo (1993, 1997) whose studies specifically con-
centrated on the behaviour of FDIs made by the Finnish MNEs in their interna-
tional markets and revealed that large Finnish MNEs preferred acquisitions in 
their establishment mode choice. 
INTEX is significant at the 0.1 level. The variable had a negative sign suggesting 
that the more extensive the international experience of the foreign firm, the higher 
the probability that the foreign firm will choose an acquisition mode of entry over 
a greenfield in Ghana. Thus, hypothesis 8 is supported. The finding is in line with 
many previous studies (Mudambi & Mudambi 2002; Larimo 2003; Harzing 2003; 
Caves & Mehra 1986; Kogut & Singh 1988 Hennart & Reddy 1997). These 
scholars argue that a firm's foreign investment experience can contribute to the 
development of new knowledge and capabilities and can make a firm efficiently 
reduce the uncertainties and threats. This result contradict the findings of Brouth-
ers and Brouthers (2000) and Arslan (2011), who found that highly internationally 
experienced firms preferred greenfield investment.. 
MSIZE is significant at the 0.05 level. The variable had a negative sign suggest-
ing that the larger the perceived market size, the higher the probability that the 
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foreign firm will choose an acquisition mode of entry over a greenfield in Ghana. 
Thus, hypothesis 9 is supported. The finding can be explained by Ghana being a 
key player in the economic community of the West African states (ECOWAS), 
with a population of more than 250 million in the region, and rapid market growth 
coupled with free movement of goods and services; entering these markets with 
greenfield investment may slow the achievement of the foreign firms’ strategic 
objective. Therefore, acquisition is considered the best method for the foreign 
investor to opt for. This result is line with previous studies e.g. Laurila and Rop-
ponen (2003); Buckley and Casson (1998), who found out that large market size 
compels firms to go for acquisition rather than greenfield when investing in a for-
eign market. 
CRISK is significant at the 0.05 level. The variable had a positive sign suggest-
ing that the higher the perceived country risk, the higher the probability that the 
foreign firm will choose a greenfield mode of entry over an acquisition mode of 
entry in Ghana. Thus, hypothesis 10 is supported. Hennart et al. (1998) reveal that 
there are high costs associated with acquisitions compared to greenfield invest-
ments due to post-acquisition integration and other structural changes in the sub-
sidiary. Furthermore, it has also been mentioned that returns on the acquisitions of 
local firms are also uncertain in many emerging economies (e.g. Li 1995; Delios 
& Henisz 2000). Hence, greenfield investments can emerge as a better option for 
the MNEs in some of the high risk host countries as it also strengthens the mana-
gerial link between parents firm and its subsidiaries (e.g. Brouthers et al. 1999; 
Ahmed et al. 2002). One can therefore think that because many countries in Afri-
ca have been volatile, foreign firms investing in this environment will try to min-
imize exposure to risk through entry mode that offers the necessary flexibility in 
the face of environmental variability. Hence, based on perceived high environ-
ment uncertainties in Sub-Africa, foreign firms prefer to opt for greenfield over 
acquisition in order to minimize their financial exposure to risk. This helps the 
foreign firms to reduce the risk in case of unexpected events occurring in the 
country that would require the foreign firm to exit or relocate to a different coun-
try.  
CULTDIS is significant at the 0.05 level. The variable had a positive sign sug-
gesting that the perceived higher cultural distance between the foreign home 
countries and Ghana increased the probability of the foreign firm choosing a 
greenfield mode of entry over an acquisition mode of entry. Thus, hypothesis 11 
is supported. The finding implies that when there is a large cultural difference 
between Ghana and the home country of the foreign firm, this is likely to result in 
differences in organizational and managerial practices. This means it would be 
difficult for foreign firms to integrate their corporate network into acquisitions 
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made in Ghana, as the practices of Ghanaian firms acquired are likely to be in-
compatible or difficult to integrate into the foreign MNCs corporate culture. To 
this end, it is thus much better for foreign firms investing in Ghana to set up new 
subsidiaries to avoid cultural problems. The result suggests that it will be easier 
for foreign MNEs to integrate greenfields investments made in Ghana, as green-
fields enable MNEs to introduce their organizational and managerial practices 
from the beginning and carefully select and hire employees who fit their national 
culture. The result of this study is consistent with the findings of previous studies 
e.g. Hennart and Park (1993); Hofstede (2001); Kogut and Singh (1988); Cho and 
Padmanabhan (1995); Larimo (2003), who found that foreign firms prefer to 
choose a greenfield rather than an acquisition in culturally distant target countries. 
This result differs from the study conducted by Bhaumik et al. (2005) in South 
Africa and Egypt. In their study, they found that cultural distance is an insignifi-
cant variable hence it does not affect the choice of establishment mode.   
PROASSETS is significant at the 0.05 level. The variable had a positive sign 
suggesting that the higher the proprietary assets possessed by the foreign firm, the 
higher the probability that the foreign firm will choose a greenfield mode of entry 
over acquisition in Ghana. Thus, hypothesis 13 is supported. The result implies 
thatsince the cost of writing and enforcing a contract is very high in Ghana, for-
eign firms prefer to choose greernfield over acquisition. Transaction costs associ-
ated with exploiting such knowledge through greenfield in Ghana is considered to 
be lower than those associated with exploiting it through acquisitions. Greeenfield 
therefore enables foreign firms entering Ghana to install their technologies from 
the start and to transfer the accompanying skills to a carefully-selected workforce 
capable of and willing to absorb them. While it has been argued by scholars that 
MNEs with an abundant firm-embedded technological knowledge are likely to 
choose greenfield, those lacking such knowledge are likely to choose acquisition. 
This result is in line with the previous studies (e.g. Hennart & Park 1993; Anders-
son & Svensson 1994; Brouthers & Brouthers 2003; Slangen & Hennart 2007; 
Drogendijk & Slangen 2006; Herrmann & Datta 2006; Larimo 2003) which sug-
gest that foreign firms with proprietary assets opt for a greenfield mode when 
entering foreign markets. 
INCENTIVE is significant at the 0.05 level. The variable had a positive sign sug-
gesting that the more incentives provided by the Ghana government, the higher 
the probability that the foreign firm will choose a greenfield mode of entry over 
acquisition in Ghana. The finding can be explained as follows: because the Gha-
naian government has provided incentives to foreign firms for greenfield invest-
ment in the form of tax holidays for a number of years, this has served as motivat-
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ing factors for foreign firms to choose greenfield mode entry over acquisition 
when entering Ghana.  
The remaining variables include; contractual risk, product relatedness, host coun-
try experience, historical ties (UK)/other countries (origin of the parent firm), and 
competition are statistically non-significant. The finding shows that there is no 
significant impact of these variables on the MNEs establishment mode choice in 
Ghana. 
 
Table 17. Logistic Regression Results Related to Establishment Mode 
 
Variables Model 1 full  
sample 
 
Model 2full  
sample with 
motives 
Model 3 full sample 
with   interaction 
variables 
Independent variables    
PSIZE -3.746 (1.376)*** -3.890 (1.498)*** -3.785 (1.275)*** 
INTEX -2.643 (1.563)* -.3.016 (1.690)* -4.337 (1.928)** 
MSIZE -1.304 (.632)** -1.214 (.652)* -1.337 (.680)** 
CRISK .853 (.401) ** .822 (.410)** -.214 (.778) 
CULTDIS .678 (.296)** .678 (.304)** .335 (.605) 
CONTRISK .740 (.457) .739 (.473) .784 (.472)* 
PROASSETS 2.117 (1.020) ** 1.612 (1.683) 1.640 (1.035) 
Motives    
MS  .971 (1.583)  
RS  .902 (1.064)  
ES  .025 (1.008)  
Control variables    
PRELATEDNESS 1.712 (1.100) 1.922 (1.159)* 1.352 (1.192) 
TCEXPERIENCE 2.432 (1.521) 2.822 (1.649)* 2.714 (1.431)* 
COMPETITION .176 (.332) .285 (.355) .187 (.354) 
INCENTIVES 2.707 (.981) ** 2.778 (1.097)** 2.769 (1.102)** 
UK/OTHERS .884 (1.112) 1.506 (1.387) 1.340 (1.288) 
TIMING OF ENTRY -1.557 (.925)* -1.435 (.943) -1.560 (.981) 
OWNERSHIP MODE 2.248 (1.114)** 2.457 (1.197)** 2.460 (1.186)** 
Interaction variables    
INTEX X CRISK   .396 (..257) 
INTEX X CULTDIS   .120 (.203) 
CONSTANT .528 (3.190) -.1.383 (4.047) 4.589 (4.378) 
N 75 75 75 
Model X2 50.837**** 51.835**** 53.597**** 
Correct Classification 
Rate 
88% 85.3% 90.7% 
-2 log likelihood 47.176 46.178 44.415 
Nagelkerke R2 .675 .684 .700 
 
 
Note: two-tailed tests; dependent variables is Establishment mode: greenfield = 1; acquisition = 0, 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Additional analysis 
In Table 17 model 2, the findings shown that none of the motives variables were 
satistically significant and hence do not have impact on the establishment mode 
choice in the contexts of Ghana. With regard to the interaction variables on es-
talishment mode choice, the results of the study reveal that none of the interaction 
variables were statistically significant; hence they do not have any impact on es-
tablishment mode choice in the context of Ghana. (see Table 17 model 3).  
8.3 Empirical results related to ownership mode 
The descriptive statistics of all variables and their correlations related to the own-
ership mode are presented in the appendix. The correlations between the inde-
pendent variables varied from moderate to low. The only worrisome correlation is 
between that of international experience and target country experience (r=0.97), 
which is higher than the correlation cut-off point 0.60, implying multicollinearity 
problems (see Appendix 3). The variance inflation factors (VIF) analysis indicat-
ed values of 27 and 25 for the two variables, which are considerably higher than 
Hair et al.’s (1998) multicollinearity threshold value of 10. Related to other varia-
bles the respective values were clearly below 10 (see Appendix 5). Thus different 
runs were performed including and excluding international and target country 
experience. The results of these models were the same as model 1 and, therefore, 
I did not report on them. 
The result of the binomial logistic regression in the basic model is presented in 
Table 18. The explanatory power of all the statistical models are good, as their 
chi-square values are significant at p<0.05 level in both model 1 and 3 and signif-
icant at p<0.01 level in model 2. Moreover, the chi-squares increase from 27.236 
in the model 1 to 40.328 in model 2 showing increased explanatory power with 
the addition of independent variables. The increase in chi-square is statistically 
significant as a result of the motive variables which are added to the model. The 
chi-square decreased from 40.328 in model 2 to 28.008 in model 3, showing de-
creased explanatory power with the addition of independent variables. The de-
crease means that the additional independent variables did not have any explana-
tory  power  on  the  model.  The  predictive  ability  of  the  statistical  models  can  be  
assessed by the correction classification rate. In the present study, the baseline 
rate for the ownership mode is 60%. Similarly, the results show that 78.7%, of the 
observations are correctly ownership mode. Also, the predictive capability of the 
statistical models is further strengthened by the fact that Nagelkerke R2values 
increase from 0. 412 to 0.562 in model 2 and also decreases from 0.562 to 0.421 
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in model 3. In Table 18 model 1 illustrates the effect of the independent variables 
and control variables on the FDI ownership mode choice of foreign MNEs in 
Ghana.The results of regression illustrate that: 
CONTRISK is significant at the 0.05 level. The variable had a positive sign sug-
gesting that the higher the contractual risk in Ghana, the greater the probability 
that the foreign firm will  choose a WOS mode of ownership over JV. Thus,  hy-
pothesis 22 is supported. This result can be interpreted here as follows: since the 
cost of making and enforcing a contract in Ghana is high, foreign firms prefer to 
set up a WOS rather than JV in order to minimize the negotiation and transaction 
costs and ensure adequate quality control, avoid the risk of dissipation of 
knowledge, and avoid property right enforcement costs. The internalizing of in-
ternational operations comes at a cost, and these costs must be compared with the 
costs of finding and maintaining an external relationship to perform the same 
functions in the international markets. These internalization advantages represent 
the motivations behind the firm’s decision to internalize its foreign markets. The 
effect of the internalization advantage suggested that firms will prefer to do things 
within the organisation if the perceived risk of dissipation of knowledge, risk of 
deterioration of quality of services, and cost of writing and enforcing contracts are 
high. This result is in line with previous studies (e.g. Hill, Hwang & Kim 1990). 
PSIZE is not a significant variable, suggesting that firm size did not increase or 
decreased the probability of the foreign firm choosing either a WOS or a JV mode 
of ownership in Ghana. Thus, hypothesis 17 is not supported.  Previous studies 
(e.g. Erramillia & Rao 1993; Hennart & Park 1993 Gomes-Casseres 1985; Kogut 
& Singh 1988; Benito 1995; Mutinelli & Piscitello 1997; Leung et al. 2003; 
Nakos & Brouthers 2002; Evans 2002; Yung-Heng & Yann-Haur 2009) found 
that large firms often prefer a WOS over JV because of their greater ability to 
input resources to absorb risks than the smaller firms, and as such will prefer high 
controlled mode. The result does not support their predictions. This result can be 
explained by the fact that the size of a firm does not really matter when it comes 
to mode of ownership in the context of Ghana.  
INTEX is not a significant variable, suggesting that international experience did 
not increase or decreased the probability of the foreign firm choosing either a 
WOS or a JV ownership mode of entry in Ghana. Thus, hypothesis 18 is not sup-
ported. Previous studies (e.g. Gomes-Casers 1985, 1987; Agarwal & Ramaswami 
1992; Sanna-Randaccio 1990; Tang 1994; Bell 1996; Mutinelli & Piscitello 1997; 
Reuber & Fisher 2003; Evans 2002; King & Tucci 2002; Nakos & Brouthers 
2002; Yung-Heng & Yann-Haur 2009) found that extensive internationally expe-
rienced firms prefer to choose a WOS over a JV when investing in the foreign 
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country. Their argument is based on the fact that a firm’s past experiences serve 
as an important competitive advantage in FDI’s choice of foreign market entry. 
The reason is that the foreign firm with more experience should have developed 
organisational capabilities suited to those markets and, hence, they can make 
greater commitments to foreign market investment. On the other hand, firms with 
less experience in a foreign market tend to prefer a JV to a WOS in order to min-
imize the financial risks associated with international expansion (Anderson & 
Gatignon 1986). This result does not support any of the above-mentioned predic-
tions, but is in line with some of the previous studies (e.g. Lu 2002; Brouthers 
2002; Claver & Quer 2005; Aslan & Larimo 2010) they also found that, interna-
tional experience did not have any impact on ownership mode.  
MSIZE is not a significant variable, suggesting that perceived large market size 
did not increase or decrease the probability of foreign firms choosing either a 
WOS or a JV ownership mode of investment in Ghana. Thus, hypothesis 19 is not 
supported. Previous empirical studies have shown that in a country with big mar-
ket  potential,  foreign  firms  tend  to  prefer  WOS  so  that  they  can  obtain  scale  
economies in order to reduce costs per units and also to establish a long-time 
presence (e.g. Agarwal & Ramaswami 1992; Nakos & Brouthers 2002; Eicher & 
Kang 2002; Chung & Enderwick 2001). In contrast, countries with low potential 
market, over capacity may exist, thus making firms reluctant to make large in-
vestments; under these condition firms may prefer a JV mode of investment. This 
result did not affect the ownership mode of foreign firms investing in Ghana.  
CRISK is  not a significant variable,  suggesting that perceived high country risk 
did not increase or decrease the probability of foreign firms choosing either a JV 
or a WOS. Thus, hypothesis 20 is not supported. Previous studies (e.g. Brouthers, 
2000; Cristina & Esteben 2002; Brouthers & Brouthers 2000; Tahir & Larimo 
2006) suggest that foreign firms will prefer to opt for JV over WOS when enter-
ing the foreign market with high risk.  This result  is  not significant and does not 
affect the mode of ownership in the context of Ghana. 
CULTDIS is not a significant variable, suggesting that the perceived large cultur-
al distance between Ghana and the home country of the foreign firm did not in-
crease or decreased the probability of the firm choosing either a WOS or JV mode 
of ownership in Ghana. Thus, hypothesis 21 is not supported. Previous studies 
(e.g. Kogut & Singh 1988; Gatignon & Anderson 1988; Padmanabhan & Cho 
1994; Benito 1995; Bell 1996; Mutinelli & Piscitello 1997; Hennart & Larimo 
1998; Padmanabhan & Cho 1999; Evans 2002; Cristina & Esteban 2002; Leung 
et al. 2003) have shown that large cultural distance between the home and host 
countries” support the choice of a JV mode of entry. Their argument is based on 
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the fact that since a foreign firm is faced with the uncertainty that arises from an 
unknown culture, the firm may be unwilling to commit substantial resources to a 
foreign operation since such a commitment would substantially reduce the firm's 
ability to exit without cost if the host market proves unattractive.  This result did 
not support the theory and the predictions of previous research. Cultural distance 
is not a significant variable in the context of Ghana and hence did not affect the 
ownership mode.  
PROASSETS is not a significant variable, suggesting that the proprietary assets 
of the foreign firm did not increase or decrease the probability of the foreign firm 
choosing either a WOS or a JV form of ownership in the context of Ghana.  Thus, 
hypothesis 23 is not supported. Previous studies (e.g. Larimo 2000; Tahir & Lar-
imo 2006; Brouthers & Brouthers  2000; Yung-Heng & Yann-Haur 2009) found 
that high R &D firms prefer to use a WOS mode of ownership than the a JV. The 
results show that due to weak institutions and lack of protection of a proprietary 
asset in Ghana, foreign firms do not usually transfer this asset to the country when 
setting up affiliates. Hence, they do not consider the proprietary asset of the firm 
as a key in their decision for mode of ownership. This can be attributed to the 
reason why proprietary asset did not affect the mode of ownership in the context 
of Ghana.  
Product relatedness is significant at the 0.1 level. This variable had a negative 
sign suggesting that the more the subsidiary product is related to the main product 
of  the  parent  firm,  the  higher  the  probability  of  the  foreign  firm  choosing  a  JV  
mode of ownership. The finding can be interpreted as follows: due to the risky 
nature of the Ghanaian business environment and the small size of the market, it 
seems more profitable for foreign firms to establish through a joint venture mode 
of ownership than a wholly owned one in order to reduce the risk associated with 
the environment. This seems to explain why the result of this study contradicts the 
findings of previous studies and the prediction of the theory used in this study. 
With regard to the control variables: target country experience, competition, in-
centives, historical ties (UK)/other countries are found to be non-significant for 
FDI ownership mode choice of foreign MNEs in the context of Ghana.  
Additional analysis 
MS is not statistical significant in Table 18 model 2, suggesting that the market-
seeking FDI motive of the foreign firm does not lead to an increase or decrease in 
the probability of the foreign firm choosing either a WOS or a JV mode of owner-
ship in the context of Ghana. Thus hypothesis 24 is not supported. The finding 
can be interpreted by the fact that the Ghana market is not big, and most of the 
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foreign firms do not invest in the country with the market-seeking motive in Gha-
na.  
 
Table 18. Logistic Regression Results Related to Ownership mode 
 
Variables Model 1 full sample 
Model 2 full 
sample  and mo-
tives) 
Model 3 full sample  
and interaction varia-
ble 
Independent variable    
PSIZE .619 (.750) .541 (.996) .574 (.744) 
INTEX -.240 (1.129) -.230 (1.335) -.214 (1.438) 
MSIZE -.143 (.423) -.087 (.500) .107 (.434) 
CULTDIS -.265 (.225) -.394 (.283) -.641 (.511) 
CRISK -.145 (.264) -.153 (.306) .118 (.711) 
CONTRISK .674 (.276)** .853 (.335)** .709 (.287)** 
PROASSETS .517 (.740) -.057 (2.031) .563 (.773) 
Motives variables    
MS  -.365 (2.007)  
RS  -1.799 (.782)**  
ES  -2.094 (.929)**  
Control variables    
PRELATEDNESS -1.465 (.809)* -2.366 (1.095)** -1.525 (.883)* 
TCEXPERIENCE .574 (1.120) .430 (1.331) .430 (1.163) 
COMPETITION -.238 (.263) – .603 (.350)* -.238 (.267) 
INCENTIVES .327 (.745) -.277 (.817) .189 (.781) 
UK/OTHERS COUNTRIES -1.033 (.754) -1.820 (.965)* – 1.332 (.857) 
TIMING OF ENTRY -1.111 (.714) 1.707 (.947)* 1.126 (.729) 
ESTABLISHMENT MODE 2.312 (1.049)** 1.806 (1.043)* 2.224 (1.037)** 
Interaction variables    
INTEX X CRISK   -.073 (.197) 
INTEX X CULTDIS   .140 (.168) 
CONSTANT -3.312 (2.443)* 1.581 (3.575) -3.318 (3.097) 
N 75 75 75 
Model X2 27.236** 40.328*** 28.008** 
Correct Classification Rate 78.7 % 84 % 74.7 % 
-2 log likelihood 73.716 60.624 72.943 
Nagelkerke R2 .412 .562 .421 
 
Note: two-tailed tests; dependent variables is Ownership choice: WOS = 1; and J V = 0, 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
RS is significant at the 0.05 level. The variable had a negative sign suggesting 
that the higher the motive for resource-seeking FDIs in Ghana, the greater the 
probability that the foreign firm will choose a JV mode of ownership rather than a 
WOS. Thus hypothesis 25 is supported. The finding can be explained by the fact 
that since most resource’s firms in Ghana are owned by the state, in general, the 
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government does not want to sell the whole firm to foreign investors but hold 
some percentage share of the firm. As a result, most resource-seeking firms end 
up becoming a JV between the government and the foreign investor.  
ES is significant at the 0.05 level.  The variable had a negative sign suggesting 
that the higher the motive for efficiency-seeking FDIs in Ghana, the greater the 
probability that the foreign firm will choose a JV mode of ownership rather than a 
WOS. Thus hypothesis 26 is supported. The reason foreign firms with efficiency- 
seeking motive opt for a JV mode of ownership in Ghana is that  because of the 
perceived high risk of investing in Ghana, most of the foreign firms prefer to set 
up their subsidiary through a JV mode instead of WOS in order to minimise their 
risk  of  exposure  of  their  resources.  As  a  result  of  uncertainties  surrounding  the  
environments, the foreign firm will try to reduce their investment risk by opting 
for JV mode of ownership rather than WOS mode.  
Interaction effect: The  results  of  the  study  reveal  that  none  of  the  interaction  
variables are statistically significant, hence does not have any impact on owner-
ship mode choice. The joint effect of these combined variables does not lead to an 
increase or decrease in the probability of a foreign firm choosing either a JV or a 
WOS in the context of Ghana (see Table 18 model 3).  
8.4 Empirical results related to subsidiary performance 
The descriptive statistics of all variables and their correlations are presented in 
Appendix 1. The correlations between the independent variables varied from 
moderate to low. The only worrisome correlation is between that of international 
experience and target country experience (r=0.97), which is higher than the corre-
lation cut-off point 0.60, implying potential multicollinearity problems. The vari-
ance inflation factors (VIF) analysis indicated values of 27 and 25 for the two 
variables, which are considerably higher than Hair et al.’s (1998) multicollineari-
ty threshold value of 10. Related to other variables the respective values were 
clearly below 10 (see Appendix 5). Thus different runs were performed including 
and excluding international and target country experience. The results of the ordi-
nary  regression  analysis  are  presented  in  Table  19.  Model  1  is  significant  at  the  
level (p<0.002), and has R2 value of 0.427, and adjusted R2 value of 0.281. The 
model 2 is significant at the level (p<0.010), and has an R2 value of 0.376, and 
adjusted R2 value of 0.218.The regression coefficients illustrate that: 
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MSIZE is significant at the 0.05 level in both model 1 and 2. This variable had a 
positive sign suggesting that perceived larger market size increases the probability 
of better performance and higher profitability by the foreign firm affiliate in Gha-
na. Thus, hypothesis 27 is supported. The finding implies that due to the large 
perceived market size which results in a reduction in marginal costs of producing, 
foreign firms tend to invest in location rather than resort to export. Thus, host 
countries with large market size enable foreign entrants to achieve economies of 
scale, which leads to better performance. This result is in line with previous stud-
ies (e.g. Brouthers 2002) who found that large market size positively affects for-
eign subsidiary performance. 
CRISK is significant at the 0.1 and 0.05 level in models 1 and 2. The variable 
had a negative sign suggesting that perceived high country risk decreased the total 
performance and profitability of the foreign firm affiliate in Ghana. Thus, hypoth-
esis 31 is supported. The finding here can be interpreted by the fact that high en-
vironmental uncertainties in Ghana lead to an increase in the cost of operation of 
firms, which in the long run has affected the total performance and profitability of 
foreign firms in Ghana.  
ESTABLISHMENT MODE is significant at the 0.05 and 0.1 level in models 1 
and 2. The variable had a positive sign suggesting that a greenfield mode of entry 
performed better than the acquisition mode of entry. Thus, hypothesis 32 is sup-
ported. This finding suggests that the lack of acquisition targets (Slangen & Hen-
nart 2008), resulted in few acquisitions in Ghana relative to greenfield invest-
ment. The relatively small number of acquisition targets suggests that local firms 
in Ghana lack the capabilities and attractiveness for foreign firms to acquire them. 
Thus, foreign firms opt for greenfield investment to enable them to introduce their 
own organizational culture that will allow them to transfer their core management 
capabilities from their headquarters, which will enhance operational effectiveness. 
Studies by Woodcock et al. (1994) and Hennert (1998) reveal that there are high 
costs associated with acquisitions compared to greeenfield investment due to 
post-acquisition integration and other structural changes in the subsidiary.  
OWNERSHIP MODE is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level in models 1 and 2. 
The variable had a negative sign suggesting that JVs performed better than the 
WOS. The results support hypothesis 33. We can therefore think that since the 
Ghanaian market is not big, entering the market with a JV has allowed foreign 
firms to better adapt to the business environment and to compete with local firms. 
Scholars have suggested that in bigger markets, foreign investors choose WOS 
over  JVs  in  order  to  obtain  scale  economies,  as  this  reduces  unit  costs  and  the  
establishment of long-term market presence. This result is in line with previous 
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studies like Pan and Chi, (1999), Pan, Li and Tse (1999), Reus and Ritchie, 
(2004) who also found that JVs perform better than WOS.  
The age of the unit is significant at the 0.05 and 0.1 level in models 1 and 2. This 
variable had a positive sign suggesting that foreign affiliated firms set up in Gha-
na after year 2000s have performed better than those affiliates set up in the 1990s 
(the older units). The result of this study contradicts the predictions of some pre-
vious studies (e.g. Dollar et al. 2003; Carlson et al. 2005). In their studies, they 
suggest that the length of subsidiaries’ operation in the host country had a positive 
impact on the subsidiaries’ performance. The finding here can be attributed to the 
fact that the improved institutional structure in the 2000s compared to the 1990s 
has improved the performance and profitability of foreign firms set up in the 
2000s and onwards. 
Proassets is significant at the 0.1 and 0.05 level in models 1 and 2. The variable 
had a negative sign suggesting that higher proprietary assets possessed by foreign 
firms decreased the total performance and profitability of foreign affiliates in 
Ghana. This result is opposite to the predictions of research, and it is very intri-
guing. The finding can be explained by the lack of protection of proprietary assets 
in Ghana and, hence, foreign firms find it very difficult to transfer their proprie-
tary assets to their affiliate in Ghana as a result of the fear of losing such assets. 
This ends up having negative implications on both the total performance and prof-
itability of the affiliate in Ghana.  
CULTDIS is significant at the 0.05 level in model 1. The variable had a negative 
sign suggesting that perceived high cultural distance decreased the total perfor-
mance of foreign affiliates in Ghana. Thus, hypothesis 30 is supported. This result 
is in line with previous studies e.g. Li and Guisinger (1992); Chang (1995) who 
found that high culture distance between the host country and home country of 
the foreign firm has a negative impact on the performance. Other studies consider 
cultural distance in the MNEs’ portfolio as having a positive influence on perfor-
mance (e.g.  Gomez-Mejia & Palich 1997; Park & Ungson 1997).  The results of 
this support the prediction and argument put forwards by, for example, Li  and 
Guisinger (1992) and Chang (1995) who stated that doing business in a highly 
cultural distance will lead to lower performance by a foreign firm. The finding 
here can be explained based on the argument that high cultural differences be-
tween foreign firms home countries and Ghana has had a negative impact on the 
total performance of foreign affiliates in Ghana. 
INTEX is significant at the 0.1 level in model 1. The variable had a negative sign 
suggesting that the extensive international experience of a foreign firm leads to a 
decreased in the total performance of foreign affiliates in Ghana. Thus, hypothesis 
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28 is not supported. This result is opposite to the prediction of previous scholars 
(e.g. Kim et al. 1993) who have suggested that as a firm expands its operation 
overseas, it learns more about how to cope with different environments in terms 
of economic, political and legal systems, as well as the psychic distances. These 
learning skills can be applied to new foreign investment opportunities. This result 
contradicts the findings of a study conducted by Kim et al. (1993).The findings 
here suggest that parent firms may have international experiences but these expe-
riences are not applicable in the context of Ghana because of differences in gov-
ernment regulations and the cultural settings of the people. 
Tcexperience is significant at the 0.05 level in model 1. The variable had a posi-
tive sign suggesting that foreign firms with previous experience in Ghana had 
their affiliates perform better on total performance than firms without previous 
experience in Ghana. This result is in line with previous studies (e.g. Johanson & 
Vahlne 1977; Barkema & Vermeulen 1998) who found that target experience has 
a positive impact on performance. This result suggests that with a parent firm 
having previous experience in Ghana, the foreign firm has acquired the necessary 
knowledge in the country concerning the various ways of doing business, and this 
leads to a reduction in the uncertainty of doing business in Ghana. Hence, previ-
ous knowledge of doing business in Ghana has helped firms to operate efficiently, 
which in turn has led to better performance. An interesting finding was the influ-
ence of two experience variables towards opposite directions: while target country 
experience is positive related to performance, international experience is negative. 
An incentive is significant at the 0.05 level in model 2. The variable had a posi-
tive sign suggesting that incentives granted by the Ghana government to foreign 
investors impacts on the profitability of their foreign affiliates.  
Historical UK/other countries were significant at the 0.05 level in model 2. The 
variable had a negative sign suggesting that foreign affiliate in Ghana with their 
parent firm originating outside UK are more profitable than those affiliates with 
their parent firm originating from the UK. The reason for adding this variable to 
the analysis is to find out if historical ties have any impact on the performance 
and profitability of foreign firms in Ghana, since Ghana was colonized by Britain. 
The finding revealed that country of origin does not affect the performance of 
subsidiaries.  The  results  do  not  offer  support  for  effect  of  country  of  origin  on  
performance. Hence, the fact remains inconclusive. Pangarkar and Lim (2003) 
and Demirbag et al. (2007) reached a related conclusion. The results here suggest 
that the strategy of the foreign firm, rather than country of origin, may have been 
the key reason behind the success of foreign firms affiliated in Ghana.  
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Firm size and product relatedness variables in both models were insignificant. 
Thus surprisingly the subsidiary performance in Ghana was not significantly de-
pendent on those variables. Furthermore, two control variables – contractual risk 
and competition – were also found to insignificant in both models.  
Additional analysis 
 
The Combined effects of establishment and ownership mode, as was discussed 
earlier, making the FDI in the form of greenfield investment was expected and 
also found to increase probability of better performance; choosing the joint ven-
ture ownership instead of WOS was expected and also found to have better per-
formance. However, we expected that joint ventures would lead to better perfor-
mance than WOSs only in cases of Greenfield investments whereas in cases of 
acquisitions WOSs would lead to better performance than joint ventures (partial 
acquisitions). As the results in model 9 indicate, independent of the measure of 
performance, greenfield joint ventures increased significantly probability of better 
performance. Thus hypothesis 34 is supported. The results analysing the influence 
of ownership arrangement in acquisition form of FDIs (model 7) indicated, how-
ever, a significant influence along performance measure but not profitability and 
is opposite to the prediction of the hypothesis. Thus hypothesis 35 did not receive 
support. 
 
Interaction effect: The findings of the interaction effects between highly interna-
tional experienced and perceived high country risk is significant at the 0.1 level in 
Table 19 model 3 but not significant in model 4. Hypothesis 36 is not supported. 
The combined variable had a negative sign suggesting that the joint effects of 
MNEs having extensive international experience and operating in high risk mar-
kets decrease the performance of foreign subsidiaries in Ghana. The findings here 
suggest that parent firms may have international experiences but these experienc-
es may not be applicable in a Ghanaian context because of the risk nature of the 
business environment.  Also, most of the MNEs rely on their past success in other 
countries and use this as a basis to enter a different country, without  proper prep-
aration forgetting that the different countries with different institutional structures 
make it difficult for MNEs to transfer those experience acquired in different con-
texts to the new market to enable them to operate efficiently. This result suggests 
that international experience alone is not enough for MNEs to achieve better per-
formance, especially when operating a high risk market. Hence, there is the need 
for MNEs to pay attention to the business environment in the local context. Based 
on these finding, we could say that the success of the MNEs in an international 
market depends not only on the ownership specific factors but also location spe-
cific factors since some of these ownership specific factors cannot be transferred 
into certain environments. It has been argued that when firms gradually increase 
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the scope of their international activities, the ownership advantage become more 
specific to the firm but less specific to any location (Kogut 1985; Rugman 1979; 
Verbeke et al. 2010). Hence there is the need for MNEs from the outset to recog-
nize the limited transferability of some of these ownership advantages when en-
gaging in international strategic planning. However, the interaction effects be-
tween large international experience and perceived high cultural distance is sta-
tistically non-significant in both models, and thus hypothesis 37 is not supported. 
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Historical ties: The results of this study reveal that historical ties do not affect the 
decision of the foreign firms related to the establishment and ownership mode 
choice as well as FDI performance in the context of Ghana. Even though the aim 
of this study is not to empirically examine the source of FDI to Ghana, the data 
shows that firms from the UK had more investment in Ghana as compared to oth-
er countries. Hence, theoretically, we can say that there is a positive relationship 
between colonial ties and FDIs inflows. This is because, out of the samples of 75 
foreign  firms,  19  of  the  firms  originated  from  the  UK  while  the  remaining  56  
firms come from 18 different countries. While some researchers (e.g. Makino & 
Tsang, 2011) suggest that historical ties must not be left out of any comprehen-
sive analysis of FDI decisions, the result of this study shows that historical ties do 
not provide any explanatory power regarding FDI decisions related to establish-
ment and ownership mode. In addition, the findings of this study indicate that 
historical ties do not have an impact on subsidiary performance in the context of 
Ghana. 
Continuation of Table 19 OLS Regression related to Performance and Profitability 
 
Two tailed significant values indicate: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,* p<0.1    
Variables Model 3 
Total Performance 
with  interaction 
variables 
Model 4 
Profitability with  
interaction 
variables 
Model 5 
Total performance 
with motives 
Model 6 
Profitability with 
motives 
Independent 
variables 
    
PSIZE -.250 (.189) .113 (.228) -.238 (.197) .133 (.229) 
INTEX -.385 (.444) -.102 (.535) -.639 (.370)* -.047 (.430) 
MSIZE .309 (.137)** .401(.165)** .346 (.146)** .431 (.169)* 
CULTDIS -.364 (.156)** -.349 (.188)* -.153 (.075)** -.135 (.087) 
CRISK .202 (.213) -.076 (.256) -.154 (.095) -.204 (.109)* 
ESTABLISHMENT 
MODE 
.596 (.281)** .572 (.339)* .585 (.289)** .628 (.336)* 
OWNERSHIP MODE -.729 (.230)*** -.677 (.279)** -.612 (.263)** -.544 (305)* 
Control variables     
CONTRISK .064 (.089) .014 (.108) .063 (.095) -.011 (.110 
PROASSEST -.303 (.246) -.620 (.297)** -.332 (.562) .065 (.652) 
PRELATEDNESS .310 (.262) .131 (.316) .305 (.207) .242 (.313) 
TCEXPERIENCE .574 (.353) .170 (.426) .696 (.364)* .180 (.422) 
COMPETITION  -.020 (.085) -.045 (.096) -.025( .088) -.047 (.102) 
INCENTIVES  .133 (.249) .703 (.300)** .261 (.263) .725 (.305) 
AGE: 1990/2000S .544 (.273)** .495 (.271)* .585 (.289)** .451(.275) 
UK/OTHERS -.487 (.298) -.833 (.329)** -.235 (.290) -.740 (.337) 
Interaction variables     
INTEX X CRISK -.115 (.066)* -.043 (.076)   
INTEX X CULTDIS .077 (.053) * .082 (.069)   
Motives     
MS   -.087 (.546) -.780 (.633) 
RS   -.041 (263) .197 (.263) 
ES   .199 (.227) .011 (.306) 
CONSTANT  .2.266 (.983)** 2.073 (1.922) 2.318 (.934) ** 1.598 (1.084) 
N 75 75 75 75 
R2                                     .475 .397 .435 .399 
Adjusted R2                       .326 .217 .235 .206 
F-statistic                                       .001 .014 .007 020 
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Impact of motives on subsidiary performance: The empirical findings of this 
study reveal that motives did not have any statistically significant impact on sub-
sidiary performance in the context of Ghana (see Table 19, model 5). This is con-
trary to scholars like Li (2007) who claims that a firm’s motivation for interna-
tional expansion exerts a direct effect on both the firm’s multinationality and per-
formance. Dess et al. (1995) suggest that examining performance without consid-
ering motivation may not be fruitful. Furthermore, Verbeke and Brugman (2009) 
point out that by adopting an overly simplified view of what constitutes firm-level 
performance, and neglecting the firm’s motives for internationalization, the ef-
fects on performance may remain ill understood. The findings of this study show 
that motives alone do not determine the success of the firm; however, firm-
specific factors, strategies of the firm and location-specific factors are the key 
factors that could influence the success or failure of subsidiary performance in the 
context of Ghana.  
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As a result of limited sample size, this study went further to test the mean values 
of motives in relation to performance, profitability, establishment and ownership 
modes. The mean of establishment and ownership modes in relation to perfor-
mance and profitability was also tested. Table 20 shows the means values and 
significant level.  
 
Table 20. Descriptive statistics (T- Test) 
 
Motive N Mean (performance) SD P  value 
Non market- seeking 41 3.34 .965  
Market- seeking 34 3.29 1.013 .838 
Non efficiency-seeking 31 3.19 .910  
Efficiency-seeking 44 3.41 1.041 .356 
Non resource-seeking 36 3.36 .899  
resource- seeking 36 3.28 1.075 .732 
  Mean (establishment mode )   
Non market-seeking 41 0.54 .505  
Market- seeking 34 0.76 .431 .035* 
Non efficiency- seeking 31 0.74 .445  
Efficiency- seeking 44 0.57 .501 .126 
Non resource- seeking 36 0.72 .454  
Resource- seeking 39 0.56 .502 .158 
  Mean (ownership mode )   
Non market-seeking 41 0.29 .461  
Market-seeking 34 0.53 .507 .040* 
Non efficiency-seeking 31 0.61 .495  
Efficiency-seeking 44 0.25 .438 .002* 
Non resource-seeking 36 0.50 .507  
Resource-seeking  39 0.31 .468    .093 
*T-test for the equality of the means 
In Table 20, with regard to motives and performance, the p-value associated to 
the T-statistic is higher than 5%, for all the three motives. The null hypothesis of 
equality of means cannot be rejected at this significance level. This means that 
there is no difference in the mean value of performance between the market-
seeking firm and non market-seeking firm, efficiency-seeking firms and non effi-
ciency firms as well as resource-seeking and non resource-seeking firms. In the 
case of motives and establishment mode, the results indicate that the p-value as-
sociated to the t-statistic is higher than 5%, for two of the motives (that is effi-
ciency-seeking and resource-seeking). The null hypothesis of equality of means 
cannot be rejected at this significant level. This means that there is no difference 
in the mean value of establishment mode between the efficiency-seeking and non 
efficiency seeking firms as well as resource and non-seeking firms. In the case of 
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market-seeking on establishment modes, the p-value associated to the t-statistic is 
lower than 5%. The null hypothesis of equality of means is rejected at this signifi-
cance level, which means that there is a difference in the mean value of estab-
lishment mode choice between the market-seeking firms and non market-seeking. 
In the case of mean values of motives and ownership modes in Tables 20, the 
results show that  the p-value associated to the T-statistic is lower than 5%, for 
market-seeking and efficiency-seeking, hence the null hypothesis of equality of 
means is rejected at this significance level. That is, there is a difference in the 
mean value of ownership mode choice between the market-seeking firms and non 
market-seeking, as well as efficiency-seeking and non efficiency-seeking. On the 
other hand, the p-value associated with the t-statistic is higher than 5% for re-
source seeking. Therefore, the null hypothesis of equality of means cannot be 
rejected at this significant level. This means that, there is no difference in the 
mean value of ownership mode choice between the resource-seeking and non re-
source-seeking.  
As Table 21 shows, the p-value associated to the T-test statistics is higher than 
5%. Therefore, the null hypothesis of equality of means cannot be rejected at this 
significance level. This means that there is no difference in the mean value of 
performance between the acquisition and greenfield. Also with profitability, the 
p-value associated to the T-test statistic is higher than 5%, the null hypothesis of 
equality of means cannot be rejected at this significance level. This means that 
there is no difference in the mean value of profitability between the acquisition 
and greenfield. In the case of ownership mode choice, Table 21 indicates that the 
p-value associated to the T-test statistic is higher than 5%, in both performance 
and profitability. The null hypothesis of equality of means cannot be rejected at 
this significance level. So there is no difference in the mean value of performance 
between the JV and WOS. Likewise, there is no difference in the mean value of 
profitability between the JV and WOS.  As shown in Table 21, the p-value asso-
ciated to the T-test statistic is higher than 5% for both performance and profitabil-
ity. Thus, the null hypothesis of equality of means cannot be rejected at this sig-
nificance level. This means that there is no difference in the mean value of per-
formance between the partial acquisition and full acquisition. Also there is no 
difference in the mean value of profitability between the partial acquisition and 
full acquisition. Futhermore, with regard to the JV greenfield and WOS acquisi-
tion the result shows that the p-value associated to the T-test statistics is lower 
than 5% for both performance and profitability. Hence the null hypothesis of 
equality of means is rejected at this significance level. That is, there is a differ-
ence in the mean value of performance between JVgreenfield and WOS acquisi-
tion. There is also difference in mean value of profitability between JV greenfield 
and WOS acquisition. 
120      Acta Wasaensia 
 
Table 21. Descriptive statistics (T- Test) 
 
Establishment mode N Mean (performance) SD P  value 
Acquisition 27 3.04 .980  
Greenfield 48 3.48 .967 .063* 
  Mean (profitability)   
Acquisition 27 3.07 1.072  
Greenfield 48 3.42 1.127 .202 
Ownership modes  Mean (performance)   
JV 45 3.49 .944  
WOS 30 3.07 1.015 .070* 
  Mean (profitability)   
JV 45 3.42 1.033  
WOS 30 3.10 1.213 .221 
Establishment /Ownership mode  Mean (performance)   
Partial acquisition 21 3.19 .928  
Full acquisition 6 2.50 1.049 .441 
  Mean (profitability)   
Partial acquisition 21 3.14 1.014  
Full acquisition 6 2.83 1.329 .474 
Ownership /Establishment 
modes 
 Mean (performance)   
JV greenfield 24 3.71 .908  
WOS acquisition 6 2.50 1.049 .008*** 
  Mean (profitability)   
JV greenfield 24 3.58 .974  
WOS acquisition 6 2.83 1.329 .708 
Establishment /Ownership mode  Mean (performance)   
Greenfield JV 24 3.71 .908  
Greenfield WOS 24 3.25 989 .101 
  Mean (profitability)   
Greenfield JV 24 3.58 .974  
Greenfield WOS 24 3.25 1.260 .311 
Establishment /Ownership mode  Mean (performance)   
Partial acquisition 21 3.19 .928  
Greenfield WOS 24 3.25 .989 .836 
  Mean (profitability)   
Partial acquisition 21 3.14 1.014  
Greenfield WOS 24 3.25 1.260 .754 
*T-test for the equality of the means 
However, with respect to the greenfield JV and greenfield WOS the result shows 
that  p-value  associated  to  the  T-test  statistics  is  higher  than  5% for  both  perfor-
mance and profitability. Hence, the null hypothesis of equality of means cannot 
be rejected at this significance level. It means that there is no difference in the 
mean value of performance between greenfield JV and greenfield WOS. There is 
also no difference in mean value of profitability between greenfield JV and green-
field WOS. Last but not least, with regard to the partial acquisition and greenfield 
WOS the result shows that P-value associated to the T-test statistics is higher than 
5% for both performance and profitability. Therefore, the null hypothesis of 
equality of means cannot be rejected at this significant level. It means that there is 
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no difference in the mean value of performance between partial acquisition and 
greenfield WOS. There is also no difference in mean value of profitability be-
tween partial acquisition and greenfield WOS. The reason for using test for statis-
tical significance in this study is that, to estimate the probability that a relation-
ship observed in the data occurred only by chance, the probability that the varia-
bles are really unrelated in the population, that is  to figure out if there observed 
difference in means is statistical significant. In order to have a good idea of the 
situation, a large sample size is usually considered as better in order to generalise 
the result. 
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9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This  chapter  begins  with  a  summary  of  the  whole  dissertation.  The  subsequent  
chapter presents theoretical and managerial implications. This is followed by the 
limitations and, finally, suggestions for further research are presented. 
9.1 Summary and findings of the study 
FDI is seen as an engine of growth as it provides the much-needed capital for in-
vestment, increases competition in the host-country industries, and aids local 
firms to become more productive by adopting more efficient technologies or by 
investing in human and/or physical capital. FDI contributes to growth in a sub-
stantial manner because it is more stable than other forms of capital flows. Fur-
thermore, FDI can facilitate access to foreign markets and generate technological 
and efficiency spillover to local firms. It is expected that, by providing access to 
foreign markets, transferring technology and generally building capacity in the 
host country, firms will inevitably improve the integration of the host country into 
the global economy and foster growth. Additionally, FDI is also becoming a key 
strategy and an integrated element of business strategy in an increasing number of 
firms. While international production practices are still unfamiliar to the firms in 
certain sectors, a great number of firms within industries such as automobile, 
electronics and software have carried out international production for many years. 
As a result of globalization, an increasing number of firms are confronted with the 
pressure to internationalize their production resources in order to retain competi-
tiveness.  
The academic interest in FDIs has been increasing in recent years. However, there 
has been very little research into the question of how foreign manufacturing firms 
have carried out their FDI operations in African markets. There have been very 
few studies that have applied the eclectic paradigm and transaction cost frame-
works to study the FDI of foreign manufacturing firms in Africa (e.g. Bhaumik et 
al. (2005). Besides, this study develops an integrated framework combining the 
two theories into a relevant framework for studying manufacturing FDIs in devel-
oping countries. There is also a managerial knowledge gap about business in Af-
rica. Many African countries including Ghana have recently implemented eco-
nomic liberalization measures and opened their economies to foreign investment. 
There is the need to empirically analyze the relationship between the changing 
business and institutional environment and the behavior and performance of for-
eign investors. Policy makers can also benefit from understanding these dynam-
ics. 
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To fill the above-mentioned research and managerial knowledge gaps, the present 
study empirically investigates how the ownership-specific (O), location-specific 
(L), internalization (I) and transaction-specific factors have influenced the mo-
tives, establishment, ownership mode and the performance of foreign manufactur-
ing affiliates in Ghana from 1994 to 2008. The overall purpose of the study is to 
increase academic understanding of the determinants of motives, entry modes 
choices and subsequent performance of foreign manufacturing firms in Ghana.   
Chapter one discusses the background and defines the research objectives and 
questions of the study. The expected contributions and scope of the study are dis-
cussed. The chapter continues by providing definitions of the main terms used in 
this dissertation and concludes by explaining the structure of this dissertation.  
Chapter two discusses the theoretical framework and builds bases for the reader to 
understand the main theoretical perspectives used in the dissertation. It presents 
the relevant concepts of the eclectic paradigm and transaction cost framework 
within which the factors influencing the FDI choices are evaluated.  
Chapter three discusses the strategic motives of foreign investors in line with the 
eclectic paradigm and transaction cost factors. It presents a classification of in-
vestment motives based on IB theories. The chapter provides an understanding of 
the relationship between the strategic motives of firms and the business environ-
ment prevailing in a developing country like Ghana. 
Chapter four and five theoretically investigate how the ownership-specific, loca-
tion-specific, internalization and transaction cost specific factors influence the 
established ownership mode of a foreign firm in Ghana. Then each of the above-
mentioned factors is reviewed in detail in different subchapters. Based on the pre-
vious theoretical and empirical literature on the establishment mode strategies, 
several hypotheses are developed addressing the components of the eclectic para-
digm and transaction costs in relation to the establishment mode choice of the 
foreign firms in Ghana.  
Chapter six theoretically investigates how the ownership-specific and location-
specific factors affect performance. This chapter also investigates the impact of 
the establishment and ownership modes on the performance of foreign firm’s sub-
sidiaries in Ghana. Each of the above-mentioned factors is reviewed in detail in 
different subchapters. Based on the extent of theoretical and empirical literature, 
hypotheses were developed regarding the components of the eclectic paradigm 
and transaction cost, establishment and ownership modes on the total perfor-
mance of the foreign subsidiaries in Ghana. 
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Chapter seven presents the research methodology of the study and the characteris-
tics of the studied firms. This chapter provides a discussion of the sample and an 
overview of the statistical procedure to be applied. In addition, the population of 
the firms and the types of investment in the sample are discussed. Finally, the 
operationalization of the dependent, independent and control variables related to 
motivation, establishment modes, ownership modes, and subsidiary performance 
of foreign manufacturing firms in Ghana is presented.  
Chapter eight presents the empirical findings of the study. It provides descriptive 
statistics showing correlations among all the dependent, independent and control 
variables. Regression results for motives, establishment mode, ownership mode 
and performance are also presented in this chapter. The chapter also discusses 
these findings in relation to the findings of previous studies addressing similar 
issues. Tables 22-25 provide the summary of all the findings of the study. First, 
with regard to motive, the results indicate that four variables were statistically 
significant in the total sample. The empirical results reveal that a perceived large 
market size increases the probability of foreign firms undertaking MS FDIs. In 
contrast, perceived large cultural distance leads to a decrease in the probability of 
foreign firms undertaking MS FDIs in the context of Ghana. The findings also 
reveal that international experience leads to a decrease in the probability of the 
foreign firms undertaking MS seeking, while perceived large market size leads to 
a decrease in ES-seeking FDIs. These results were opposite to the prediction of 
the hypotheses. Furthermore, the results reveal that firm size, perceived high 
country risk and perceived high contractual risk were non-significant (see Table 
22). 
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Table 22. Summary of the hypotheses tested related to motives 
 
Hypotheses Results 
H1 
 
PSIZE (There is a positive relationship between firm 
size and market- seeking and/or efficiency- seeking 
FDIs).  
Not supported  
H2 
 
INTEX (There is a positive relationship between 
international experience and market- seeking and/or 
efficiency- seeking FDIs). 
Not supported: significant at 
the p < 0.1 level. opposite to 
the prediction of the hypothe-
ses 
H3 
 
MSIZE (There is a positive relationship between 
international experience and market-seeking and/or 
efficiency-seeking FDI). 
 
Partially supported:  signifi-
cant at the p < 0.05 level.  
 
Not supported. Significant at 
the p < 0.01 level.  
H4 
 
CRISK (There is a negative relationship between 
perceived investment risk and efficiency seeking 
FDIs). 
Not supported  
H5 
 
CULTDIS (There is a negative relationship between 
perceived cultural distance and market-seeking and/or 
efficiency-seeking FDIs). 
Partially supported: significant 
at the p< 0.1 level. 
H6 
 
CONTRISK (There is a negative relationship be-
tween perceived contractual risk and resource- seek-
ing FDIs). 
Not supported 
 
Furthermore, with regard to establishment mode, the results indicate that six out 
of the ten hypotheses were statistically significant in the total sample. The empiri-
cal results reveal that large firm size, international experience and perceived large 
market size lead to the choice for an acquisition mode of entry in Ghana by for-
eign firms. Similarly, high cultural distance, high country risk, and high proprie-
tary assets lead to the choice of greenfield mode of entry in the context of Ghana. 
On the other hand, the results reveal that contractual risk is non-significant in the 
model.  With regard to the impact of motives on establishment mode choice, the 
results indicate that motive was non-significant with regard to the choice of estab-
lishment mode; hence it does not have any impact on the establishment mode in 
the context of Ghana (see Table 23). 
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Table 23. Summary of the hypotheses tested related to the establishment mode 
 
Hypotheses Results 
H7 
 
PSIZE(Firm size is positively related to a acquisition mode 
of establishment) 
Supported: signifi-
cant at the p< 0.01 
level  
H8 
 
INTEX (International experience is positively related to an 
acquisition mode of establishment) 
Supported: signifi-
cant  at the p<0.1 
level 
H9 
 
MSIZE (Market size is positively related to an acquisition 
mode of establishment) 
Supported: significant 
at the p < 0.05level 
H10 
 
CRISK (There is a positive relationship between perceived 
investment risk and greenfield mode of establishment). 
Supported: significant 
at the p< 0.05 level 
H11 
 
CULTDIS (There is a positive relationship between per-
ceived cultural distance and greenfield mode of establish-
ment). 
Supported: significant 
at the p< 0.05 level 
H12 
 
CONTRISK (There is a positive relationship between per-
ceived contractual risk and greenfield mode of establish-
ment). 
 
Not supported 
H13    
 
PROASSETS (There is a positive relationship between 
perceived contractual risk and greenfield mode of estab-
lishment). 
Supported: significant 
at the p< 0.05 level 
H14 Market-seeking (There is a negative relationship between 
MS and a greenfield mode of establishment). 
Not supported 
H15 Resource-seeking (There is a negative relationship between 
RS and greenfield mode of establishment). 
Not supported 
HI6 Efficiency-seeking (There is a positive relationship between 
ES and greenfield mode of establishment). 
Not supported 
 
*implies that the converse is supported since greenfield was coded as 1 & acquisition was coded as 0 in the regression 
model 
 
With regard to the ownership mode, the results indicate that three out of ten hy-
potheses were statistically significant in the total sample. The empirical results of 
this study show that high contractual risk in the context of Ghana leads to the 
preference for a WOS mode of ownership by foreign firms. Similarly, the results 
reveal that firm size, international experience, perceived large market size, per-
ceived high country risk, perceived high cultural distance and proprietary assets 
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are non-significant in the context of Ghana. In addition, with regard to the impact 
of motives on ownership mode choice in the context of Ghana, the results indicate 
that foreign firms investing in Ghana with ES and RS motive lead to a preference 
for an JV mode of ownership (see Table 24). 
 
Table 24. Summary of the hypotheses tested related to ownership mode 
 
Hypotheses Results 
H17 
 
PSIZE (There is a positive relationship between firm size 
and WOS mode of ownership). 
Not supported 
H18 
 
INTEX (There is a positive relationship between interna-
tional experience and WOS mode of ownership). 
Not supported 
H19 
 
MSIZE (There is a positive relationship between perceived 
market size and WOS mode of ownership).  
 
Not supported  
H20 
 
CRISK (There is a negative relationship between perceived 
investment risk and WOS mode of ownership ) 
Not supported 
H21 
 
CULTDIS (There is a negative relationship between per-
ceived cultural distance and WOS mode of ownership). 
Not supported 
H22 
 
CONTRISK (There is a positive relationship between per-
ceived contractual risk and WOS mode of ownership.) 
 
Supported: significant 
at the p < 0.05level 
H23 
 
PROASSET (There is a positive relationship between pro-
prietary assets and WOS mode of ownership). 
Not supported 
H24 Market-seeking (There is a positive relationship between 
MS and WOS mode of ownership) 
Not supported 
H25 Resource-seeking (RS is positively related to a JV mode of 
ownership) 
Supported: significant 
at thep<0.05 level 
H26 Efficiency-seeking (ES  is positively related to a JV mode 
of ownership) 
Supported: significant 
at  the p<0.05 level 
 
*implies that the converse is supported since wholly owned was coded as 1 & JV was coded as 0 in the regression model 
 
Finally, with regard to performance, the results indicate that six out of eleven hy-
potheses were statistically significant in the sample for performance. The empiri-
cal results reveal that a perceived large market size, greenfield, JV and green-
fieldJV had a positive impact on the performance of foreign firms in Ghana. In 
contrast, perceived high country risk and perceived large cultural distance had 
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negatively impacted on total performance of foreign subsidiary firms in Ghana. 
On the other hand, international experience was found to be statistically signifi-
cant but opposite to the prediction of the hypothesis while the firm size was found 
to be non-significant in the context of Ghana. In the case of profitability, the re-
sults reveal that perceived large market size, greenfield mode of entry and JV 
mode of ownership had a positive impact on profitability. In contrast, perceived 
high country risk negatively impacted on profitability, while firm size and inter-
national experience were non-significant in the context of Ghana (see Table 25). 
 
Table 25. Summary of the hypotheses tested related to overall performance and 
profitability 
 
Hypotheses                                Results    
H27 
 
PSIZE (There is a positive relation-
ship between parent firm size and 
FDI performance). 
Not supported Not supported                        
H28 
 
INTEX (There is a positive relation-
ship between international experi-
ence of the foreign firm and FDI 
performance). 
Not supported: significant 
at the p< 0.1 level. Opposite 
to the prediction of the 
hypotheses 
Not supported 
 
 
 
H29 
 
MSIZE (There is a positive relation-
ship between perceived market size 
and FDI performance). 
Supported: significant at the 
p< 0.05 level  
Supported: sig-
nificant at the  
p<0.05  
 
H30 
 
CULTDIS(There is a negative rela-
tionship between perceived cultural 
distance and FDI performance) 
Supported: significant 
  at the p<0.05 level 
Not supported 
 
H31 
 
CRISK (There is a negative relation-
ship between perceived investment 
risk and FDI performance). 
Supported: significant  
at the p< 0.1 level     
Supported: sig-
nificant at the  
p<0.05  
 
 
H32 
 
Establishment mode: There is a 
positive relationship between the 
greenfield establishment modes and 
FDI performance 
Supported: significant at  
the p< 0.05 level 
Supported: sig-
nificant at the 
p<0.1level 
 
 
H33 
 
Ownership mode: Joint venture is 
positively  related to FDI perfor-
mance 
Supported: significant at  
 p < 0.01 level 
Supported Sig-
nificant at the 
p<0.05 level 
H34 Greeenfield JV vs. WOS. (There is a 
positive relationship between joint 
venture ownership in greenfield 
mode of investments and FDI per-
formance) 
Supported: significant at the 
p<0.05 level 
Supported: sig-
nificant at p<0.1 
level 
H35 Full vs. Partial acquisition. (There is 
a positive relationship between WOS 
ownership and FDI performance in 
acquisition mode of investments) 
Not supported Not supported 
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H36 INTEX X CRISK (International 
experience positively moderates the 
impact of perceived country risk on 
FDI performance 
Not support: significant 
at the p<0.1 level.  
Not supported:  
 
H37 INTEX EXP X CULDIS (Interna-
tional experience positively moder-
ates the impact of perceived high 
cultural distance on FDI perfor-
mance 
Not supported Not supported 
 
*implies that the converse is supported since JV was coded as 0 &WOS was coded as 1 in the regression model 
 
 
Table 26. Distribution of motives, establishment mode, ownership mode and 
performance mean of the sample 
 
Motive Frequency Percentage Mean (performance) 
Non market- seeking 41 54.7 3.34 
Market- seeking 34 45.3 3.29 
Non efficiency- seeking 31 41.3 3.19 
Efficiency- seeking 44 58.7 3.41 
Non resource- seeking 36 48.0 3.36 
Resource- seeking 39 52.0 3.28 
Establishment mode  
Acquisition 27 36.0 3.04 
Greenfield 48 64.0 3.48 
Ownership mode  
JV 45 60 3.49 
WOS 30 40 3.07 
 
Table 26 shows that the number of firms that opted for market-seeking invest-
ments was 45.3% of the sample and their performance mean value was 3.29.  The 
number of non marketing-seeking firms constituted 54.7% of the sample and their 
performance mean was 3.34. With regard to efficiency 58.7% made efficiency-
seeking investments with the performance mean value of 3.41.Non efficiency-
seeking firms accounted for 41.3%, and their performance mean value was 3.19.  
In relation to resource-seeking the results reveal that 52%  of the sample made 
resource-seeking investments with a performance mean value of 3.28, while non 
resource-seeking firms were 48% with performance mean value of 3.49. In the 
case of the establishment mode, the result reveals that 64% enter the market 
through greenfield investment, with a mean performance value of 3.48. 36% of 
the firms enter through acquisition and they have a performance mean value of 
3.04. With regard to the ownership mode, 60% used JVs and they had a perfor-
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mance mean value of 3.49, while 40% invested in WOS with the mean perfor-
mance value of 3.07 
 
9.2 Conclusion of the study 
FDI business environments in African countries have been perceived to be eco-
nomically and politically unstable, and FDI inflows, outside the natural-resource 
extracting sector, remained relatively sparse (MIGA 2011). This is also confirmed 
by the World Investment Prospect survey conducted by UNCTAD in 2009, in 
which multinational investors indicated that they continue to have low preference 
for Sub-Saharan Africa as a future investment location (UNCTAD 2009a). The 
image of Africa as a location for foreign direct investment has not been favoura-
ble (Owusu & Habiyakare 2011).  
Apart from low inflows of FDI to the region, academic interest with regards to the 
MNE strategies and performance in Africa is very limited. However, there is an 
immense body of literature on international entry mode research done in the ad-
vanced  world.  A  growing  number  of  studies  have  explored  the  entry  modes  of  
MNCs entering emerging markets. In addition, many studies have focused on the 
performance implications of entry modes examined from the perspective of the 
parent firm. Based on the presented gap, the main research questions of the study 
were stated as fellows: What factors motivate and influence the FDI choices of 
MNEs with regard to motives, establishment mode and ownership mode, and how 
do they impact subsidiary performance in the context of Ghana? Thus this study 
intends to fill the gap by examining the FDI strategies of MNEs and their perfor-
mance implications in the context of Ghana.  
The findings of this study reveal that the large market size of a host country has 
significant impact and leads to an increase in investment inflow, while the large 
cultural distance leads to decreased inflows of investment. The results also show 
that firm size is non-significant to both the marketing and efficiency-seeking fac-
tors and, hence, they do not have any impact in the context of Ghana. The result 
also show that international experience of MNEs leads to decreased market-
seeking FDIs, while large market size leads to decreased efficiency-seeking FDIs. 
With regards to establishment mode, the empirical data reveal that international 
experience, large firm and perceived large market size lead to a preference for 
acquisition mode while high country risk, high cultural distance and proprietary 
assets lead to a preference for greenfield mode of investment. The results also 
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show that incentives lead to preference for greenfield investment, while MNEs 
entering the Ghanaian market during the 1990s period prefer acquisition mode of 
entry. The results also show that motives do not have any impact on establishment 
mode choice. For the ownership mode choice, the results reveal that high contrac-
tual risks in the country lead to MNEs choosing WOS.  The results also show that 
firm size, international experience, market size, country risk, cultural distance and 
proprietary assets do not lead to any of the ownership mode choice.  Hence they 
do not have any impact on mode of ownership in the context of Ghana. With re-
gard to the control variables, the result shows that product relatedness leads to a 
preference for JV mode of ownership. On the other hand, timing of entry, incen-
tives, target country experience, UK/other countries or origin of the investors do 
not lead to any of the above-mentioned choices. Hence, these variables do not 
have any impact on the ownership mode choice in the context of Ghana. In rela-
tion to motive and ownership mode, the results reveal that efficiency-seeking and 
resource-seeking MNEs lead to a preference for JV mode of ownership. However, 
market-seeking motives do not lead to any of the choices and hence do not have 
any impact on the mode of ownership. Also, the results show that the interaction 
variables do not have any effect on mode of ownership choice.  
With regards to performance, the results reveal that independent variables such as 
large market size, greenfield and JV lead to better performance, while high cul-
tural distance and high country risk leads to a decrease in the performance of 
MNEs in the context of Ghana. Furthermore, the results reveal that the interna-
tional experience leads to a decrease in performance, while target country experi-
ence leads to an increase in performance. This shows that the experience acquired 
by the MNEs in a different geographical context cannot be applied in a different 
country as a result of differences in institutional set ups. The key issue with re-
gard to experience is that previous experience with the host market is very im-
portant because it affects performance positively. In relation to the impact of con-
trol variables on performance, the results show that target country experience and 
MNEs that entered the Ghanaian market between 2000 and 2008 led to better per-
formance, while proprietary assets led to decreased performance. Product related-
ness, competition, incentives, UK/other countries of origin of the investors do not 
have any impact on performance. With regard to the impact of motives on per-
formance, the result indicates that none of the motives were significant and, 
hence, do not have any impact on performance. In relation to interaction terms 
and performance, the results reveal that interaction variables between internation-
al experience and country risk were significant but opposite to the prediction of 
the hypothesis, while interaction effects between international experience and 
cultural distance were non-significant. In the case of the combined effect of 
choices between establishment and ownership mode, the result indicates that the 
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MNEs entering Ghana through greenfield investment and JV mode of ownership 
achieve better performance as well as those that enter through partial acquisition.  
A summary of the results is shown in Table 27, which indicates that market size 
and cultural distance were significant in three of the models. They had influence 
on motive, establishment and performance as predicted by the theories. Further-
more, country risk was significant in two of the models. It had influence on estab-
lishment mode and performance based on the prediction of the theories. In addi-
tion, proprietary asset was also significant in two of the models. It had influence 
on establishment mode in accordance with the theories, while it had negative in-
fluence on performance. Moreover, the following variables, firm size, contractual 
risk, product relatedness, target country experience, incentives, timing of entry, 
efficiency-seeking and resource-seeking FDIs were significant in one model. Firm 
size and incentives had influence on establishment mode choice, while contractu-
al risk, product relatedness and time of entry had influence on ownership mode 
choice. Furthermore, target country experience had influence on performance. In 
addition, competition and UK/other countries of origin of the investor were not 
significant in any of the models. The findings lead to a general inference that in 
order to present a more detailed picture of business activities in Ghana, there is a 
need for researchers to extend the eclectic paradigm and transaction cost theory 
with lessons from some other theories like institutional theory to capture the ex-
tent with which local environmental forces affect MNEs’ investment decisions 
(see Figure 3 for the supported hypotheses of this study). 
9.3 Theoretical and managerial implications 
The findings of this study provide theoretical and practical implications regarding 
the  entry  strategies  of  MNEs  to  Ghana,  particularly  the  relationship  among  the  
firms’ entry mode choices and performance implications. It contributes by focus-
ing on foreign firms investing in Ghana, where the market conditions are very 
different from those of the multinational’s home country. The integrated analyti-
cal model in this study, which draws on insights from the eclectic paradigm and 
the transaction cost theory, has proved to be useful by providing a framework on 
MNCs’ strategies in the context of Ghana. Research in FDI strategies and subsid-
iary performance has largely focused on advanced and emerging markets; howev-
er, this study contributes to the current body of knowledge surrounding the FDI 
behaviour of MNCs by combining the three dimensions of ownership-specific, 
location-specific, internalization specific and transaction cost theory in the con-
text of Ghana. 
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The theoretical contributions of this dissertation are also reflected by the fact that 
it  is  one  of  the  first  studies  to  use  OLI  paradigm and transaction  cost  theory  in  
addressing FDIs strategies and performance in a developing country. This study 
shows that  all  three  proposed  specific  factors  of  the  OLI  paradigm do  not  have  
equal level of importance for FDI made in a developing country like Ghana. Re-
garding the establishment mode decision, the empirical results of the study imply 
that in Ghana, the establishment mode decisions are purely efficiency-driven as 
theorized by transaction cost theory and eclectic paradigm and supported by nu-
merous past studies. These findings add to the existing literature and broaden the 
scope of the current literature from the developed and emerging economies to the 
developing country. 
In ownership decisions the result of the study demonstrated that ownership choice 
in Ghana is an intrinsic part of an MNEs establishment - the empirical results  
reveal that perceived high contractual risk leads to foreign firms choosing WOS. 
This suggests that firms under a high level of contractual risk of the host country 
are more likely to choose a high control ownership mode. In a developing country 
like Ghana, the overall predictive power of the eclectic paradigm and transaction 
cost theory in relation to the ownership choice is limited.  
Another  contribution  of  this  study  is  that  the  notion  of  product  relatedness  as  a  
factor influencing the likelihood of a firm’s WOS investment decisions is not as 
consistently positive as previous research has argued. Rather, the firm's invest-
ment decision in choosing a WOS form of ownership is sometimes dependent on 
the level of uncertainties it faces in the foreign market. Thus, a foreign market 
with weak institutions poses high uncertainty levels as is the case of Ghana where 
the institutional apparatus is not yet well developed as compared to Western de-
veloped economies. Therefore, as the findings of this study suggest, foreign sub-
sidiaries with product lines the same as the parent company prefer to choose JV 
mode of ownership contrary to the prediction of the theories.  
In relation to performance, the empirical results reveal some interesting findings 
and contribute to the current literature. One of the most intriguing results in this 
area is the lack of support for certain predictions by the eclectic paradigm and 
transactions cost theory. It was found in this study that proprietary assets have a 
negative effect on performance, which contradicts the prediction of both the ec-
lectic paradigm and transaction cost theory. One explanation is that technology 
transfer in developing country like Ghana may be very difficult because of the 
weak institutional systems to protect these assets. Another fascinating example is 
the international experience and target country experience. Both experiences have 
opposite effects on subsidiaries performance in the context of Ghana. While in-
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ternational experience has an opposite (negative) effect on the performance, the 
target country experience has a positive effect on performance. The findings in 
relation to international experience confirm the argument put forward by scholars 
(e.g. Verbeke et al. 2010) as firms gradually increase their scope of their interna-
tional activities, the ownership advantage becomes more specific to the firm but 
less specific to any location. Hence the international experience acquired by the 
MNEs in different regions cannot be easily transferred to a different environment. 
These findings contradict the predictions of both the eclectic paradigm and trans-
actions cost theory that accumulated experience leads to the success of the subsid-
iaries. The findings reveal that in developing country like Ghana, where the insti-
tutions systems are very weak and there are high uncertainties, country experience 
has more predictive power in relation to performance than the international expe-
rience.   
Furthermore, an exploration of the interactions terms and combined effect of en-
try strategies on subsidiaries performance brings a new and useful perspective to 
both the eclectic and transaction cost theories. The results reveal that international 
experience does not moderate the impact of country risk on subsidiary perfor-
mance in Ghana. This finding offers another addendum here, suggesting that the 
moderating influence of international experience does not really matter in the 
context of a developing country. The fact that their institutional structures are 
weak and uncertainties are high makes transfer of these firms’ level of advantages 
not applicable.  
Transaction cost theory claims that greenfield investments are riskier than acqui-
sitions. Thus, it propounds that acquisitions would perform better than greenfield 
investments. The findings of this study imply, however, that in the context of a 
developing country like Ghana, where the institutional structures are weak or not 
well-developed, greenfield and JV perform better than acquisition and WOS. This 
emphasizes the importance of institutional factors. Thus, extant theory should be 
reformulated in the case of developing countries to take cognizance of the role of 
weak institutions. Based on the findings of this study, in order to present detailed 
information about FDI strategies and performance implication in developing 
countries like Ghana, there is a need for researchers to extend the eclectic para-
digm and transaction cost theory by incorporating theories such as institutional 
theory in order to arrive at comprehensive FDI decisions. The incorporation of 
institutional theory into eclectic paradigm and transaction cost theory will broad-
en the scope of these two theories and would be more applicable in developing 
economies where high environmental uncertainty and weak institutional frame-
works prevail. The findings of this study are significant because they help further 
in assessing the applicability of the theories in a different environment. 
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Managers making an entry mode choice face a difficult and challenging decision. 
Previous research has repeatedly shown that companies do not make a conscious 
and deliberate cost and benefit analysis of entry modes (Anderson & Gatignon 
1986; Buckley, Devinneney & Louviere 2007) and, as a result, inappropriate en-
try modes are often selected. The findings of this study highlight the trade-offs 
that may be related to the efficiencies of operation modes at different levels, and 
types of uncertainties faced in different environments of which managers must be 
aware of. Thus, if managers consider it important to be able to cope with uncer-
tainties with the least possible transaction costs, a careful evaluation of different 
uncertainty types in the target country is recommended when making an entry 
mode decision.  Also, it is often difficult for managers to achieve optimal perfor-
mance given the complexity that characterizes the real world, and the bounded 
rationality that they possess. Thus, more satisfactory rather than an optimal solu-
tion seems to be the best that can be achieved. Nevertheless, assuming that global 
markets are reasonably competitive, in the long run, competitive force will elimi-
nate those firms that make FDI decisions inconsistent with value maximization. 
Hence, it is of critical importance that management decision-makers consider the 
relative weight of the ownership-specific, location-specific, internalization and 
transactions cost specific factors identified herein when making FDI choices in 
the context of Ghana and developing economies as a whole.  
Furthermore, this study will assist managers to have a better understanding of the 
importance of each variable in influencing motives, establishment mode, owner-
ship mode and its effect on the performance of foreign subsidiaries. Hence, man-
agers can prioritize the relevant variables in evaluating their entry mode alterna-
tives and their impact on performance in the context of developing economies. 
This is important because it allows managers who often have resource constraints 
to focus on the variables most relevant to their entry mode decision without going 
through an exhaustive entry mode analysis. Fourth, this study also helps managers 
to make financially sound entry mode choices and allows expansion of the entry 
mode analyses to gain a broader understanding of investment decision-making 
from a developing economy perspective in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
In addition, the findings of this study reveal that perceived market size and per-
ceived cultural distance were the two variables which have the biggest impact on 
the performance. Hence decision makers should critical look at these two varia-
bles  any  time  a  company  wants  to  enter  a  Sub-Saharan  African  or  developing  
country. Cultural distance is a critical factor impacting on performance and, thus, 
companies should understand its role in decisions regarding motive and estab-
lishment mode choice. They should implement strategies to reduce cultural dis-
tance. Such strategies should include training of personnel, hiring of capable staff, 
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and building relations and networks with local companies who know the im-
portant actors in the market. Furthermore, market size is critical for motives, es-
tablishment mode choice and significantly impacts performance. Thus companies 
planning FDI investment to any developing country should analyse the market 
thoroughly. They should analyse market size from both the destination market, as 
well as regional and global markets which they can reach from the investment 
location.   
The findings emphasize to managers that international experience has negative 
impact on performance while target country experience has positive impact. 
There is a need for managers to know that experience acquired in different con-
texts cannot be easily applied in the new market. Many MNEs rely on their past 
success in other countries and use this as a basis to enter a different country with-
out proper preparation, forgetting that the different countries with different insti-
tutional structures make it difficult for MNEs to transfer those experiences ac-
quired in different contexts to the new market to enable them to operate efficient-
ly. Hence there is a need for MNEs from the outset to recognize the limited trans-
ferability of some these ownership advantage when engaging in international stra-
tegic planning.  
Finally, the findings of this study will provide policy implications to Ghana and 
other  developing  countries  to  implement  the  necessary  policies  to  attract  in-
creased FDI inflows.  The findings of this study show that high country risk has 
negative impact on the subsidiaries’ performance and it will discourage MNEs to 
set up their subsidiaries in the country. Hence, there is need for policy makers in 
Ghana to design and implement policies which will reduce the investment risk in 
the country. This will boost the confidence of the MNEs to set up subsidiaries in 
the country. The findings of this study may also help the Ghana government to 
identify and prioritise these problems, so that they may move to solve them more 
efficiently. It is also hoped that these findings will assist other Africa govern-
ments as well in recognizing and identifying factors that might discourage MNEs 
from investing in their economies. 
In  a  globalizing  world,  where  MNCs can  enter  and  exit  with  relative  ease,  gov-
ernment policies are currently more important than in the past (Moran 1999). 
Hence policy makers in Ghana should develop policies that are both friendly to 
investors and that maximize the contribution of FDI to development. In order for 
the policy makers to attract FDI into the country, there is a need to upgrade na-
tional laws to meet international standards. A transparent and non-discriminatory 
regulatory environment, effective competition policies and an efficient judicial 
system, and low and stable tax rates are also important. Fiscal incentives may 
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increase the attractiveness of a country but cannot substitute for the lack of a 
healthy FDI environment. Promotion activities may also help attract FDI but only 
when the basic framework is in place, including equal treatment of foreign and 
local investors and fast dispute-settlement mechanisms. 
Policy makers in Ghana should also invest in the development of human capital. 
Currently low-cost, unskilled labour is becoming less important in attracting nec-
essary FDIs. There is a greater demand for qualified human capital with diverse 
modern skills that can cope with emerging technologies. Equally important is 
labour market flexibility including the use of needed expatriate personnel.  
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Figure 3.    Research model in the context of Ghana  
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9.4 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
Limitations 
The first limitation of this study is the small sample size (n=75). The limited sam-
ple size means that generalizing the results to wider populations is problematic. In 
addition, the sample was confined to foreign manufacturing FDIs in Ghana for the 
time period 1994–2008, which may also cause problems for generalization. Se-
cond, there are a great number of possible variables that could influence FDI be-
haviour; however, this study only considers a few of these variables in the light of 
data availability and ease of measurement procedures. It must be emphasized that 
it would be impossible to include all the variables in one study, even if we are 
able to identify them. Therefore, this limitation could be considered partly as a 
result of necessary decisions about the resources available for this research. Also, 
as the data was collected over a short period in time, we can neither draw conclu-
sions about causation from them, nor can we measure the change over time.    
Moreover, although the eclectic paradigm is widely accepted as an explanation 
for international production, few researchers have challenged the validity of the 
paradigm.  The criticism of the theory has come from Itaki (1991). Itaki claimed 
that an ownership-specific advantage actually comes from an internalization ad-
vantage. Therefore, it is redundant to consider these two separate determinants. 
He also points out that the ownership advantages cannot be separated from the 
location-specific advantages, and they are simultaneously determined. Further-
more, Dunning's theory has been described as ambiguous regarding the sources of 
location advantage. Fifth, transaction cost theory has been criticized for the fact 
that the influence of psychic distance and institutional backgrounds are absent in 
the discussion of entry mode decisions. This is mainly due to the difficulties in 
understanding that social and cultural factors are only a part of the so called trans-
action atmosphere and that interaction effects between socio-cultural and transac-
tion cost factors cannot be determined in this simplified model (Schaefer 2002). It 
has also been criticized for being unable to explain the evolution of entry modes 
(Lu 2002) because it just offers a static view of organizational activities character-
ized by the absence of adequate social bonds. In addition to these facts recent 
scholars have begun extending transaction theory by including cultural context 
and institutional context factors. 
Since performance was measured by using managers’ subjective assessment of 
total performance, it may not represent the actual performance of the firms due to 
the subjective nature of managerial responses. It is possible that managers may 
not wish to reveal information which they think it is very crucial for the company. 
Hence, they might end up providing answers to certain questions in the question-
naire which might not reflect the true position of the firm.  
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Furthermore, this study does not fully address the interrelationship between the 
establishment and ownership mode choices. The issue of whether establishment 
modes choices are sequential, simultaneous or decisions that constrain each other 
needs more attention. Furthermore, as a result of limited sample size and insuffi-
cient  number  of  respondents  per  industry,  this  study  is  unable  to  investigate  in  
depth the industry-level factors that might influence the decision making of 
MNEs with regard to the establishment and ownership modes choices.  
In addition, lack of information about the absolute and relative sizes of FDI prevented us 
from including competition-related information. Last  but  not  least,  since  this  study  
applies both the eclectic paradigm and transaction cost theory, the arguments for 
motives and operation mode choice are based on efficiency considerations and, 
thus, it is assumed that firms are motivated to make their motives, establishment 
and ownership mode decisions based on the efficiency criterion. However, firms 
may be driven to enter and operate in a specific target country by some other mo-
tives such as seeking new markets or developing new capabilities. This means 
that the choice criteria for motives, establishment and ownership choices may be 
different. Therefore, the applicability of the framework in the context of Ghana is 
limited based on the efficiency criterion. 
Suggestions for future research 
Although this dissertation makes a number of contributions, there are a number of 
issues that need to be addressed further. The study considers only the investment 
behaviour of foreign manufacturing firms in Ghana, which may have little in 
common with advanced economies in terms of market, resources, industrial and 
corporate structures and strategies. It is therefore recommended that the present 
study be extended to different industries in order to analyze the distinct invest-
ment characteristics of each industry. It would also be interesting to explore the 
investment behaviour of service firms and compare it to manufacturing firms. 
Since the focus of this study is Ghana, it would also be interesting to use the same 
method and examine the behaviour and motivations of foreign manufacturing 
firms in other African or emerging countries in the different regions and compare 
them with Ghana. This may provide an opportunity to understand issues about 
different country regulations, risks, and the role of the host government and, par-
ticularly, FDI behaviour in general. 
The analyses in this study were cross-sectional in nature. The study did not cap-
ture the longitudinal changes in the ownership levels and subsequent perfor-
mance. It is therefore recommended that future studies should be conducted longi-
tudinally in order to capture the impacts of changes in equity level on perfor-
mance. Future studies on establishment and ownership choice should explore in 
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what situation will the environmental uncertainty be a more important predictor 
of the MNEs establishment and ownership mode than the MNEs mode-specific 
experience or their predominant firm level know-hows, especially in the case of 
developing  economies  where  the  institutional  set  ups  are  not  well  developed  as  
compared to the developed economies.  
Another critical question remains to be addressed: how do firms determine the 
importance of each independent variable compared to the other variables in mak-
ing entry mode choice decisions? If one variable suggests greenfield modes, an-
other one acquisition or wholly owned modes, and a third one joint venture, how 
does a firm determine the weight to give each of the variable determinants? Fu-
ture research studies could go a long way in improving our understanding of entry 
mode decision-making by focusing on the trade-offs made by managers in evalu-
ating a difference in entry mode criteria. This study is restricted to the behaviour 
and performance of foreign firms from numerous countries in one host market, 
Ghana. Future studies should conduct more extensive tests using samples of for-
eign firms investing in multiple Sub-Saharan African countries.  
Moreover, subjective measures which are based on the perception of managers 
concerning affiliate performance could be combined with objective measures 
such as return on investment (ROI) and, possibly, market-based measures such as 
the wealth gain surrounding FDI announcements. Another opportunity may in-
clude following subsidiary performance over time and establishing the anteced-
ents of shifts in performance, such as the changed strategy of the affiliate or loca-
tion  variables  such  as  the  host  government  attitudes.  The  results  of  this  study  
show that the eclectic paradigm and transaction cost theory do not have the mag-
nitude to capture the true dynamics of FDI in developing economies where the 
institutions framework is weak, Thus, future studies could apply institutional the-
ory or incorporate institutional theory into eclectic paradigm and transaction cost 
theory to examine the variable used in this study in developing countries. Addi-
tionally, future research should analyse changes in ownership structures and its 
impact on subsidiary performance. Finally, most of the investments made by the 
MNEs firms were JVs than WOS; future studies should conduct more detailed 
comparison between minority-owned, equal share, and majority-owned JVs. Fu-
ture studies can also conduct more detailed analysis of the criteria MNEs use to 
select their partners in developing country such as Ghana, and how this affects 
performance.  
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APPENDIX 5:  VIF Test (Collinearity Diagnostics in the Dataset). 
 
  Dependent variable: ESTABLISHMENT MODE 
 
Dependent variable: OWNERSHIP MODE 
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) .591 .335    
Psize -.267 .080 -.334 .844 1.185 
Inter experience -.184 .164 -.534 .038 26.628 
Msize -.124 .062 -.220 .701 1.426 
Cultural distance .067 .033 .205 .874 1.145 
Country risk .085 .041 .205 .896 1.116 
Contractual risk .027 .041 .070 .730 1.370 
Proprietary Assets .180 .110 .185 .666 1.502 
product related .211 .115 .194 .763 1.311 
Target country exp .149 .161 .430 .039 25.605 
Incentives .285 .107 .274 .808 1.238 
Competition .013 .037 .035 .890 1.124 
Age:1990s/2000s -.203 .102 -.210 .771 1.297 
UK/Others .087 .119 .079 .740 1.352 
Ownership choice .208 .105 .213 .749 1.335 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients Collinearity Statistics 
   
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -.088 .410    
Psize .092 .104 .113 .722 1.384 
Inter experience .005 .198 .013 .037 27.185 
Msize .008 .077 .013 .658 1.521 
Cultural distance -.043 .040 -.127 .831 1.203 
Country risk -.018 .050 -.042 .837 1.195 
Contractual risk .112 .047 .287 .793 1.262 
Proprietary Assets .094 .134 .095 .643 1.555 
product related -.195 .139 -.176 .746 1.341 
Target country exp .041 .194 .117 .039 25.947 
Incentives .074 .135 .069 .726 1.377 
Competition -.021 .045 -.053 .891 1.122 
Age:1990s/2000s .155 .124 .157 .742 1.347 
UK/Others -.186 .140 -.165 .755 1.325 
Establishment mode .297 .149 .291 .547 1.829 
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Dependent variable: TOTAL PERFORMANCE 
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 1.730 .878    
Psize .148 .224 .081 .713 1.403 
Inter experience -.059 .424 -.074 .037 27.185 
Msize .427 .164 .330 .658 1.521 
Cultural distance -.130 .086 -.172 .815 1.226 
Country risk -.221 .107 -.232 .835 1.198 
Contractual risk -.002 .106 -.002 .725 1.379 
Proprietary Assets -.674 .289 -.300 .638 1.568 
product related .172 .302 .069 .722 1.385 
Target country exp .194 .416 .244 .039 25.966 
Incentives .765 .290 .319 .723 1.384 
Competition -.048 .096 -.055 .888 1.126 
Age:1990s/2000s .496 .269 .223 .723 1.383 
UK/Others -.686 .305 -.270 .733 1.364 
Establishment mode .607 .330 .264 .513 1.950 
Ownership choice -.637 .277 -.282 .703 1.423 
 Dependent variable: PROFITABILITY 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 2.568 .748    
Psize -.253 .191 -.155 .713 1.403 
Inter experience -.636 .362 -.903 .037 27.185 
Msize .341 .140 .296 .658 1.521 
Cultural distance -.156 .073 -.232 .815 1.226 
Country risk -.165 .092 -.194 .835 1.198 
Contractual risk .057 .091 .073 .725 1.379 
Proprietary Assets -.419 .246 -.210 .638 1.568 
product related .277 .258 .125 .722 1.385 
Target country exp .683 .355 .967 .039 25.966 
Incentives .263 .247 .124 .723 1.384 
Competition -.025 .082 -.032 .888 1.126 
Age:1990s/2000s .570 .229 .288 .723 1.383 
UK/Others -.213 .260 -.094 .733 1.364 
Establishment mode .570 .282 .279 .513 1.950 
Ownership choice -.670 .236 -.334 .703 1.423 
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APPENDIX 6: Some of the biggest manufacturing companies in Ghana  
 
COMPANIES PRODUCT HOME COUNTRY 
Nestle Ghana limited Food Product Switzerland 
Unilever Ghana limited Food, home care and personal 
care products 
UK 
Alcoa-Ghana Aluminum 
company td 
 
Aluminum  USA 
Guinness Ghana Brewery  Ireland 
Cadbury  Chocolate UK 
Ghacem Cement  Norway 
PZ Cussons Hair care, medicament, deter-
gent , baby care etc 
France 
Nexan Cable metal Cable metal Germany 
Johnson Wax Household cleaning products 
& personal care  
U.K 
Coco cola Drinks USA 
Barry Callebaut (Gh) Limited Food and chocolate drinks Switzerland 
Yara Ghana Mineral fertilizers and indus-
trial products. 
Norway 
Promasidor (Gh) Limited Food products South Africa 
West coast beverage company 
limited 
 
Manufacturing and bottling of 
alcoholic beverages 
 
South Africa/Switzerland 
 
GAFCO Wheat flour, bran,  semolina, 
etc  
Germany 
Blue Sky Products (Gh) lim-
ited 
processing of fresh exotic 
fruits 
UK 
Kgm industries limited 
 
Plastic products   
 
Hong Kong 
 
Indus-chimie mfg. limited 
 
Oil & emulsion paint 
 
France 
Precision chemicals limited 
 
Paints & basic chemical mate-
rials 
Canada/Hong Kong 
 
Cargill (Gh) Limited  Cocoa processing USA 
Trusty foods (Gh) limited 
 
Tomato paste and spaghetti Italy 
 
Permafix industries (Gh) ltd 
 
Tile adhesive ( Tile Cement) Spain 
Fan Milk companies Milk-based products Group of Scandinavian inves-
tors 
AkzoNobel (Sikkens Paints) Paints The Nethlands 
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APPENDIX 7:  Number of observations by industry 
 
Manufacturing  Number of observations 
Food products and beverages 26 
Textiles, leather  and footwear 1 
Wood, pulp and  paper product 3 
Rubber and plastic products 10 
Concrete  an cement products 4 
Manchinery, equipment and steel 9 
Chemical products 14 
Electrical and electronic products 8 
Total 75 
 
APPENDIX 8 
 
FOREIGN MANUFACTURING INVESTMENTS BY FOREIGN FIRMS IN 
GHANA 
PART 1: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
1) Country of origin of the investor(s) ______________________________________________ 
2) Name of the company_____________________ 3)Year of estment_____________________ 
4)  How did your company initially enter into the Ghanaian market?  a) Acquisition __ b) setup   
 investment/greenfield ___ 
5) What was your ownership share of the unit in Ghana at the beginning? a)___ 10-49% b)___ 
50% c)___ 51-65% d)___ 66-94%  e)___95-100% 
6) Total number of employees in the parent firm headquarters at the time of investment and in 
2009/2010?  
At the beginning:  a) 10-499 b) 500-999 c) 1000-3999  d) 4000-6999 e) 70000 and 
above 
In 2009/2010: a) 10-499 b) 500-999 c) 1000-3999  d) 4000-6999 e) 70000 and 
above 
7) What was the parent firm experience in international manufacturing operations at the time of 
the establishment? 
 a) ____ No unit b) ____ one unit c) ____ 2-4 units d) ____ 5-9 units e) ____ 10-19 units       
 f) ____ 20 or more units 
 
8) What is the unit’s line of business?  a) ____ industrial products b) ____ consumer products   
c) ____ both d) in more detail the line of business __________________________________ 
9) How similar was your company’s business/product similarity with the parent firm busi-
ness/products 
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a) ____ totally different b) ____ partially similar c) ____ totally similar    
 
10) Your company’s operations in Ghana before the establishment of the unit:  1) ____ no prior 
activity, 2) ____ sales office, 3) ____ licensing agreement, 4) ____ exporting, 5) ____ a 
wholly-owned manufacturing unit, 6) ____ a manufacturing joint venture, 7) ____ several 
manufacturing units.    
  
11) Your company’s manufacturing investments in other African countries before investing in 
Ghana.     a) ____ none b) ____ one c) ____ 2-4 d) ____ 5 or more  
 
If you had manufacturing investments in other African countries before investing in Ghana, where 
those units:   
12) a) all acquisitions ____ b) all greenfields ____ c) both types ____ 
13) a) all joint ventures ____ b) all wholly owned subsidiaries ____ c) both types ____     
 
 
 
 
 
14) Why did you choose to invest in this country? Please evaluate each of the motives presented 
below from 1 to 5. 
                                               Not at all Somewhat Very 
 important  important important 
a) Availability of low-cost input factors (e.g. raw material) 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Availability of cheap labour, 1 2 3 4 5 
c) To serve the country local market 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Access to a  regional (Ecowas) market 1 2 3 4 5 
e) To gain presence in new market 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Purchasing power of customers 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Prospects for market growth 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Economies of scale 1 2 3 4 5 
i) Better resource and capacity usage  1 2 3 4 5 
j) Learning purposes 1 2 3 4 5 
k) Other motive, which _________________________ 1 2 3 4       5 
l) Main motive _______________________________ 1 2 3 4 5 
 
15)  How does your company perceive the Ghanaian market at the time of investment and in 2010? 
(please circle the number)    
a) at the time of investment:  Culture:      Very different 1       2     3    4    5 Very similar 
b) in 2010: Culture:                               Very different    1       2      3       4       5    Very similar 
c) at the time of investment: Risk:                  Very high risk    1       2      3       4       5 Very low risk 
PART 2: KEY ISSUES RELATED TO THE GHANAIAN MARKET AND THE INVESTMENT 
 Acta Wasaensia      189 
 
  
d) in 2010: Risk:                                          Very high risk    1      2     3       4       5    Very low risk 
e) at the time of investment: Competition:   Very high          1      2     3       4       5    Very low 
f) in 2010: Competition:                          Very high          1       2      3       4       5    Very low 
g) at the  time of investment: market size  
    and growth potential                          Very small          1      2      3      4       5   Very large 
i) at the time of investment: cost of marking 
    and enforcing contract                      Very high          1 2 3      4       5    Very low 
j) in 2010 cost of marking and 
   enforcing contract                           Very high          1      2    3       4    5    Very low 
  
The following questions should be answered with respect to the investment in the country based 
on conditions at the time of market entry and now.  
16) At the time of your investment, were there any legal restrictions on foreign ownership in 
Ghana in main industry of the firm a) No ____ b) Yes ____ What? _________ 
___________________ 
 
17) At the time of your investment, were there any incentives (e.g. tax incentives) for                  
setup/greenfield investment?   a) No____ b) Yes ____ What? _________________________ 
  
18) If your investment was made in the form of a setup/greenfield investment, what was/were the 
main motive(s) for the choice?  a) no good potential acquisition target firm ____ b) acquisi-
tion negotiations complicated ____ c) acquisition would have been more expensive form 
____  
 d) other reason, what/which ______________________ 
   
19) What/which motive(s) affected your choice of 95-100% ownership in the unit?  a) company  
policy is to establish/make only wholly-owned foreign investments ____ b) no good joint 
venture partners were available ____ c) other reasons, what/which __________ 
____________________ 
 
If your company entered into Ghanaian market with joint venture or through acquisition, please 
answer the questions 20-22. 
 
20) Please state your opinion on each of the following criteria which your firm considered when 
selecting the Ghanaian partner/acquisition target. Please circle according to the importance 
of each criterion on the scale below where 1= ‘of no importance’, 5= ‘very significant’)  
 
                                                                               Of no importance                         very significant 
a) Technology strength of partner             1 2 3 4 5 
b) Financial resources of partner          1 2 3 4 5 
c) Partner's local market knowledge 1 2 3 4 5 
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d) Established marketing/distributing system 1 2 3 4 5 
e) International experience of partner   1 2 3 4 5 
f) Relatedness of partner's business 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Managerial strength of partner  1 2 3 4 5 
h) Reputation of partner           1 2 3 4 5 
 
21) What was the type of ownership of the IJV partner or acquired unit?  a) ____ family-owned 
b) ____ state-owned c)____ local plc d) ____ local unit of an MNC e) ____                                   
other f) what/which _________________________________ 
 
22) Relationship of your company with the IJV partner or acquisition target prior to the estab-
lishment of the unit: Target firm was a) ____ no prior relationship b) ____ customer c) ____ 
licensing partner d) ____ representative of your products e) ____ competitor f) ____                                
other, what? _____________________________________________________ 
 
23) What was/were the main motive(s) for the choice of acquisition form of investment?  a) 
setup investment would had taken too long time ____ b) greenfield investment would had 
been more expensive than an acquisition ____ c) gaining a market share ____ d) gaining a 
strong brand ____ e) to eliminate competitors ____ f) other reason, 
what/which_________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________  
 
PART 3: MANAGEMENT, CHANGES AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE 
UNIT 
24)  What was the status of the unit’s ownership arrangement in 2009/2010 (compared to the time 
of establishment)? 
 a1) ____ No change    
 b1) ____ Changes in ownership share. The new share of the unit: ____%  
 b2) Year(s) of Change(s) ____________ 
 c1) ____ Sold to a third party. c2) Year of sale: ________ 
 d1) ____ Closed down. d2) Year of closing:________ 
 e1) ____ Other changes: ____________________ e2) ____________________ 
 f) The reason for the change ____________________________________________________ 
 
What was the unit’s market position in the country? 
25) At the time it was established  a) ____ market leader b) ____ within 2-5 biggest firms c) ____ 
smaller 
26) In 2009/2010 a) ____ market leader b) ____ within 2-5 biggest firms c) ____ smaller 
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27) Unit’s turnover in 2009/2010 in Million USD:  a) ___ <10 b) ___ 10-49 c) ___ 50-99                   
d) ___ 100-499 e) ___ ?500 
     
28) Were the original decisions on establishment and ownership modes the right ones? If you 
would make the investment at this moment would the company use the same choice?   
 a) Establishment mode: yes no  if no, why? ____________________________ 
  b) Ownership mode: yes no if no, why? ____________________________ 
 
29) When there are disagreements/conflicts in the operations/strategic decision of the unit be-
tween your firms and local firm(s), your company’s actions applied: (with 1: never used; 2: 
relatively seldom used; 3: quite often used; 4: often used; 5: always used)  
  Never            Always 
a) Use written agreement to obtain compliance 1             2             3             4             5 
b) Remind partner of contractual obligations 1             2             3             4             5 
c) Refer to contract when disagreement occur 1             2             3             4             5 
d) Interpret written agreement to convince 1             2             3             4             5 
e) Get all concern and issues into the open 1             2             3             4             5 
f) Tell own ideas and ask partner to tell theirs 1             2             3             4             5 
g) Show logic and benefits of own position 1             2             3             4             5 
h) Enter direct discussion of problem 1             2             3             4             5 
i) Use “give and take” to achieve compromise 1             2             3             4             5 
k) Try to find an intermediate position 1             2             3             4             5 
m) Propose a middle ground 1             2             3             4             5 
n) Find a fair combination of gains and losses 1             2             3             4             5 
o) Use power to win a competitive situation 1             2             3             4             5 
q) Use expertise to make decision 1             2             3             4             5 
s) Use management authority to select proposal 1             2             3             4             5 
 
30) Please mark the measures that  your  company  uses  to  evaluate  the  performance  of  the  unit  
using the scale from 1 to 5 to the list below with 1: totally unimportant measure or no use it at 
all and 5: extremely important measure or always use it: 
 
Measures At formation stage of unit At present stage of unit 
 
 
Totally un-
important 
 Extremely 
important 
Totally 
unimportant 
 Extremely 
important 
a) Cash flow 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Growth in sales 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Level of sales 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Return on Investment 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Market share 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Degree of conflict with 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
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local partners 
g) Market position 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Quality & Quantity of 
product 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
i) Innovation & learning 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
j) Distribution 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
k) Reputation of unit 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
l) Customer satisfaction 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
m) Employee satisfaction 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
n) Labor productivity 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
o) Other (please specify) 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
          
31) At present, how satisfied are you with the performance of the unit in the country? Please rate 
each measure on a scale from 1 to 5 
 
                            Very unsatisfied                       Very satisfied 
a) Overall performance           1 2 3 4 5  
b) Level of sales: 1 2 3 4 5  
c) Sales growth: 1 2 3 4 5  
d) Profitability      1 2 3 4 5  
e) Market share    1 2 3 4 5  
f) Distribution     1 2 3 4 5  
 
32) Your name ________________________ 33) Your position in the company 
_________________ 
34)  Your telephone contact number ______________ 35) Your email _________ 
________________ 
36) Did you participate in the decision-making during the establishment of the unit? ____ Yes 
____ No 
37) Your relationship with the unit at the moment _____________________ 
_____________________  
38) Would like to have a summary of the study results? ____ Yes ____ No 
 
